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Abstract 
Responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, 
is one of the most legally, politically and ethically charged issues confronting states. 
Born out of a desire to find consensus between proponents of military intervention 
and opponents concerned with potential for abuse, the articulation of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty in 2001, appeared to provide a framework for resolving the 
dilemma between the defence of humanity and preservation of sovereignty. 
Employing Alex Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P by states invariably 
involves a choice about how they employ the principle which licenses two disparate 
functions, a policy agenda aimed at addressing risk factors or a normative call to 
action seeking to mitigate an imminent threat, this thesis seeks to develop an 
interpretive understanding of how R2P has influenced international engagement 
with mass atrocities. Employing a constructivist framework to examine two recent 
cases in Darfur and Libya, this thesis finds the question of human protection from 
mass atrocities under the umbrella of R2P is not just one of legality but to a larger 
extent, one of legitimacy. With R2P founded upon a dual commitment to prevention 
and reaction, this thesis concurs with Bellamy that invocation of R2P by states 
necessarily involves a preference for which elements of the principle are 
emphasised to rationalise their actions. However, it is the contention of this thesis 
that this preference and the international response it elicited in Darfur and Libya 
was far more fluid than suggested by Bellamy. Rather than occupy ends of a 
spectrum of choice, international engagement in Darfur and Libya inherently 
involved both prevention and reaction. 
 
I NT RO D U CT IO N  
The decision to intervene in a third party state to address human suffering is one of 
the most legally, politically and ethically complex issues confronting states. 
Drawing on the concept of responsible sovereignty,1 and born out of a desire to find 
consensus between proponents of military intervention and opponents concerned 
with potential for abuse, the articulation of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by 
the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) appeared to provide a framework for resolving the 
‘dilemma’ between the defence of humanity and sovereignty.2 The historical 
backdrop for the emergence of R2P was an inconclusive legal debate surrounding 
the use of force to address human suffering and the perceived failure of the 
international community in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. In response, 
members of ICISS were hopeful R2P would provide the ‘rationale and 
methodology’ for the United Nations (UN) Security Council to take both systematic 
and targeted action to address mass atrocities of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.3 More importantly, they hoped R2P would 
instigate a paradigmatic shift in the ‘basic mindset’ underpinning Security Council 
action, from a ‘culture of reaction’ based on the immediate need to “do something” 
towards a ‘culture of protection’ focused upon the longer-term prevention of 
atrocities.4  
This thesis employs the premise that it is the sum of all three elements of the ICISS 
principle of R2P—encompassing a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to 
react and a responsibility to rebuild—that demonstrates the significant breakthrough 
made by its architects.5 Most notable, R2P bridges the divide between legal and 
normative obligations associated with the use of force for human protection. From 
this perspective, the responsibility to react cannot be invoked in isolation; rather, it 
                                                 
1 FM Deng, S Kimaro, T Lyons, D Rothchild & IW Zartman, Sovereignty as responsibility: conflict 
management in Africa, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1996, p.8. 
2 E McClean, ‘The responsibility to protect: the role of international human rights law’, Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law, vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, p.125.  
3 L Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice’, Review 
of International Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, July 2008, p.447.  
4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) The responsibility to 
protect, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, December 2001, para 3.42. 
5 Ibid., pp.42-3. 
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represents a starting point within a continuum of international engagement, between 
peace enforcement which seeks to respond and peacebuilding as preventive action. 
Within this assessment, the aim of peacebuilding is to foster the ‘social, economic 
and political institutions and attitudes’ that prevent escalations in violence through 
activities that target root causes of conflict and build local capacity within a conflict 
resolution framework.6 With R2P firmly grounded in prevention, the ‘ultimate goal’ 
is for states to internalise the principle into conceptions of their nature, obligations 
to their populations and to others during conflict. 7  
At the time of writing, it is twelve years since the principle of R2P was articulated 
by ICISS and eight since it gained wider acceptance among states through 
endorsement at the 2005 World Summit. Since 2009, the Secretary-General has 
facilitated an interactive dialogue on the subject through annual reports on different 
aspects of the principle accompanied by a thematic debate in the General Assembly. 
Topics for each debate range from implementing the principle of R2P,8 the 
contribution of early warning and assessment to prevention,9 regional and sub-
regional arrangements,10 to practical aspects of a timely and decisive response. 11 
This interactive dialogue has played an important role in broadening the basis for 
consensus around R2P. It has also provided ‘valuable insights’ into individual 
elements of R2P,12 including clarifying and deepening collective understanding 
around the relationship between the two most contested elements:  prevention and 
reaction. Since 2009 the Secretary-General has concentrated on increasing the 
breadth and depth of understanding around prevention aspects of R2P. Driven 
largely by a desire to move the debate beyond a narrow focus on the reaction 
element of R2P, which may include the use of force, this has enhanced knowledge 
of the non-sequential and mutually-reinforcing nature of individual elements 
considerably. The problem with this approach, however, is that it fails to consider 
                                                 
6 MW Doyle & N Sambanis,  Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006, pp.22-3. 
7 E Luck, ‘The responsibility to protect: growing pains or early promise?’, Ethics and International 
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 4, Winter 2010, pp.349-365. 
8 A/63/677 (12 January 2009). 
9 A/64/864 (14 July 2010). 
10 A/65/877 (28 June 2011). 
11 A/66/874 (25 July 2012). 
12 Department of Public Information, Responsibility to protect faces urgent test “here and now” 
(5 September 2012) SG/SM/14490. 
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the more difficult question for R2P around the relationship between prevention and 
reaction; that is, the ‘utility’ of the principle in ‘spurring and shaping’ a timely and 
effective international response as well as encourage adoption of longer-term 
preventive measures.13 In this regard, Alex Bellamy’s analysis of the prevention and 
reaction elements of R2P is instructive.  
According to Bellamy, the problem is that while reference to R2P is both a 
welcome and positive development in international politics, invocation of the 
discursive frame of R2P by states invariably involves a choice about the way in 
which the principle is employed, which in turn licenses two disparate functions.14 In 
the first instance, invocation of R2P by states is based on a ‘political commitment’ 
to prevent human suffering utilising existing mechanisms and procedures. Based 
closely on the commitment of states at the 2005 World Summit, invocation of R2P 
in this manner is most accurately described as a policy agenda requiring 
implementation because of its focus upon the ‘upstream prevention’ of atrocities15. 
Upstream prevention involves taking action to address risk factors underlying large 
scale violence. In practice, it involves proactive international engagement within a 
state to address risk factors or sources of instability in order to prevent a crisis 
occurring in the first place, rather than only respond to a crisis once it occurs. While 
invocation of R2P in this manner is mostly associated with prevention, it can 
include measures typically associated with reaction, such as sanctions or the use of 
force. In the second instance, invocation of R2P by states is based on a normative 
call to action to mitigate an imminent threat of large scale violence. Emphasising 
the reaction element of R2P, labelling a crisis as a case for R2P concern serves as a 
‘red flag’ to quickly ‘elevate’ the crisis on the international agenda as beyond 
normal politics and provide a ‘catalyst’ to generate sufficient political will to 
mobilise a timely and decisive response.16 In this sense, invocation of R2P is based 
on a moral imperative to take immediate action to halt human suffering or avert 
large scale violence.  
                                                 
13 Luck, Responsibility to protect: growing pains, pp.349-365. 
14 AJ Bellamy, ‘The responsibility to protect—five years on’, Ethics and International Affairs, 
vol. 24, no. 2, 2010, p.158. 
15 Ibid., pp.158-60. 
16 Ibid., p.159.  
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In summary, Bellamy argues that R2P as it has been employed by states more 
accurately reflects a policy agenda to address risk factors rather than ‘a “red flag” to 
galvanise the world into action’. 17 Furthermore, drawing on theories of 
securitisation, Bellamy argues that while states can (and do) switch between the 
two,  they cannot ‘sustain a political commitment’ to prevention and its associated 
policy agenda to address risk factors while employing R2P as a ‘speech act’ to 
mobilise a decisive response to mitigate an imminent threat of atrocities.18  It 
necessarily follows that when states invoke the distinctive language of R2P they 
make a choice about the way in which they employ the principle to rationalise their 
actions. In turn, this choice affects collective understanding of the ‘role and impact’ 
of R2P upon international action.19  Put simply, how states invoke R2P to 
rationalise their actions licenses disparate functions that are incompatible.  
The issue highlighted here by Bellamy is not if the threat of atrocities is objective 
(real) or subjective (a perceived threat), but rather the way in which a crisis is 
socially constructed by states through discursive references to R2P. More 
specifically, how states may employ R2P to claim that there is an existential threat 
to civilian populations which requires emergency measures, and through this 
process of securitisation, convince others to support action outside the bounds of 
normatively permissible agency and action, including what may constitute rule-
breaking behaviour. 20 Drawing on this process of securitisation, Bellamy argues the 
use of ‘emergency language in non-emergency situations’ could ‘erode’ the 
capacity of R2P to galvanise an extraordinary response, if required.21 His 
conclusion regarding the incompatibility of the two functions of R2P is grounded in 
this tension.  
Intrigued by Bellamy’s assessment, the central question of this thesis is: does the 
invocation of R2P by the Permanent Five (P5) within the Security Council 
necessarily occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of choice for states, between a 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p.166. 
18 Ibid., p.160. 
19 Ibid. 
20 B Buzan, O Wæver & J de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis, Lynne Reinner, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1998, pp.23-4. 
21 Bellamy, Responsibility to protect—five years on, pp.159-160. 
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policy agenda requiring implementation and a normative call to action? 
Recognising R2P is founded upon both a commitment to prevention as well as 
taking timely and decisive action, this thesis concurs with Bellamy that invocation 
of R2P necessarily involves a preference in how the principle is employed, 
including which elements of R2P are emphasised by states to support their actions 
(or inaction). However, this thesis argues the preference among the P5 between a 
policy agenda and a normative call to action, and their perceived association to 
prevention and reaction respectively, is far more fluid than suggested by Bellamy. 
Rather than occupy opposite ends of a spectrum of choice, cases such as Darfur and 
Libya reflect a range of choices. Within this range, perceptions of R2P as a policy 
agenda versus a normative call to action are not fixed and are often subject to 
variations in emphasis.  As such, it is the contention of this thesis that invocation of 
R2P involves a rich and complex process of validation based on perceptions of 
legitimacy. Normatively, this means R2P may validate international thinking on 
preventing future crises, unite a divided community to take timely and decisive 
action or occupy somewhere in between. By implication, R2P may represent a 
policy position with an aspirational target for collective implementation or a 
discursive tool seeking to mobilise an operational deployment. Put simply, it is the 
fluid and at times contested nature of the relationship between prevention and 
reaction that ensures R2P remains a prominent feature on the international agenda.  
In formulating this response, this thesis examines how R2P has influenced Security 
Council decision-making towards addressing mass atrocities of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This examination pursues two 
lines of enquiry. The first is concerned with how the distinctive language of R2P 
has been employed by states to justify their actions (or inaction). The second line of 
enquiry examines to what extent members of the Security Council have engaged 
with the three elements of R2P (prevent, react and rebuild) in deliberations 
following a general commitment to the principle at the World Summit. To this end, 
the two examples of Darfur and Libya stand out as prime cases for examination. 
This is because while both elicited concern as cases for R2P they appear to have 
taken different trajectories in terms of engagement with prevention and reaction 
elements of the principle.  
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In the case of Darfur, Security Council deliberations since 2003 have been framed 
around the need to halt atrocities while emphasising a longer-term policy agenda 
aimed at preventing further atrocities by addressing structural issues underpinning 
the conflict. Despite a lengthy engagement with the crisis, the inaction of the 
Security Council to protect Darfurians and systematic under-resourcing of peace 
operations remain a feature of international engagement, despite this emphasis upon 
prevention.22 In contrast, the 2011 uprising in Libya against long-time leader 
Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi caught the Security Council by surprise. Subsequent 
invocation of R2P within Council deliberations seemingly moved the conflict up the 
international agenda quickly as a situation requiring the mobilisation of an 
immediate response to address exceptional circumstances.23  However, this 
emphasis upon reaction was quickly followed by regret and broader questioning 
about the preventive contribution of R2P when international action seemingly 
exceeded its authorised mandate. 
Methodology and structure 
Individually and collectively, these two case studies are of significant evidentiary 
value for charting the development of international thinking on R2P. Debates 
around the invocation of R2P provide a rich source of analysis polarised between 
opponents who see R2P as an aspirational target and argue its demise is near and 
those who regard the principle favourably and are more concerned with practical 
aspects of its implementation. Sceptics of R2P highlight inconsistency in 
application of the principle by the P5, difficulty in implementation and a perceived 
association with regime change, as cementing its demise.24 More persuasive 
however, are arguments in support of the increasing influence of R2P on 
international engagement. While R2P is certainly being tested in recent cases such 
as Syria and continues to contain a number of unresolved tensions, this thesis 
subscribes to the conclusion that the ongoing prominence of the principle across the 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p.165. 
23 T Dunne, ‘Libya and the state of intervention’, R2P Ideas in Brief, Asia Pacific Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, p.1. 
24 D Reiff, ‘R2P R.I.P’, The New York Times, 7 November 2011, The Opinion Pages, retrieved 
10 July 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 
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UN system twelve years after its emergence suggests claims of its demise are 
‘exaggerated’.25    
Recent developments in Libya and Syria demonstrate that international politics is a 
dynamic space often evolving in unpredictable ways. Within this landscape, shifting 
trajectories between the more ambitious prevention element of R2P and the 
functional or practical need to secure support for a timely and decisive response 
provides an opportunity to strengthen collective understanding. Furthermore, 
shifting trajectories raise the question of the continued relevance of existing 
theoretical perspectives to accommodate emerging events. In response, researchers 
either sharpen existing thinking or develop new perspectives. This thesis contributes 
to the former by engaging in a constructivist examination of the relationship 
between the Security Council, the principle of R2P and international engagement 
with mass atrocities. The rationale for adopting a constructivist theoretical frame is 
that it is crucial to any analysis of the use of force to recognise the politically and 
socially constituted environment within which state action takes place.26  
Adopting the assertion that scientific methodologies relying purely upon 
quantification and verification of hypotheses are inappropriate for a subject 
revolving around ethically driven political action, it is imperative the methodology 
employed recognises the dynamic and social nature of the international political 
space where the decision-making process resides. This is based on the proposition 
advanced by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominic Zaum, 
to which this thesis subscribes, that the ‘actual practice’ of the Security Council is 
far ‘richer, more complex, and more paradoxical’ than simply interpretation and 
application of the provisions of the UN Charter.27  In this regard the constructivist 
methodology employed in this thesis can be defined as an approach to international 
politics concerned with explaining how shared ideas, beliefs and values condition 
                                                 
25 T Dunne, ‘R2P, Libya and the myth of regime change’, The Interpreter (5 September 2012) 
retrieved 9 October 2012 <http:/ www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/09/05/R2P-Libya-and-the-
myth-of-regime-change>. 
26 C Reus-Smit ‘The politics of international law’ in C Reus-Smit (ed) The politics of international 
law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.14. 
27 V Lowe, A Roberts, J Welsh, & D Zaum, ’Introduction’ in V Lowe, A Roberts, J Welsh, & D 
Zaum, (eds) The United Nations Security Council and war, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, 
p.2. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 8 
the interests of states. Through a constructivist lens this thesis is also concerned 
with explaining the role of normative and ideational structures in influencing what 
is regarded as legitimate state action.28 Ideational structures include public 
deliberation, prevailing conceptions of legitimacy and the provisions of 
international law. 
Applied to the question of prevention versus reaction, the utility of this approach as 
argued persuasively by Christian Reus-Smit, is that it provides a broader theoretical 
framework for ‘thinking about the mutually constitutive relationship between 
international politics and law’.29  Moreover, because constructivism is necessarily 
concerned with understanding the intersubjective dimensions of reason and action 
within international politics, particularly the regulative and constitutive norms that 
underpin the functioning of international institutions and assign meaning to state 
action, it is well placed for understanding the politics of international law governing 
the use of force and human protection.  With interpretation being a key feature of 
constructivist epistemology, the value of adopting such a focus is that it opens up 
analysis of international institutions to consideration of what Kratchowil and 
Ruggie conceptualise as ‘communicative dynamics’; that is, the interplay between 
how states interpret behaviour of other states, the practice of rationalising and 
justifying their action (or inaction), and the responsiveness of other states to such 
reasoning.30  
Consistent with this concern for regulative and constitutive norms, this thesis is 
organised into two parts. Part one, comprising chapters one to three traces the 
conceptual foundations (legal, political and ethical) which inform international 
deliberations on human protection. To this end, chapter one examines the scope, 
nature and function of international law through the legal paradigm of jus ad bellum 
provided by the UN Charter and jus in bello provided by international humanitarian 
law (IHL). Embracing the notion of the “rule of law”, chapter one draws on Thomas 
                                                 
28 C Reus-Smit. ‘Constructivism’ in S Burchill, R Devetak, A Linklater, M Paterson, C Reus-Smit, 
& J True (eds) Theories of international relations, 2nd end, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p.221. 
29 Reus-Smit, Politics of international law, p.14. 
30 F Kratchowil, & JG Ruggie, ‘International organisation: a state of art on a art of the state’, 
International Organisation, vol. 40, no.4, Autumn 1986, pp.774;769. 
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Franck31 and Rosemary Higgins’32 examination of international law as a socially 
constituted process and Simon Chesterman’s persuasive analysis of the politics of 
the rule of law.33 This reveals that international law is most accurately described as 
a politically-constituted decision-making process that allocates meaning, rather than 
a body of rules supported by precedent to be applied impartially. It necessarily 
follows that the question of human protection is not just one of legality, but 
increasingly one of legitimacy. Consequently, it is the ‘synergy and synthesis’ 
between different conceptions of legitimacy that ultimately influences state action.34  
Continuing its concern for shifting conceptions of legitimacy, chapter two traces the 
intellectual journey of R2P, from its inception by ICISS to consideration at the 
World Summit and ongoing development. Of central importance is the role of 
discourse in advancing international understanding; specifically, the role the 
‘distinctive language of R2P’35 has played in establishing and codifying ‘normative 
precepts’ against which future state action may be rationalised as legitimate.36 
Drawing upon Ramesh Thakur and Gareth Evans’ numerous examinations of the 
development and acceptance of the principle by states, chapter two finds despite 
pessimism about a disparity between words and deeds, the normative advance of 
R2P has been remarkable. In what is arguably the greatest contrast with its 
predecessor humanitarian intervention, chapter two finds R2P is about more than 
just reacting to mass atrocities. Founded upon a dual commitment to prevention and 
reaction, R2P provides a comprehensive and constructive continuum of 
international engagement that seeks to not only protect populations, but also prevent 
further conflict by rebuilding communities. Within this framework, invocation of 
R2P means the Security Council also has a positive obligation to assist with 
developing political, economic and societal capacity so as to prevent further 
                                                 
31 See TM Franck, Recourse to force: state action against threats and armed attacks, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2002 and ‘Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian 
intervention’ in JL Holzgrefe & RO Keohane (eds) Humanitarian intervention: ethical, legal and 
political dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. 
32 See R Higgins, Problems and processes, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. 
33 See S Chesterman, ‘I’ll take Manhattan: the international rule of law and the United Nations 
Security Council’, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, vol. 1, no. 1, March 2009, pp.67-73. 
34 Franck, Interpretation and change, p.231. 
35 Reus-Smit, Politics of international law, p.9. 
36 NJ Wheeler, ‘The Kosovo bombing campaign’ in C Reus-Smit (ed) The politics of international 
law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.195. 
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suffering. With the legitimacy of peace operations and the Security Council itself 
increasingly linked to its role in both civilian protection and human development, 
post-conflict peacebuilding has become a key feature of international engagement 
with mass atrocities.  
While an increased focus upon peacebuilding is reflective of a more nuanced 
understanding of R2P, it has also been problematic. One of the many problems with 
this development and illustrative of the future challenges associated with the 
application of R2P, is that international efforts to promote liberal democratic 
governing systems and market-oriented economic growth in post-conflict states 
have generally proved disappointing.37 This is because where peacebuilding efforts 
have established security relatively effectively, the complexities of multi-
dimensional peace operations, mismatches between mandates and resourcing and 
tensions between international demands and local needs, have hindered economic, 
political and social development.38  
Seeking to better understand the contribution of peacebuilding to the preventive 
dimensions of R2P and practical challenges associated with contemporary UN 
operations, chapter three draws on the influential scholarship of Roland Paris,39 
Beatrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albert Schnabel40 together with Alex 
Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin.41 In the context of international action 
under the umbrella of R2P, chapter three finds that while consensus exists among 
scholars that a common factor underpinning mass atrocities is the nature and 
capacity of the state, what remains to be resolved is how to mediate the tension 
between international imperatives and local needs. Recognising this tension, the 
question for the Security Council when confronted with mass atrocities is not 
whether the international community needs to act—to rebuild communities torn 
                                                 
37 R Paris, ‘Saving liberal peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, 2010, 
p.337. 
38 C Goetze & Guzina, D. ‘Peacebuilding, statebuilding, nationbuilding: turtles all the way down?, 
Civil Wars, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, p.320. 
39 R Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, International Security, vol. 22, 
no. 2, Fall 1997 and Saving liberal peacebuilding, pp.337-75. 
40 B Pouligny, S Chesterman  & A Schnabel (eds) After mass crime: rebuilding states and 
communities, United Nations University, Tokyo, 2007. 
41 AJ Bellamy, P Williams & S Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
2004. 
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apart by conflict or what institutions and characteristics need to be reconstructed—
but rather how to do so in order to avoid recreating the conditions, tensions and 
unsustainable structures that contributed to an escalation in violence.42  
Having outlined the conceptual foundations of R2P that inform international 
deliberations on mass atrocities, part two engages in an empirical investigation of 
the role shifting conceptions of legitimacy play in constituting or constraining state 
action. Drawing on the legal, political and ethical foundations outlined in part one, 
chapter four establishes the value of a constructivist framework including 
implications for understanding the role and importance of legitimacy in 
international politics. Consistent with this approach, chapter four locates the 
communicative role of the Security Council in influencing state action. Seeking to 
address the ‘explanatory poverty’ of material calculations associated with military 
power or wealth and recognising the centrality of communication to the ascription 
of legitimacy, 43 this chapter finds it is the sociological orientation of 
constructivism, particularly its concern for identifying ‘social structures, influence 
routes and popular discourses’,44 which provides the impetus for the case studies 
that follow. Moreover, the value of a constructivist framework lies in its 
interdisciplinary heritage which brings to light the how, what and where questions 
of empirical research. While this investigative framework is not designed to confine 
the empirical investigation that follows to fixed lines of enquiry, it does provide a 
framework within which to conceive the case studies presented in chapters five and 
six on Darfur and Libya, respectively.  
Taking the two functions of R2P identified by Bellamy, the case studies presented 
in this thesis draw on situations where the principle of R2P featured in Security 
Council deliberations surrounding the capacity and willingness of a state to protect 
its citizens. Representing two of the thirteen post-2005 cases where references to 
                                                 
42 AJ Bellamy, ‘Libya and the responsibility to protect: the exception and the norm’, Ethics and 
International Affairs, vol. 25, no. 3, 2011, p.265. Emphasis in original. 
43 Reus-Smit. Constructivism, p.227. 
44 C Navari, ‘Introduction: methods and methodology in the English school’ in C Navari (ed) 
Theorising international society: English school methods, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009, p.3. 
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the distinctive language of R2P were made,45 the rationale for selecting these case 
studies is their perceived disparity in terms of the international response elicited by 
references to the principle and suitability for tracing social processes that led to 
invocation of R2P. Consistent with the qualitative methodology of process tracing, 
the cases of Darfur and Libya presented here offer a comprehensive, yet bounded, 
historical narrative of P5 interactions, including unfolding dynamics that led to 
various turning points in the international response to each crisis.46  
Despite praise for the role of Africa in advancing the principle of R2P and sustained 
efforts of the African Union (AU) to engage in capacity-building, the case of Darfur 
is often cited as a failure of R2P to exert any considerable influence in post-2005 
deliberations.47 While the most ‘significant development’, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Omar al-Bashir, could be credited 
with eliciting a decisive international response, it needs to be balanced against 
Security Council inaction to protect Darfurians and systematic under-resourcing of 
peace operations.48 In the case of Libya, the Security Council set a precedent when 
it passed resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) authorising a no-fly zone and the use of 
‘all necessary measures’, including the use of force, to address widespread and 
systematic attacks on civilians. Compared to Darfur, resolution 1973 was unique 
because of a ‘convergence’ between perceptions of legality and legitimacy, political 
will for action and operational capacity and speed. Libya was also unique in the 
clarity of the threat of mass atrocities, short time-frame and role of regional 
organisations in supporting intervention.49 Until Libya, prevention had dominated 
the debate around R2P.50  In contrast, invocation of R2P in the case of Libya framed 
the debate as a question of a timely and decisive action to protect vulnerable 
                                                 
45 At the time of writing there were thirteen cases post-2005 where the language of R2P was 
invoked: Darfur (2003-ongoing); Côte d’Ivoire (2004-ongoing); Kenya (2007-08); Georgia (2008); 
Myanmar (Cyclone Nargis 2008); Gaza (2009); Sri Lanka (2008-09); Libya (2011); Syria (ongoing); 
Mali (2012); Democratic Republic of Congo (ongoing); North Korea (ongoing); Myanmar (ethnic 
minorities). See Bellamy, Five years on, pp.149-50. 
46 D Druckman, Doing research: methods of inquiry for conflict analysis, Sage, London, 2005, 
pp.202-205. 
47 Ibid., p.165. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Bellamy, Libya and the responsibility to protect, p.266 
50 TG Weiss, ‘RtoP alive and well after Libya, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 25, no. 3, 2011, 
p.290. 
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populations. Unfortunately, while the passing of resolution 1973 should have been a 
‘vindication’ of the reaction element of R2P, it was followed by ‘buyers regret’ 
when intentional action seemingly exceeded its human protection mandate.51   
A necessary requirement for any assessment of the Security Council’s role in 
responding to human suffering is analysis of how members justify their actions. 
Sceptics of R2P argue there is nothing to suggest its emergence has altered the 
decision-making process by which the Security Council responds to mass atrocities, 
aside from ‘expanding the rhetoric employed’ by states seeking to rationalise their 
position.52 In contrast, the research presented here argues the distinctive language of 
R2P has significantly expanded the normative and ideational framework for 
international engagement with mass atrocities.53 Consistent with this finding, the 
case studies in this thesis are necessarily concerned with variations in the practice of 
the Security Council. Examined through a constructivist conception of 
communicative dynamics, it is the constant interplay between sources of 
international law and practice, or established rules and norms, values and ideas, 
which helps to ‘yield’ a multi-dimensional picture of the Security Council, 
including its role in advancing R2P through ‘successive adaptations’.54  
While a multitude of analyses exist that examine the legality of individual instances 
of the use of force, the foreign policy imperatives of members of the Security 
Council, and the practical challenges of contemporary peace operations, few have 
sought to qualitatively examine the debate surrounding prevention and reaction for 
evidence of a procedural shift consistent with the ICISS conception of R2P (to 
prevent, react and rebuild). Recognising this gap, the research presented here seeks 
to build on the interdisciplinary focus of scholarship outlined in part one, by 
‘interweaving’ the relevant legal, political and ethical perspectives.55 Through an 
interpretive approach this thesis also seeks to develop a more nuanced 
                                                 
51 R Paris, ‘R2P v. ICC?’, CIC, retrieved 4 September 2012 
<http://www.opencanada.org/features/r2p-v-icc>. 
52 A Hehir, ‘The responsibility to protect: “Sound and fury signifying nothing?”’, International 
Relations, vol. 24, no. 2, 2010, p.219. 
53 Reus, Smit, Politics of international law, p.12. 
54 Lowe et al United Nations Security Council and war, p.18. 
55 B Pouligny, B Doray & J Martin, Methodological and ethical problems in B Pouligny, S 
Chesterman  & A Schnabel (eds) After mass crime: rebuilding states and communities, United 
Nations University, Tokyo, 2007, p.19. 
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understanding of how R2P has influenced state action. On the one hand, evidence of 
increased references to prevention in Security Council deliberations suggests a shift 
is taking place. On the other hand, the implications of recent action in Libya on 
future responses will ensure the path to full operationalisation of R2P may not only 
be narrow and deep as forecasted by the Secretary-General, but possibly also ‘long 
and steep’.56 
 
                                                 
56 Luck, Responsibility to protect: growing pains, pp.359. 
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The UN Security Council and humanitarian intervention 
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) circumvented Security 
Council authority in 1999 to intervene in Kosovo in response to mass atrocities, 
questioning regarding the relationship between international law and politics came 
to a head. Central to this questioning were shifting notions of authority. While 
NATO action was seen as illegal as it had not secured proper legal authority 
through the Security Council, the intervention itself was seen as legitimate because 
there was a strong ‘moral or humanitarian justification’ to take such action.1 
Together with the perceived failures of the Security Council to protect populations 
from genocide in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo provided the backdrop for ICISS to propose a fundamental rethink of 
existing notions of authority through its articulation of R2P.2 To understand the 
contribution of R2P to notions of authority, the first part of this chapter reviews the 
legal foundations for Security Council action to address mass atrocities by 
examining the scope, nature and function of public international law.3 This chapter 
will then turn its attention to examining the increasing influence of human rights 
upon international law and the procedure of the Security Council in the lead up to 
articulation of R2P by ICISS. Drawing on the idea of a ‘rule of international law’ as 
conceived by Simon Chesterman,4 the final part of this chapter departs from 
traditional legal scholarship, which typically narrows the field of enquiry to the 
extent to which instruments of international law constrain state behaviour. In 
contrast, and operating within the tradition of social constructivism broadly defined, 
this chapter concludes by identifying the mutually-constitutive structures embedded 
in international law which influence and give meaning to state action. 
From this it is clear by 1999 international law had increasingly become the subject 
of a significant debate. Central to this debate was the confrontation between the 
politics of international human rights law (the pursuit of greater justice) and 
                                                 
1 ICISS, Responsibility to protect, p.vii. 
2 A Orford, International authority and the responsibility to protect, Cambridge University Press, 
2011, p.101. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as international law. 
4 Chesterman, I’ll take Manhattan, p.2. 
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conventional notions of statehood (based on inviolable or absolute sovereignty). 
Traditionally regarded as an instrument of social cohesion and order, international 
law as understood through the UN Charter legal paradigm for jus ad bellum was 
expanding its ambit to include societal demands based on values of justice. 
Recognising the increased willingness of the Security Council to use force for 
human protection juxtaposed with a perceived failure of the international legal 
system to prevent mass atrocities, part two of this chapter finds it is three 
generations of international human rights law (civil and political rights; economic, 
social and cultural rights; and collective rights) that introduced a ‘human-centric’ 
corrective to the interpretation of international law.5 Examining the legal 
foundations for Security Council action and R2P, it is the contention of this chapter 
that international law is more accurately described as a socially-constituted 
decision-making process that allocates meaning, rather than a body of rules 
supported by precedent, to be applied impartially. It necessarily follows that the 
question of authority to address mass atrocities is not just one of legality, but also 
equally one of legitimacy. Moreover, it is the ‘synergy and synthesis’ between 
different understandings of legality and legitimacy within international law that 
influenced the development of R2P. 6   
1.1 International law governing the use of force 
Traditionally regarded as an instrument for encouraging coexistence among states, 
international law has increasingly become the subject of a significant debate. At the 
heart of this debate lies the confrontation between the politics of international 
human rights law (IHRL) and IHL, based on the pursuit of greater international 
justice through the protection and promotion of human rights, and conventional 
notions of statehood based on inviolable or absolute sovereignty. Philosophically, 
this debate raises questions about the nature, function and application of 
international law. Should international law be regarded as an ordering principle of 
predominant weight within international politics? How do differing interpretations 
                                                 
5 P Kerr, The evolving dialectic between state-centric and human-centric security, Working paper 
2003/2, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 
2003, pp.11-2. 
6 Franck, Interpretation and change, p.231. 
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of international law influence what is understood as “international” in terms of 
rights and obligations? Moreover, is it still conceptually correct to talk about a state-
based legal system or are we moving more towards a global legal system? While 
these questions are in no way exhaustive of the range posed by scholars concerned 
with human protection, collectively they highlight key parameters of the debate 
underpinning the intellectual journey of R2P.  Seeking to develop a response to 
these questions and appreciate the legal and political consequences of international 
engagement with mass atrocities, particularly the more controversial use of force for 
human protection, it is first and foremost necessary to develop a more precise 
understanding of the scope, nature and function of international law. 
1.1.1 Scope, nature and function 
In its most general form, international law provides a body of principle-based rules 
primarily concerned with regulating relations between sovereign states. By virtue, 
states are not only the principal subjects of international law, but collectively 
through international organisations such as the UN, occupy a ‘pivotal role’ in the 
interpretation, implementation and if necessary enforcement of specific provisions.7 
While seemingly an accurate description of the purpose of international law, this 
generalisation is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it neglects to account 
for the full potential of international law in terms of its adaptive capacity. 
Specifically, the ‘elasticity’ of the international legal system to ‘make allowances 
for’ exceptional circumstances when interpreting particular provisions,8 or to 
account for the manner in which international law ‘lives’ through deliberation in 
organs such as the Security Council.9 Secondly, such a generalisation neglects to 
accommodate the politics of international law which can introduce complexity to 
deliberations of the Security Council; for instance, the mutually reinforcing yet 
sometimes competing nature of the relationship between statehood, as understood 
through the principle of sovereignty, and the pursuit of international justice, based 
on international human rights standards. Thirdly, such a generalisation neglects to 
                                                 
7 J Rehman, International human rights law: a practical approach, Pearson, London, 2003, p.14. 
8 TM Franck & MJ Glennon, Foreign relations and national security law: cases, materials and 
simulations, 2nd edn, West Group, St Paul, 1993, p.859. 
9 Reus-Smit, Politics of international law, p.41. 
C H A P T E R  O N E  
 ͳͺ
recognise that international law is also distinct in its position and operation. Unlike 
national legal systems, international law cannot rely on the competence of a single 
legislature for creation, an executive organ for enforcement and a judiciary to make 
determinations in the event of a dispute.10  Characterised by a myriad of ‘organs, 
specialised agencies, working groups and programs’ with disparate interests and 
priorities, the international legal system can appear to be ‘eclectic, unsystematic, 
overlapping’ and often ‘poorly coordinated’.11  While it is easy to be pessimistic 
about the complexities this distinction embodies for the operation of international 
law, its contribution should not be underestimated.  
As the ‘centrepiece’ of the international legal framework governing state action the 
UN Charter demonstrates the sui generis (unique) character of international law. 
The Charter represents a remarkable effort on the part of drafters to construct 
effective barriers to international aggression. It is distinctive in the 
comprehensiveness of its scope of duties: the maintenance of international peace 
and security and the promotion and preservation of public welfare through respect 
for human rights. Furthermore, because of its constitutional structure, the Charter 
represents an instrument of such predominant weight that the ‘will’ of members in a 
particular situation can be ‘derogated’ almost to a ‘subsidiary means of 
interpretation’.12  
While these characteristics require more rigorous examination, it is worth clarifying 
the sources of international law to understand its complexity, potential and 
contribution to international engagement with mass atrocities. Consistent with the 
approach adopted by authoritative sources of legal scholarship,13 the logical starting 
point are the primary sources of international law that constrain or enable Security 
Council action. Consensus among scholars engaged in jurisprudential, political or 
broader philosophical debates surrounding the use of force is somewhat rare. 
However, when it comes to identifying sources of international law, consensus 
                                                 
10 Rehman, International human rights law, p.13. 
11 A Boyle, & C Chinkin, The making of international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
pp.100-1. 
12 G Ress, ‘The interpretation of the charter’ in B Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: a 
commentary, 2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp.15-6. 
13 See Ian Brownlie, Thomas Franck, Louis Henkin and Rosemary Higgins. 
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exists that Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) is 
authoritative. It identifies the primary sources as  
(a) International conventions (including international treaties such as 
charters, covenants, protocols, pacts and declarations); 
(b) Customary international law (as evidenced by state practice and the 
general acceptance of such practice as law by states);  
(c) General principles of law;  
And as a subsidiary source 
(d) Judicial decisions and teachings of publicists (such as judicial 
decisions of the International Court of Justice, regional human rights 
courts or national courts). 
In order to understand the impact of these sources upon Security Council practice, a 
brief discussion of the nature and function of each follows. 
1.1.2 International conventions 
Turning to the first source, international conventions, the UN Charter is pivotal for 
being the principal multilateral treaty regulating relations among states and for 
determining more generally, the character and function of international law. The 
Charter is significant for the constraints it imposes on the use of force through the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. The Charter explicitly prohibits the 
threat or use of force by members  
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations (Article 2(4)).  
The Charter proscribes the principle of non-intervention on the basis that  
nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state (Article 2(7)).  
The next part of this article however, indicates the Charter also permits enforcement 
action to be taken under Chapter VII should it be required. Comprising the first of 
two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force proscribed by Article 2(4), the 
specific provisions of Articles 39-42 invest in the Security Council primary 
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authority to define when large scale human suffering constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security. It also confers legal authority upon the Security 
Council to make decisions that are in principle binding on all members of the UN. 
These may include measures excluding the use of force such as the imposition of 
sanctions or severance of diplomatic relations (Article 41). Or they may involve 
more robust measures, including military action on behalf of the UN by air, sea or 
land (Article 42). The second exception to the prohibition on the use of force is the 
inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defence (Article 51).  
Through these provisions the Charter is designed to be both stabilising and 
empowering. Stabilising in terms of placing severe limitations upon the purposes 
for which force could be used, and empowering in that the Security Council is not 
reliant upon the traditional notion of aggression between states to make a 
determination (Article 39) or to secure legal authority for the to use force 
(Article 42).14 Characterised collectively as the rules of international law governing 
the recourse to force, a consensus among legal scholars has emerged since the 
1990s that the framework of the UN Charter for jus ad bellum (just recourse to war) 
provides a legal paradigm within which questions regarding international 
engagement with conflict are to be considered.15 Functionally, the general principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention as proscribed in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) are 
significant as they are credited with providing the ‘cornerstone’ for peaceful 
coexistence among states.16  Within this paradigm, the significance of the Charter 
lies in the fact that since its entry into force in 1945, its text has not been 
significantly amended. What has fundamentally shifted is how specific provisions 
are interpreted and applied by states.  
Taking account of shifts in interpretation is not only important for establishing the 
manner in which international law grants personality to states and other actors 
within the international legal system, but also for charting the development of 
                                                 
14 J Stromseth, D Wippman & R Brooks, Can might make rights? building the rule of law after 
military interventions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp.22-3. 
15 AC Arend & RJ Beck, International law and the use of force: beyond the UN Charter paradigm, 
Routledge, London, 1993, p.4. 
16 MJ Glennon, Perogatives of power: interventionism after Kosovo, Palgrave, New York, 2001, 
p.147. 
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international law itself. In the context of R2P, the most prominent development in 
the post-Cold War period has been a shift in notions of statehood and authority, 
from a Westphalian conception of inviolable or absolute sovereignty towards the 
idea of ‘conditional’ or responsible sovereignty.17  While the concept of responsible 
sovereignty has secured widespread acceptance, a disparity between words and 
deeds continues to fuel criticism of the effectiveness of international law. Such 
criticism targets enforcement action by the Security Council for human protection 
as being unduly selective or limited in exercise of its authority. While this approach 
could be defended on the basis that it demonstrates the ‘constantly developing role’ 
of the organ in addressing mass atrocities,18 critics belonging to the realist tradition 
are more sceptical suggesting international law remains the domain of great power 
politics (see section 1.3.2). From this perspective, the execution of international law 
is more about securing the relative power and national interests of the P5 than it is 
about pursuing justice and peace.  
The other source of international law within this category that is of primary 
importance is IHL or the “laws of war”. Where the UN Charter governs jus ad 
bellum, IHL governs jus in bello (how wars are fought).19 As such, the protection 
provided by IHL is not from violence or armed conflict, but rather against ‘arbitrary 
power acquired through the course of a conflict’.20 Ratified or acceded to by 
virtually all states, the four Geneva Conventions (1949)21 and two Additional 
Protocols (1977)22 represent the main treaties or instruments of IHL. With its 
origins in the customary practices of armed forces, IHL was designed, for 
humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.23 In practice, IHL is 
                                                 
17 R Hinnebusch, ‘The Iraq war and international relations: implications for small states’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 19, no. 3, 2006, p.460. 
18 Lowe et al, Introduction, p.17. 
19 M Byers, War law: understanding international law and armed conflict, Grove, New York, 2005, 
p.115. 
20 F Kalshoven & L Zegveld, Constraints on the waging of war: an introduction to international 
humanitarian law, 3rd edn, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, 2001, p.51. 
21 The First Geneva Convention concerns the protection of the wounded and sick on land; Second 
Geneva Convention the protection of wounded and sick at sea; Third Geneva Convention the 
treatment of prisoners of war; and Fourth Geneva Convention the protection of civilians in war. 
22 Additional Protocol I covers protection of victims of international armed conflicts and Additional 
Protocol II protection of victims of non-international conflicts. These are supplemented by a third 
protocol concerning the adoption of an additional distinctive emblem which was adopted in 2005.  
23 Kalshoven & Zegveld, Constraints on the waging of war, p.12. 
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primarily concerned with balancing the competing interests of humanity with 
military necessity during both international conflicts (between states) and non-
international conflicts (armed conflict within a state). In terms of scope, IHL is 
restricted in application to armed conflict and therefore has no jurisdiction over 
internal tensions, civil wars or isolated acts of violence. IHL applies only once a 
conflict has begun, and then equally without discrimination to all parties to a conflict 
including governments and their armed forces, armed opposition groups and any 
other parties to a conflict. In addition to the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols, IHL draws on various other treaties covering the means and methods of 
armed conflict, including: the Genocide Convention (1948); Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflict (1954) and Protocol (1999); 
Biological Weapons Convention (1972); Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (1980); Chemical Weapons Convention (1993); the Ottawa Convention on 
the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Landmines (1997); Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (1998); and Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (2000).24   
Based on a series of principles concerned with civilian immunity, protected objects 
and property, protection of military personnel, proportionality of means and military 
necessity, IHL contains both common and specific provisions. Through these 
provisions, IHL is concerned with placing restrictions on armed conflict that: fails 
to discriminate between combatants and civilians; causes superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering; causes severe or long-term damage to the environment.25 
The most prominent common provision provided by IHL is Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. Article 3 outlines provisions 
that constitute a minimum standard of humane treatment to be applied without 
discrimination for all participants in armed conflict. To this end, common Article 3 
prohibits: violence to life and person including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; the taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity through 
humiliating and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences and carrying out 
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executions without previous judgement (Article 3, Convention I). Drafted for non-
international conflicts, Article 3 has achieved the status of customary international 
law and is therefore binding all states. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to consider the full range of specific provisions provided by IHL, Convention IV 
provides a number of relevant examples including: the protection of civilian 
hospitals from attack (Article 18); free passage of medical supplies (Article 23); and 
special protections for women (Article 27) and children (Article 77).  
With regard to application and function of IHL, it is important to note that “respect” 
and “protection” as they appear in IHL are complimentary. Both confer obligations 
upon parties to a conflict. Respect within IHL confers a ‘passive obligation’ to do 
no harm, to not expose victims of conflict to suffering or kill a protected person; 
whereas, protection signifies an ‘active obligation’ to ‘ward off dangers and prevent 
harm’.26  For states, IHL confers the obligation to: ensure populations (both armed 
forces and general public) are aware of the provisions of IHL; prevent violations; and 
punish violations, including enact laws to address the most serious violations of IHL 
which constitute war crimes under customary international law.27 This is because 
violations of IHL generally do not result from the ‘inadequacy’ of provisions, but 
usually from a lack of willingness of parties to respect them, the means to enforce 
provisions, uncertainty as to their application in a specific situation or ignorance of 
the rules codified in IHL.28  
1.1.3 Customary international law 
As international law is also derived from custom, a focus on the legality of 
international engagement with mass atrocities often translates into a desire among 
legal scholars towards establishing whether sufficient evidence exists within state 
practice to constitute the two necessary requirements for customary international 
law. The first being uniformity and consistency of state action with respect to 
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customary international law.29 The second requirement that must be satisfied 
supports the more ambitious proposition of opinio juris, where state action is 
regarded as lawful on the basis that failure to take such action would constitute an 
illegal act.30 In this sense, custom is significant as a source of law in that it 
represents a precedent with the capacity to fundamentally alter the manner in which 
states understand, interpret and apply specific provisions of international law. 
Identification of an emerging norm and its subsequent characterisation as customary 
international law is however, a complex exercise.  
Examining whether intervention for human protection represents an emerging 
custom, the Security Council’s evolution into law-making has been problematic. 
The Council’s narrow membership raises questions as to whether state practice 
alone can satisfy the category of a prevailing norm. Furthermore, procedural 
constraints contained in the UN Charter (Article 27), such as reliance upon a 
three-fifths majority vote, the right to veto a resolution among the P5 and the 
documented willingness of members to abstain to avoid use of the veto, ‘cast a 
shadow’ on the decision-making process.31  In response, on 3 May 2012 the Small 
Five (S5), comprising Costa Rica, Jordan Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, 
presented a draft resolution (A/66/L.42 Rev 1) to the General Assembly aimed at 
addressing such concerns. The draft resolution proposed constraints on the use of 
the veto by the P5 where mass atrocities are concerned to ‘enhance the 
accountability, transparency and effectiveness’ of the Security Council (paragraphs 
19-21). Despite support for imposing constraints on the veto from sources such as 
ICISS and the Secretary-General, lack of wider support forced the S5 to withdraw 
the resolution.  
Taking into consideration the restricted membership of the Security Council and 
established use of the veto by the P5, this would suggest consensus towards an issue 
in the Council is more accurately described as the absence of opposition rather than 
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a truly consensual agreement on how to respond.32 In this sense, consistent with the 
theoretical frame of social constructivism, it appears it is the constitutive and 
regulative norms embedded in the Security Council which influence, and sometimes 
constrain, the voting habits of members. While the development of customary 
international law can be problematic and the validity of the idea that state practice 
alone can amend international law is often challenged by legal scholars, the practice 
of the Security Council is nonetheless of significant evidentiary value for charting 
the development of international law. As highlighted by Thomas Franck, in its 
judgement on the Nicaragua case,33 the ICJ recognised the practice of international 
organisations (such as the UN) is evidentiary of the role of interpretation in 
influencing mutual understanding of more general principles. In this regard, where 
practice appears to have fundamentally diverged from established norms, so too has 
broader understanding among states of the provisions of international law.  
1.1.4 General principles  
Scholarship on the third category of international law, general principles, is divided 
on both the nature and stature of this category within the international legal system. 
Central to this division is the notion that having recourse to general principles of 
national law does not add anything new to international law, beyond that which can 
already be found in treaty and customary international law. Furthermore, if 
principles drawn from national legal systems are to be applicable in international 
law, they would need to be reflected in state practice or adopted by states through 
treaties that are binding. Regarded as soft law because they are not binding in the 
traditional sense, collectively the general principles described here represent a 
normatively significant set of standards and rules that function like international law 
because they guide the behaviour of states.34 Moreover, they can confer legal 
obligations on states through their erga ommes status (rights or obligations owed 
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toward all).35 By their very nature, they often serve to give further meaning to the 
organisations within which decisions regarding their application take place.  
Where legal scholars accept general principles represent an ‘independent source of 
international law’, Anthony Arend and Robert Beck offer ‘three plausible 
definitions’ of this source.36 In the first instance, Arend and Beck explain general 
principles refer to basic legal principles ‘present in most domestic legal systems’.37 
Because states have recognised these principles widely within their own legal 
systems, it is assumed that they will accept them as principles in the international 
legal system. Examples include legal concepts widely accepted in most national 
systems, such as consent, prescription, reciprocity, equality of states, estoppel and 
res judicata (final judgements on merit are conclusive).38 Further examples can be 
found in criminal law. These include the presumption of innocence and right to fair 
trial, which have made a notable contribution in IHRL.  
In the second instance, general principles refer to specific aspects of the nature of 
international law that states have come to accept. The obvious example is the notion 
of state sovereignty. According to Arend and Beck, in order  
for international law to be efficacious, states must accept the notion that 
states are sovereign, that they can be bound by law without their 
consent, and that they can be bound by law with their consent.39    
In this sense, because general principles relate to the nature of international law, 
they may be assumptions about the law-making process or notions that underpin the 
operation of the international legal system itself. 
In the third instance, general principles refer to ‘principles of higher law’,40 which 
are similar to principles of natural law in that they intended to address any gaps that 
exist between treaties and customary international law or provide a source of 
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inspiration where a determination is being made in specific case and there is an 
absence of existing clearly defined rules.41 An example often cited by authoritative 
legal scholars, such as Rosalyn Higgins,42 is the Corfu Channel case. In its 
judgement the ICJ held Albania responsible under international law for failure to 
notify and warn Britain of mine laying. The judgement was unique because rather 
than apply the provisions of IHL to peace time to determine the merits of the case, 
the ICJ drew on ‘general and well-recognised principles’, including ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ and ‘every state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’.43   
1.1.5 Judicial decisions  
While advisory opinions of the ICJ are not binding on states unless they are party to 
the case and the opinions of the Court, their evidentiary value for charting the 
development of international law is important. They are consultative in nature but 
are regarded as being ‘highly authoritative’ because of their wide influence and role 
as a ‘subsidiary means’ for determining or clarifying the rules of law.44 One of the 
most frequently cited examples is the Nicaragua Case where the ICJ rejected the 
use of force by the US as an ‘appropriate method to monitor or ensure’ respect for 
human rights.45 In doing so, the ICJ reaffirmed the intent and provisions of 
international law prohibiting the use of force, the exception of self-defence and 
reflected the common position of states opposed to a more permissive 
interpretation. Furthermore, the decision developed a general principle 
distinguishing the collective use of force for human protection from the broader 
humanitarian enterprise of aid provision or development assistance, provided 
without discrimination to all victims and consistent with ‘the purposes hallowed in 
the practice of the Red Cross’ (paragraphs 239-245). While the latter is associated 
with the altruistic intent and the impartiality of the UN, it is also the case that the 
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increasing influence of human rights on the interpretation of international law 
provides the rationale for international engagement with mass atrocities. 
Consistent with this assessment, the ICJ’s advisory opinion regarding the Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain) found the text of 
the UN Charter on human rights contains binding legal obligations (paragraph 33). 
To ignore such obligations would be ‘incompatible’ not only with the principles and 
purpose of the instruments of international law, but also with the purpose of the UN 
itself.46 This confirms that IHRL represents an explicitly defined human rights 
system, as well as unwritten but widely accepted general principles codified through 
treaty or custom, against which individuals and groups can expect certain behaviour 
from a state. In the context of international engagement with mass atrocities, the 
general principles contained in IHRL serve to highlight the important link between 
conceptions of legality and legitimacy. Most notable, is that different modes of 
authority may be based on different ideas of legitimacy.  
1.2 The humanitarian critique of sovereignty 
Anthony Arend and Robert Beck explain that the challenge in the late 1990s to the 
legal paradigm of order over justice ‘manifested’ itself in three different 
rationalisations for international action: to promote or support self-determination; to 
support ‘just reprisals’; and to ‘correct past injustices’.47 Underpinning this 
challenge is the belief that the use of force is at times warranted to challenge the 
status quo in the pursuit of international justice. While this proposition is not 
desirable, the Security Council adopted the position that it was better to ‘break the 
peace in the name of justice, than to live with the injustice’ of doing nothing.48 
From this it is clear that serious, large scale or systemic violations of human rights 
have not only ceased to be a matter of exclusive concern to the states that commit 
them, but under international law the Security Council has an obligation through the 
authority conferred on it by the UN Charter to ‘prevent, suppress and sanction’ such 
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violations.49 Based on a more permissive interpretation of international law, 
Security Council practice represents ‘unequivocal proof’ that a ‘significant 
evolution’ occurred during the 1990s in the interpretation and use of powers 
conferred under Chapter VII. Confronted with large scale human rights violations in 
Northern Iraq, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Haiti, and Rwanda, 
peacekeeping operations quickly transcended traditional operational parameters as 
they employed “all necessary means” to re-establish respect for human rights.  
Consistent with the idea of an international rule of law (examined in section 1.3), 
this expansion in international authority marked the beginning of the 
institutionalisation of the practice of collective armed intervention for human 
protection.50 In this regard, Francis M Deng and Roberta Cohen’s persuasive 
conceptualisation of sovereignty as responsibility is instructive for understanding 
the implications of this development. Deng and Cohen forecasted a fundamental 
shift within the ‘confrontation’ between human rights and the ‘parochialism’ of 
traditional sovereignty that would result in a move towards a more humanised form 
of sovereignty.51  At the same time, the need for human protection justified the 
expansion of international authority.52 It is clear from the measures adopted by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII during this period that the prevailing notion of 
authority had begun to move in this direction.  
The primary purpose of operations under Chapter VII, to enforce order and stability 
through coercive measures, continued to evolve through Security Council practice 
from a more traditional policing role to enforcement and the more controversial 
territorial administration and peacebuilding.53 Moreover, the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda (ICTR) indicated an increased 
willingness on the part of the Security Council to guide domestic stability within 
                                                 
49 Rehman, International human rights law, p.33; Vargas Carreño, Humanitarian intervention, pp. 
350-1. 
50 Ibid., pp. 359-60. 
51 Deng et al Sovereignty as responsibility, p.8. 
52 Orford, International authority, p.136. 
53 JA Frowein & N Krisch, ‘Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression’ in B Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: a commentary, 2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p707. 
C H A P T E R  O N E  
 ͵Ͳ
states. By implication, peace as it was interpreted through the scope of Chapter VII, 
fundamentally shifted from being the ‘absence of war between two or more states’ 
towards ‘peace in the internal sphere’.54 While sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity continued to remain vital elements of statehood, where these 
conflicted with the protection of human rights the increased willingness of the 
Security Council to take collective action under Chapter VII provided substantial 
and convincing evidence of the contribution of international human rights to 
shifting notions of statehood. It also provided substantial evidence of a fundamental 
shift in the collective understanding of international obligation and morality that 
underpinned prevailing perceptions of legitimacy.55 In the twenty-first century 
progress in this area was quite remarkable. Characterised as the humanitarian 
critique of sovereignty it is the ‘growing influence’ of human rights as defined in 
IHRL and  how they influence international understandings of legitimate action that 
mounted the greatest challenge to the legal paradigm of the UN Charter.56 
1.2.1 The influence of human rights on interpretation of the UN 
Charter  
Accompanying the adoption of a more permissive interpretation of international law 
was formal recognition of a new international legal subject. David Chandler 
explains the referent for this subject is similar to that of domestic law, the 
‘individual person’.57 In the twenty-first century the capacity of the Security 
Council as promoter and enforcer of international law has received a great deal of 
scholarly attention. In the context of human protection, most of this attention has 
been directed towards critiquing its capacity to deliver greater justice to this 
emerging legal subject. Central to this critique is the premise that the problem with 
a traditional state-centric approach is that it ignores the ‘security of people’.58  
Providing the impetus for this critique is three generations of IHRL concerned with 
civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and collective rights. 
                                                 
54 M Ruffert, ‘The administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the international community’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 3, July 2001, p.620. 
55 I Clark, Legitimacy in international society, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p.216. 
56 Ruffert, Administration of Kosovo and East Timor, p.620. 
57 D Chandler, ‘Back to the future? the limits of neo-wilsonian ideals of exporting democracy’, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, 2006, pp.487-8. 
58 Kerr, The evolving dialectic, pp.11-2. 
C H A P T E R  O N E  
 ͵ͳ
Drawn together under the concept of human security, and introduced by the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development Report 1994,59 this 
has introduced a ‘human-centric’ corrective to the international policy discourse to 
address the perceived failure of a state-centric approach to international order.60 
Located at the intersection of human protection, atrocity prevention and 
development, human security offers an insight into possible causes of intra-state 
violence, provides an ‘organising umbrella’ for state action and at the same time, 
introduces new variables into the determination of the legality and legitimacy of 
international responses.61     
This manifestation of a ‘value based hierarchy’ within international law tilted 
towards human protection supports the argument that the international legal system 
has shifted from being a system based on ‘bilateral law-making and state 
voluntarism’ towards one based on ‘multilateral law-making and community 
values’.62 Developments such as the successful negotiation of multilateral treaties 
that incorporate obligations on the part of states erga omnes (such as human rights 
or environmental) and ‘invocation’ of the language of the ‘will of the international 
community’ although criticised for its vagueness,63 illustrates that intent and 
normative ambition has become a feature of international law. While this human 
corrective to the conventional state-centric view of international order is an 
important development, some interesting questions have arisen regarding this idea 
of international justice. This includes how deep such concern actually runs within 
the Security Council. Regardless of such concern, widespread recognition of this 
human-centric corrective has translated into expectations of a moral minimum on 
the part of states, both towards their citizens as well as those of the broader 
international community. Consistent with this finding, Michael Walzer argues 
despite different histories most citizens ‘have moral expectations’ regarding not 
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only their ‘fellow’ citizens, but also of ‘strangers’.64 Within this framework, the use 
of force for human protection represents a legitimate form of warfare on the basis 
that while sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention may be central to 
international order, non-interference is no longer an ‘absolute moral rule’ once a 
state is incapable or unwilling to address extreme cases of ‘cruelty or human 
suffering’.65  
Theoretically, the emergence of a behavioural moral minimum provides evidence of 
the extent to which interpretations of sovereignty have fundamentally shifted from 
conventional notions of inviolable or absolute sovereignty towards a more liberal 
conception of ‘conditional’ sovereignty.66 Consistent with the concept of 
responsible sovereignty articulated by Deng and Cohen, the sovereign status and 
authority of states is contingent upon their capacity and willingness to guarantee 
individual human rights, rather than assumptions regarding ‘territorialist space, 
statist regulation and national identity’.67 Of interest here is the manner in which the 
two aspects of internal and external sovereignty become embroiled in a relationship 
of dependency. Consequently, a state’s ‘legal identity’ under international law, 
‘equality’ among other states and its political claim to be the legitimate authority for 
a particular population become contingent upon internal aspects of its sovereignty;68 
particularly, the social contract between citizens and the state that guarantee 
fundamental individual and collective human rights. 
The decision to use force to intervene in a third party state for human protection is 
one of the most legally, politically and ethically complex issues confronting states. 
However, the use of force and violent conflict dominated by large scale human 
rights violations are by no means new. Examined through the lens of just war 
theory, antecedents can be traced as far back as medieval Catholic natural law and 
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the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Vattel and Vitoria among others, and 
later in Edmund Burke’s reflections upon the French Revolution.69 Despite its 
medieval origins, just war theory has continued to influence the development of a 
moral and legal framework for the use of force and the conduct of hostilities. Many 
of the rules developed in early modifications have since been codified into 
international legal instruments which seek to mitigate the consequences of conflict, 
such as the Geneva Conventions (1949). Since its emergence there have been 
further modifications made to the medieval conception of just war, with its 
distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.70 However, the principles that 
underpin the framework guiding the use of force to address human suffering remain 
essentially the same.  
While the UN Charter continues to be the principal multilateral treaty governing 
relations among states, a preference for engaging in a politics of exceptionalism 
supported by a discourse of a humanitarian ‘imperative’,71 ‘impulse’,72 or 
‘impetus’73 to take collective action to address large scale human suffering signalled 
a fundamental shift in post-Cold War interpretations of international law. In this 
regard, resolution 814 (26 March 1993) which extended and expanded the existing 
UN operation in Somalia (UNSOM) (paragraphs 5-6) is instructive for locating a 
fundamental ‘turning point’ in Security Council practice. What was unique about 
resolution 814 and the accompanying UNSOM operation is that it presented the 
Security Council with a clear humanitarian imperative based on the nature and scale 
of the humanitarian crisis and lack of functioning sovereign authority. This enabled 
a more ‘flexible interpretation’ of the crisis as a threat to international peace and 
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security,74 which turn, provided weight to the notion that international law was 
developing an ethical foundation.75  
While the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ became synonymous throughout the 
1990s with introducing novel humanitarian justifications for the use of force, it 
must be noted that no such right exists in the UN Charter. Consequently, state 
practice was often perceived as steeped in ambiguity, deliberate or otherwise. In an 
attempt to resolve some of the ambiguities that surround the term, yet at the same 
time give adequate recognition to the legal and political context within which it 
operates, this thesis adopts JL Holzgrefe’s definition. According to Holzgrefe, 
humanitarian intervention is the  
threat of use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, 
without the permission of the state within whose territory force is 
applied.76  
In its broadest form, this definition is applicable to both the collective and unilateral 
use of force. However, as this thesis is primarily concerned with the actions of the 
P5, this definition is restricted in application to action taken by the Security Council 
to address the threat or commission of mass atrocities.  
1.3 The politics of an international rule of law 
Scholarship concerned with human protection is often dominated with references to 
an “international rule of law” or the “rule of international law”. With regard to the 
Security Council, this scholarship often emphasises the link between re-establishing 
respect for the rule of law, peaceful coexistence in international politics and the 
promotion of human rights. Essentially, what this discourse of rule of law is 
referring to is the contribution of international law to maintaining order among 
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states. As the concept of rule of law has become of central importance to 
international peace and security, most country-specific resolutions since 2003 have 
included references to the rule of law.77 However, it is not always clear what 
authority can be derived from the concept or the practical requirements for 
implementing the rule of law. Responding to the invasion of Iraq (2003) by a 
coalition of willing states without Security Council authorisation and premised on 
contested rhetoric of a humanitarian imperative, former Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan released a common definition of the rule of law and confirmed its centrality 
to the purpose and mission of the UN. He defined the rule of law as a 
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private...are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which 
are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires...measures to ensure adherence to the principles of the 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, 
fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation 
in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency.78 
To understand the true character of the rule of law and its contribution to 
international order, it must be acknowledged that the rule of law as articulated here 
is both normative and procedural. When applied to international engagement with 
mass atrocities, the rule of law influences, constrains and gives meaning to state 
action through its normative character. 
Looking at this discourse of a rule of law, Simon Chesterman identifies three 
conceptions of what the term necessarily means. Firstly, it can be understood as the 
application of the principles contained in the rule of law at the international level 
primarily to relations between states, but also to other subjects of international law. 
Typically, this definition is associated with the liberal ‘new world order thesis’ of 
the early 1990s which emphasised the contribution of international law to world 
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order through the idea of the ‘international rule of law’.79 To some extent, this 
definition continues to underpin legal scholarship as it is premised on a global 
architecture embodying liberal beliefs regarding order, security and justice: that 
disputes among states can be settled peacefully, aggression will be met with 
collective action, and ‘just treatment’ should be guaranteed for all peoples.80 The 
Security Council occupies a prominent position within this conception, because of 
its capacity for collective action to preserve international legal and ethical 
standards. The second conception offered by Chesterman is characterised as the 
‘rule of international law’.81  Functionally, it privileges the principles of 
international law over that of national law where the latter fails in its obligations to 
the former. Given the consistencies between R2P as articulated by ICISS and 
endorsed by states at the World Summit and the functions of this conception, this 
thesis subscribes to this definition of the rule of law. The third conception is that of 
a ‘global rule of law’. Here the rule of law refers to the ‘emergence of a normative 
regime’ that recognises and protects individuals without being subject to ‘formal 
mediation’ through parallel institutions of international and national law. 82  It is 
most often associated with cosmopolitanism and the ‘rise of governance regimes’ 
that reside outside traditional national and international legal structures.83 The 
proposition that the international legal system should be replaced with a global legal 
system based on a value hierarchy of justice, rather than peace, is consistent with 
this conception.  
At the international level, legal scholarship has concentrated on an identified gap 
between rhetoric and practice or aspiration and reality, rather than the discourse of 
the rule of law itself.84  Regardless of their conclusion, there seems to be ‘little 
dissent’ among scholars to the ‘idea’ or substance of the rule of law.85 This suggests 
that the debate surrounding the discourse of the rule of law is not one about the 
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idea, but rather the meaning that different social contexts allocate to notions of 
authority. Consistent with this assessment, this chapter is necessarily concerned 
with the extent to which members of the Security Council have internalised a rights-
based understanding of the rule of law as a ‘normative standard’.86  Applied to the 
broader membership of the UN, it appears that the idea of the rule of law is now 
firmly implanted. In the 2005 Summit Outcome states reaffirmed a commitment to  
an international order based on the rule of law and international law, 
which is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states 
(paragraph 134). 
While formal endorsement for the rule of law, including its relationship to human 
rights is a significant development, realist assessments of the influence and 
effectiveness of the idea (see section 1.3.2) are more pessimistic, asserting the 
‘expansive’ nature of the rule of international law as conceived by Chesterman, 
requires practice that goes well beyond what states are likely to implement at the 
national and international levels.87 This is not to say that inclusion of human rights 
language into legal discourse is a wasted exercise. Rather, what is required is a 
thicker, more substantive understanding of what the rule of international law 
necessarily entails, rather than the thin/formal one often associated with legal 
scholarship. 
To give full merit to the rule of international law to which this thesis subscribes 
would involve a particular understanding of international law on two levels. At the 
first level, this would involve greater recognition that the rule of international law is 
characterised by a very specific standard of justice, based on a ‘system of non-
instrumental rules’ with associated authoritative obligations governing the 
‘transactions’ of members.88 At the second level, it contains procedural content 
necessary for ‘identifying, enacting, altering, and applying’ these rules.89 To fully 
understand the relationship between normative and procedural elements of the rule 
of international law, a review of a constructivist interpretation follows. 
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1.3.1 A constructivist interpretation—international law as a socially-
constituted process 
The first point to be derived from a constructivist interpretation is that the 
international institutions and rules of the international legal system are not inert 
structures established by states, but in contrast are constitutive frameworks that 
influence states’ identity, role and by implication, their interests.90 While states 
continue to be the primary actors within the international legal system, the 
institutions of the system have somewhat acquired an identity of their own.91 The 
emergence of references to an ‘international community’ while problematic because 
of its vagueness, recognises sources of influence that guide state action beyond 
traditional concerns for survival and security. Within this community, the 
‘decentralised’ nature of the international legal system means that the emergence of 
new interpretations of international law are often the result of the ‘subtle and 
evolving interplay’ between binding and non-binding instruments of international 
law, consensus among states on more general principles and the normative and 
ideational frameworks within which deliberation takes place.92 Drawing on the 
debate among scholars regarding whether international law constitutes rules to be 
impartially applied, or conversely, is representative of a much deeper normative 
process, a review of the writings of Rosalyn Higgins is instructive.  
Higgins argues, convincingly, that international law is more than rules. Rather, 
international law constitutes a ‘process for resolving problems’.93 Considered within 
this framework, Security Council practice supports the central point of Higgins’ 
argument that the ‘specialised processes to which the word “law” refers include 
many things besides rules’.94 Christian Reus-Smit in his examination of The Politics 
of International Law arrives at a similar conclusion suggesting  
actors assume the existence of a set of socially sanctioned rules, but 
international law “lives” in the way in which they reason argumentatively 
about the form of these rules, what they prescribe or proscribe, what their 
jurisdictional reach is, what new rules should be enacted, and how these relate 
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to established rules, and about whether a certain action or inaction is covered 
by a given rule.95 
Looking at the contribution of shifting interpretations to the development of 
international law, it becomes apparent that rules removed of their social context 
simply become accumulated past decisions. Furthermore, if international law was 
simply rules devoid of context and meaning, then it would be unable to respond 
effectively to significantly changing circumstances. In practice, this means when 
decisions are made by authorised persons or organs...within the 
framework of established practices and norms, then what occurs is legal 
decision-making…International law is the entire decision-making 
process.96  
This is not to disregard the importance of rules to the idea of the rule of law. Rather, 
what is being advocated here is a more nuanced understanding that while rules 
continue to play a part in international law, they are not the only part. Political 
procedures also play a key role in amending or abrogating the provisions of 
international law.   
International law represents an ‘output of Security Council decisions’,97  where 
decisions advance the role of international law through prescription, interpretation, 
endorsement or enforcement. At the same time, international law represents an input 
to Security Council decisions, in terms of the institutions of international law 
influencing Security Council decision-making. It necessarily follows that those 
tasked with the process of making a legal choice could not stake claim to justice-
based or humanitarian considerations if they neglected to recognise the political and 
social contexts within which power is constrained or authority is granted. In 
practice, the granting of legal authority by the Security Council is dependent upon 
the decision for action being made by those authorised to do so, with ‘important 
guiding reliance on past decisions, and with available choices made on the basis of 
community interests and for the promotion of common values’.98 Failure to satisfy 
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these requirements for the granting of authority challenges not only the legitimacy 
of international law, but also the Security Council itself.  
Examining shifting interpretations of Security Council action within this framework 
demonstrates that the social context for international law-making is in essence a 
political context; one that requires sufficient political will, initiative, energy and 
skill, to both ‘set the process in motion’ for change and once this occurs, sustain it 
through to fruition.99 It also reveals that international law can shift in light of 
changing ideas in world politics or conversely make an important contribution to 
international politics by providing the ‘resources with which states interpret, justify 
and understand’ their behaviour and the behaviour of other states.100 This can be 
both enabling and constraining in the authority it conveys. As such, international 
law should be viewed as the interlocking of power and authority. In application, 
international law becomes a socially constituted decision-making process that 
grants meaning rather than simply a body of rules supported by precedent to be 
applied impartially.  
Rosalyn Higgins’ authoritative examination of the process of international law 
reveals that it remains somewhat of a ‘fantasy’ to suggest that legal authority for 
state action can exist in the ‘total absence of supporting control, or power’.101   The 
basis for this assessment is that the ‘authority’ which increases the normative 
influence of an international rule of law exists ‘not in a vacuum’, but precisely 
where the very idea of a rule of law ‘intersects’ with the power that has the capacity 
to implement it.102 This is not to say that the decision-making process of 
international law will always privilege the constitutive norm of legal authority over 
that of power. However, where the decision-making process fails to do so, where 
the power of dominant states is privileged over that of legal authority, such action 
will fail to meet the test for understanding what is lawful and legitimate.  
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What these examples demonstrate is that to understand Security Council action as 
the interlocking of power and authority is not to say that the function of 
international law is purely about securing authority for state action or that power is 
by definition hostile to the idea of the rule of international law. In contrast, as 
argued by Rosalyn Higgins, power is an ‘integral element’ of authority and should 
be recognised as such if we are to develop a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between international law, sovereignty and Security Council action for 
human protection.103  The foreseeable criticism however, is that while Security 
Council resolutions may demonstrate state practice is of significant evidentiary 
value, inconsistency in application remains a key feature. The result has been 
decisions that span the full spectrum from excessive interventionism, to collective 
indifference, or inaction.  This suggests while humanitarian concerns may indeed 
play a significant part in Council decision-making, their role in the relationship 
between power and authority is somewhat variable.  
Recognising these extremities of Security Council practice lends support to claims 
that collectively members show ‘no great enthusiasm’ for embracing the role of 
‘authoritative interpreter of the law’.104 Rather, practice demonstrates pragmatic 
attempts to agree upon practical steps to address specific crises rather than a 
fundamental shift in the international legal system. While Security Council 
resolutions reaffirm a willingness to define situations that constitute a threat to 
international peace and security more broadly, they also indicate a general 
reluctance to embrace broader morally-based doctrinal change. Instead, members 
remain committed to more pragmatic ‘case-by-case determinations’ of obligation.105 
While an ad hoc approach could be defended on the basis of the unique situation 
confronting the Security Council, inconsistency in the application of its declared 
concern for human protection fuels realist claims that the nature of the relationship 
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between power and authority ensures that international law continues to be a system 
of power politics,106 primarily serving the interests of the P5. 
1.3.2 A realist interpretation—international law as an ordering system 
As the preceding claim demonstrates, realism broadly defined is based on a number 
of assumptions about the importance of states as actors in international politics, the 
anarchic environment where states coexist in a decentralised international legal 
system, and the necessity of maximising their own power and security.107 By 
implication, the Security Council is seen as the domain of great power politics with 
the execution of international law dependent upon the relative power and national 
interest of states involved in a dispute.108 Where neither a ‘community of interest’ 
nor a ‘balance of power’ is attainable, then according to realists such as Hans J 
Morgenthau, there is ‘no international law’.109 While realism shares with 
constructivism a concern for understanding the relationship between power and 
authority, it is based on a systemic rather than constitutive interpretation. Power 
within this interpretation is based on four key assumptions: that it represents a 
‘tangible resource’ that states command individually; is best understood exclusively 
in terms of material resources; politics represents the struggle for power; and 
through power there is a dichotomy between international law and politics whereby 
the latter is subordinated to the former.110 
The capacity of the Security Council to take action consistent with a humanitarian 
intent is ‘severely constrained’ if it encounters political opposition from its most 
powerful members; unless it corresponds with members’ national interest who are 
also those states ‘most capable of orchestrating’ collective action.111 Consequently, 
realists refute constructivist assumptions regarding the power of norms in Council 
decision-making. Concluding instead that principles reflect the reality of power 
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interests in that they enable powerful states to ‘clothe parochial interests’ in 
collective morality while ensuring they are applied selectively in a manner to 
advance their interests.112  While realism regards law and politics as distinctly 
separate domains of international life, the idea of a rule of law cannot be 
‘uncoupled’ from international politics because it is not enforceable independent of 
the collective interest and will of powerful states.113 It is for this reason that realists 
argue that international law cannot be regarded as being binding in nature.  
Examining the scholarly contributions of the two most prominent realists in the 
post-Cold War period—Hans J Morgenthau’s political realism and Kenneth Waltz’s 
structural realism—reveals that although their theory of international politics is 
based on divergent intellectual perspectives, they share core assumptions in their 
critical assessment of the function and effectiveness of international law. Central to 
this assessment is the contention that the international community has not 
developed an ethical-legal consensus on how to address mass atrocities nor the 
institutional capacity to support such action.114 According to Menon, the source of 
this failure is not ‘lack of goodwill’ or ‘callousness’ on the part of individual states, 
but rather ‘persistence of an international order based on instrumental connectivity 
rather than the primacy of universal obligations’.115 By implication, states remain 
protective of their freedom to determine whether or not to take action and 
‘suspicious’ of ‘supranationalism and binding commitments’ such as liberal 
democratic principles which seek to implant a humanitarian impulse in international 
law.116 The realist critique regards such claims as ‘daring’ possibly even ‘ignorant’ 
because of the manner in which they seek to present an ‘abstract’ principle adopted 
by Western states  ‘to the rest of mankind not for imitation, but for mandatory 
acceptance’.117 Moreover, the pursuit of peace through the institutions of 
international law is destined to fail because of its ‘mistaken’ faith in the 
‘universalisation’ of Western liberal values.118  
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When suspicion of morality is combined with an overwhelming focus on the 
concept of national interest, realists display great respect for preserving sovereignty 
and the status quo because of its perceived stabilising contribution to international 
order. This is especially the case where the legality and legitimacy of international 
action is reliant upon moral precepts of humanitarianism. According to Waltz 
the humane rhetoric and obvious good intention...disguise what should 
worry us greatly. One cannot assume that the leaders of a nation 
superior in power will always define policies with wisdom, devise 
tactics with fine calculation, and apply force with forbearance... Since 
justice cannot be objectively defined, the temptation of the powerful 
nation is to claim that the solution it seeks to impose is a just one.119    
In direct opposition to constructivism, the realist thesis concludes that powerful 
states create and guide institutions to maintain their power or increase it. Rarely do 
institutions exert any significant influence on the interests or interactions of states. 
This is what Jack Donnelly refers to as the ‘no-effects thesis’.120  To support this 
claim, realists draw attention to the apparent double-standards or high degree of 
selectivity of Security Council practice. As noted by Adam Roberts, while the 
‘plight of Iraqi Kurds...vicious fighting and sieges in the former Yugoslavia, and the 
starvation in Somalia’ shocked the Security Council into action, ‘mass slaughter in 
Cambodia...ruthless dictatorship in Myanmar...or catastrophe in Sudan’ have not 
elicited a similar response.121 The problem with international law according to a 
realist assessment, is that while the Council may have primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, its role in upholding an 
international rule of law has been problematically ‘wished upon’ the organ by 
powerful members who wish to impose their will upon what they consider is a 
‘recalcitrant state’.122  
Consistent with the constructivist position advanced by Reus-Smit, there are three 
reasons why this realist view is both problematic and unconvincing. Firstly, it 
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neglects to adequately account for the adaptive capacity of international law, 
particularly the ‘existence of a growing body of law’ that is primarily concerned 
with societal demands around human rights.123 Secondly, it fails to account for how 
the institutions of international law have historically constrained the behaviour of 
powerful states and play a role in defining the interpretation of national interest. 
Finally, a realist view is problematic because it refuses to recognise the enabling 
capacity of international law. For instance, how weak states or other non-state 
actors have utilised international law to influence the outcomes of a diverse range of 
issues, from crimes against humanity to environmental concerns.124 Moreover, the 
realist claim that international law serves the ‘self-conceived interests’ of powerful 
states can be refuted on the basis that powerful states ‘do not invariably ignore’ 
international law when they choose to violate it.125 Rather, they do so with the 
knowledge that while they will incur political costs and that they will have to 
rationalise their actions legally. What this realist critique does serve however, is to 
provide a timely reminder of the legal and political consequences of inconsistency: 
diminished political will to enact specific provisions, when required. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Traditionally regarded as an instrument for encouraging coexistence among states, 
international law has increasingly been expected to serve a more complex and 
elaborate agenda. Within this agenda, international law as understood through the 
UN Charter legal paradigm for jus ad bellum and provisions of IHL for jus in bello, 
has increasingly expanded its ambit to include societal demands to promote justice 
in addition to peace. Driving this development has been the perceived failure of the 
international legal system to prevent mass atrocities. Theoretically, constructivist 
interpretations that conceive international law as a ‘site for negotiation of practical 
and purposive norms’ have proved more persuasive in explaining this development 
than realist assessments of international law as merely a rule-based framework for 
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coexistence.126 Examining the development of international law, it is clear that the 
increasing influence of human rights together with shifting notions of authority 
have emphasised the ethical foundation to international law. In light of these 
developments, this thesis concurs with Rosalyn Higgins that within the Security 
Council, the question of human protection must be viewed as the interlocking of 
power and authority.127 The utility of this approach is that unlike traditional legal 
interpretations concerned only with the text of authoritative sources of international 
law, it can accommodate non-traditional sources of influence, such as widely shared 
principles, values or norms. In highlighting the importance of reason and 
argumentation it also delivers an approach capable of explaining both the 
empowering and constraining characteristics of international law. In sum, viewing 
Security Council action in this way recognises that the process of international law 
is a socially constituted decision-making process that allocates meaning, rather than 
a body of rules supported by precedent to be applied impartially. Moreover, it is the 
mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures within international 
law that influence collective understandings of the legality and legitimacy of state 
action.     
Having established the parameters of legal scholarship on Security Council action 
and the development of international law, consideration should be given to the 
political consequences of the developments described here. Consistent with this 
aim, chapter two examines the challenge posed by the concept of responsible 
sovereignty to international politics. While legal scholarship has been concerned 
with examining Security Council action within the framework of obligation, 
authority and the value hierarchy that influences state action, International Relations 
scholars have directed their attention towards the conceptual, normative and 
operational challenges associated with implementing R2P.  
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R2P as a continuum of international engagement 
Set against the backdrop of an inconclusive legal debate surrounding the use of 
force ‘for human protection purposes’1 and perceived failure of the Security 
Council to respond effectively to crises in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia 
and Kosovo in the 1990s, the release of the Canadian-sponsored ICISS report The 
Responsibility to Protect (2001) appeared to provide a principled framework to 
resolve the ‘dilemma’ between the defence of sovereignty and the defence of 
humanity.2 As architects of the principle, ICISS were hopeful R2P would provide 
the ‘rationale and methodology’ for the Security Council to engage in both 
systematic and targeted action to protect populations from mass atrocities.3 They 
were also hopeful R2P would instigate a paradigmatic shift in the ‘basic mindset’ 
underpinning Security Council action from a culture of reaction, based on an 
immediate need to “do something”, towards a culture of prevention, aimed at 
addressing risk factors for mass atrocities.4 Representative of an unprecedented 
milestone in developing consensus among states towards R2P, in 2005 the General 
Assembly formally endorsed the principle at the UN World Summit. Often 
misunderstood as a licence for humanitarian intervention,5 the three elements of 
R2P, a responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild, demonstrate a breakthrough on 
the part of ICISS. This breakthrough is most notable in terms of the contribution 
that R2P makes to bridging the divide between legal and normative obligations 
associated with authorising the use of force for human protection.6  
Since its emergence, debates around invocation of R2P have provided a rich source 
of analysis polarised between opponents who see the principle as an aspirational 
target and argue its demise is near, and those who regard the principle favourably 
and are more concerned with practical aspects of its implementation. Sceptics of 
R2P highlight inconsistency in application of the principle by the P5, difficulty in 
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implementation and a perceived association with regime change, as cementing its 
demise. While R2P continues to contain a number of unresolved tensions and is 
being tested with the current crisis in Syria, this thesis subscribes to the conclusion 
that the ongoing prominence of the principle across the UN system twelve years 
after its emergence suggests claims of its demise are ‘exaggerated’.7  To support 
this assessment and understand the normative advance of R2P within international 
politics, this chapter traces the intellectual journey of R2P from inception by ICISS, 
wider acceptance by states at the World Summit to the most recent interactive 
dialogue in the General Assembly aimed at moving the principle from words to 
deeds. This approach has been adopted because it highlights  how the ‘distinctive 
language’ of R2P may influence state action,8 by establishing and codifying 
‘normative precepts’ against which future action (or inaction) to address mass 
atrocities may be rationalised or assessed.9 It is the contention of this chapter that 
while there remains a long way to go before consensus is reached across the UN on 
effective implementation, the normative advance of R2P has been nothing short of 
remarkable. This is because in a relatively short timeframe of just twelve years R2P 
has become an integral part of Security Council thinking, deliberations on, and 
responses to mass atrocities.  
2.1 The emergence of R2P  
In September 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit, former Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan characterised opposing parameters of the inconclusive legal debate 
surrounding the practice of humanitarian intervention as a ‘dilemma’ between the 
‘defence of sovereignty and the defence of humanity’.10  While he reaffirmed the 
‘vital’ importance of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention as 
proscribed in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter to international order, he 
posed the question ‘how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
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humanity?’11 In response, former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien 
announced the establishment of an independent international body designed to 
complement existing efforts of the UN to address mass atrocities.12 Officially 
launched on 14 September 2000 by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, ICISS 
embarked on an ambitious twelve month program of intensive research, worldwide 
consultations and deliberations with a mandate to  
reconcile the international community's responsibility to act in the face of 
massive violations of humanitarian norms while respecting the sovereign 
rights of states; and to foster a global political consensus on how to move 
towards more effective action within the UN system.13   
Co-chaired by former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (Australia) together with 
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), ICISS 
comprised ten high profile commissioners from diverse regional and professional 
backgrounds: Giséle Côté-Harper (Canada); Lee Hamilton (US); Michael Ignatieff 
(Canada); Vladimir Lukin (Russia); Klaus Naumann (Germany); Cyril Ramaphosa 
(South Africa); Fidel Ramos (Philippines); Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland); 
Eduardo Stein (Guatemala); and Ramesh Thakur (India). An advisory panel of 
prominent politicians and dignitaries served ICISS as a point of reference and to 
assist with generating support for the work of the Commission.14 Fifteen months 
later on 18 December 2001 the Commission presented its final report. 
 Articulation of R2P by ICISS reframed international thinking on mass atrocities. 
Ramesh Thakur argues that the growth of an ‘international human conscience’ and 
‘sense of international community’ that accompanied release of the report translated 
into what he and others (such as Amitai Etzioni) describe as a ‘new normative’ or 
‘global architecture’ of world order.15 Consistent with shifting notions of statehood 
outlined in chapter one, the ‘core tenet’ or principle upon which R2P is based is that 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Three governments provided financial support, Canada, UK and Switzerland, plus several 
international foundations: Carnegie Corporation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, John D and 
Catherine T MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Simons Foundation. ICISS, 
Mandate and organisation of the commission, retrieved 12 July 2010 <http://www.iciss.ca/mandate-
en.asp>. 
13 ICISS, Frequently asked questions, retrieved 12 July 2010 <http://www.iciss.ca/progress-en.asp>. 
14 ICISS, Mandate and organisation of the commission. 
15 Thakur, The United Nations, peace and security, p.244; A Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’, 
Orbis, vol. 50, no. 1, Winter 2006, p.82. 
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sovereignty necessarily entails responsibility rather than exclusive authority for 
decision-making within an identified territorial population;16 a form of ‘people’s 
sovereignty’ rather than absolute state sovereignty.17 Based on a ‘three-layered’ 
conceptualisation of sovereignty,18 responsibility for both ‘acts of commission’ as 
well as acts of ‘omission’ lies firstly with the host state; secondly, with a 
partnership between the host state and assistance from ‘representatives of the 
international community’;19 and thirdly, where these two former layers fail, with the 
UN. Unlike its predecessor humanitarian intervention, R2P is founded upon a 
‘positive and affirmative’ concept of sovereignty rather than a negative or 
restrictive legal interpretation.20 It is also based upon a natural law interpretation of 
human rights as inalienable rights to be defended in the name of common humanity, 
with sovereignty an ‘institutional value’ derived from a state’s capacity to guarantee 
the protection of its citizens.21  
While the UN Charter continues the ‘domestic jurisdiction-international concern 
dichotomy’,22 wider acceptance of R2P renders the contention that human rights 
within a state can be shielded from the reach of international law redundant. In 
practice, this means where a state fails to guarantee inalienable rights then the 
international community not only has a right to react, but moreover, through organs 
such as the Security Council has a moral obligation to do so. While the inclusion of 
a language of human rights into international legal scholarship signalled an 
emerging consensus towards recognising this relationship between sovereignty and 
human rights, states and scholars alike continued to contest the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention. Tasked with revisiting ‘the Pandora’s box’ of Security 
Council action in the 1990s and driven by a desire to achieve some form of 
                                                 
16RJ Hamilton, ‘The responsibility to protect: from document to doctrine—but what of 
implementation?’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 19, 2006, pp.289-90. 
17ICISS, ‘State sovereignty’ in Part I: Research essays, the responsibility to protect: supplementary 
volume, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, December 2001, p.11; WM 
Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law, American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 84, no. 4, October 1990, p.869. 
18 A Etzioni, ‘Sovereignty as responsibility’, Orbis, vol. 50, no. 1, 2006, p.83. 
19 Thakur, United Nations, Peace and Security, p. 251.  
20 KA Annan, Secretary-General defends, clarifies ‘responsibility to protect’ at berlin event on 
responsible sovereignty: international cooperation for a changed world (15 July 2008), 
SG/SM/11701. 
21 AJ Bellamy, Just wars: from Cicero to Iraq, Polity, Cambridge, 2006, p..202. 
22 Reisman, Sovereignty and human rights, p.869. 
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consensual breakthrough,23 ICISS adopted a fundamental shift in language from 
“humanitarian intervention” to a “responsibility to protect” so as to relocate the 
parameters of this debate. In doing so, members of ICISS sought to shift the ‘basic 
mindset’ underpinning international responses to human suffering from a ‘culture of 
reaction’ based on a state-centric crisis management approach, towards a ‘culture of 
prevention’ that adopts a victim-centred approach to conflict prevention.24 
2.1.1 Shifting the discourse from intervention to protection  
What is interesting about a discourse of humanitarian intervention is the 
contradiction that motivated the search for consensus. While members of the 
Security Council prior to the emergence of R2P had been unable to secure 
consensus towards how best to address mass atrocities, they demonstrated 
unanimous agreement towards what they did not want: ‘Rwanda never again’ in 
terms of hesitancy to take action;25 ‘no more Kosovo’ in terms of going outside the 
framework of Security Council authority;26 but also to avoid being bogged down in 
a perceived bottomless pit of post-conflict peacebuilding. Advocacy by ICISS to 
embrace a shift in language from humanitarian intervention towards a R2P can be 
located in a concern for developing an ‘effective, consensual response’ to extreme 
and exceptional, conscience-shocking events in a way that the language of a right to 
intervene would find difficult to achieve.27 In contrast to the concept of 
humanitarian intervention and its corresponding notion of an implied right to 
intervene, advocates of R2P argue the ‘core idea’ of the principle is ‘not about the 
“right” of big states to do anything’, but in contrast is based on the notion of ‘the 
responsibility of all states to protect their own people from mass atrocities and to 
help others to do so’.28 Similarly, where the language of humanitarian intervention 
                                                 
23 J Tanguy, ‘Redefining sovereignty and intervention’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 
1, 2003, p.141. 
24 ICISS Responsibility to protect, para 3.42. 
25 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), Meeting Summary, uniting to support the 
responsibility to protect: preserving the spirit of the 2005 agreement (25 September 2008), New 
York, p.2. 
26 Thakur, United Nations, peace and security, p. 284. 
27 ICISS, Responsibility to protect, paras 2.4-2.5; G Evans, ‘The responsibility to protect: an idea 
whose time has come...and gone?’, International Relations, vol. 22, no. 3, 2008, p.293; Thakur, 
United Nations, Peace and Security, p. 251. 
28 Evans, Responsibility to protect: an idea, p.285. Emphasis in original. 
C H A P T E R  T W O  
 52 
is often critiqued for being associated with moral imperialism or Western 
exceptionalism, the language of a R2P suggests international solidarity.29 In terms 
of legitimacy, adopting the language of protection rather than intervention is less 
confrontational and through its enabling preventive tone, more likely to secure 
consensus towards what is regarded as legitimate state action.  
From this it is clear, unlike the ‘atavistic terminology’ of humanitarian intervention 
R2P is primarily concerned with an enabling continuum of engagement based on a 
victim-centred approach of protection.30  Within this framework the element of 
responsibility on the part of states individually and collectively, is above all else a 
‘responsibility to prevent’ with the question of reaction only ‘arising’ should the full 
range of preventive measures fail.31  Should reaction become necessary however, 
the question is not whether to take action, but rather when, through whom and 
how.32 On this basis, this research finds that while development of R2P may have 
been initially driven by a desire to find international consensus on a ‘right’ to 
intervene,33 attention quickly shifted towards examining the relationship between 
individual elements of  R2P, within a broader peacebuilding mandate.  
Consequently, R2P as articulated by ICISS quickly became a continuum of 
international engagement where the responsibility to protect implies not just a 
responsibility on the part of states to react, but also to follow through and rebuild. 
While the relationship between R2P and peacebuilding is explored further in 
chapter three, it is the contention of this chapter that although a shift in language 
may be indicative of acceptance among ICISS architects of the consequential 
dimensions of R2P, there remains a ‘long way to go’ before the continuum of 
engagement that characterises R2P is ‘universally understood, internalised and 
properly and effectively applied’ by all states.34  
                                                 
29 A Wendt, Social theory of international politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 
p.305. 
30 AJ Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to protect or trojan horse? the crisis in Darfur and humanitarian 
intervention after Iraq’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 19, no.2, October 2005, p.35. 
31 Evans, Responsibility to Protect: An Idea, p.286. Emphasis in original. 
32 G Evans, ‘State sovereignty was a licence to kill’, SEF News (Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden), 
Spring 2008, retrieved 26 May 2008 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5449&1=1>. 
33 ICISS, Responsibility to protect,  p.vii. 
34 G Evans, ‘The responsibility to protect and the use of military force’, presentation to seminar on 
the International use of force, world legal forum, The Hague (11 December 2007) , available at: 
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2.1.2 A continuum of international engagement 
Central to R2P as articulated by ICISS are the three core ‘elements’ that constitute 
the full continuum of international engagement with mass atrocities: the 
responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to react; and the responsibility to 
rebuild.35 Taken individually the first element, the responsibility to prevent, 
requires initial action on the part of states to prevent atrocities from occurring in the 
first place. Moreover, it encompasses the provision of international support and 
assistance associated with increasing the capacity of individual states so as to avoid 
future humanitarian crisis. As such, it aims to address both the ‘root causes and 
more direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting 
populations at risk’.36 Addressing root causes may involve action targeting 
structural deficiencies in political, economic and societal institutions, such as 
democratic or economic reform, promotion of freedom of speech, strengthening the 
rule of law and promotion of civil society. At the same time, root cause prevention 
may also involve a more traditional security aspect in terms of activities associated 
with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). This may include 
education and training of local police forces, disarming and reintegrating ex-
combatants and promoting compliance with arms control agreements.37  
The second element of R2P, the responsibility to react, invariably obliges a state to 
respond to ‘situations of compelling need for human protection’ in a timely 
manner.38 Where preventive measures have failed to ‘resolve or contain the 
situation’ or the host state is ‘unable or unwilling to redress the situation’, then this 
responsibility transfers to the international community.39 Such action may include 
diplomacy, economic sanctions, international criminal prosecution or as a last 
resort, the use of force.40 Linked to a liberal notion of international order, it is this 
aspect of the ICISS principle of R2P that receives the most criticism from scholars 
and states alike in terms of rationalising the decision to use force. Central to such 
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36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, p.23. 
38 Ibid, para 4.1. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p.xi. 
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criticism are concerns regarding inconsistency in application by the P5, difficulty in 
implementation and the perceived association between reaction under the banner of 
R2P and forced regime change.41 Questioning the legality and legitimacy of 
international action, critics such as Noam Chomsky often focus upon this more 
controversial element of R2P to argue that the principle is at the very least, the 
‘cousin’ of humanitarian intervention,42 and at its worst, Western imperialism in 
disguise. While this research acknowledges R2P continues to contain a number of 
unresolved tensions, particularly around the reaction element of the principle, it 
finds such criticism unconvincing because it fails to recognise the full continuum of 
engagement embodied in R2P (to prevent, react and rebuild). Moreover, when 
examined in more detail (see section 2.3.2) this thesis finds such criticism is not 
persuasive because it neglects to account for the significant normative influence of 
R2P, evidenced by its increasing prominence across the UN system twelve years 
after its articulation by ICISS.  
The third element of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, draws attention to the 
peacebuilding dimension of the principle in that it obliges a state(s) to provide ‘full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation’.43 It also reinforces the 
first element of R2P, a responsibility to prevent, in that it requires states to again 
address root or direct causes of harm that intervention under the previous element (a 
responsibility to react) was ‘designed to halt or avert’.44  Alex Bellamy suggests that 
the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005 to coordinate 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts ‘goes some way towards formalising’ the third 
element of R2P.45 Its very existence reaffirms that states do have a collective 
responsibility to rebuild following intervention. Moreover, they have a positive 
obligation to assist with developing political, economic and societal capacity so as 
to avoid future violence. One of the many problems highlighted by Bellamy with 
this interpretation, is that the ICISS conception wrongly assumes a ‘general 
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consensus’ exists among states regarding the ‘most appropriate’ form of post-
conflict institutions and structures.46 This conception also wrongly assumes that 
interveners have the necessary material capability and political will to discharge 
such responsibility.  
Regardless of these concerns, collectively the three elements of R2P represent a 
multifaceted, comprehensive and systematic approach to the challenge of mass 
atrocities within a broader conflict prevention framework. Moreover, they provide a 
framework for constructive engagement within a continuum of international 
engagement that seeks to not only protect citizens, but also to prevent further 
conflict by rebuilding communities; or in the words of former ICISS Commissioner 
Michael Ignatieff, to ‘follow through’ and stay the necessary course.47 Since its 
inception R2P has undergone several conceptual shifts. The most significant shift is 
that post-conflict engagement constitutes an ‘integral part’ of international 
engagement with mass atrocities, rather than an ‘afterthought’.48 This characteristic 
is significant because it demonstrates consistency with a normative turn among 
theorists advocating the importance of an ‘end state’ as opposed to an ‘end date’,49 
when contemplating the use of force for human protection.  
Reaction to R2P among scholars has spanned the full spectrum from 
characterisation of the ICISS report as a watershed in the debate surrounding human 
protection, through claims of indifference, criticism for being too radical, yet 
another form of moral imperialism or a ‘conceptual straightjacket’ preventing those 
willing to take action.50 One of the key criticisms of the report is that it fails to 
define the ‘parameters of acceptable pre-crisis intervention’ in similar detail to the 
threshold criteria allocated to reactionary activities .51 The ‘vision of sovereignty’ 
upon which preventive responsibility is based is also criticised for wrongly 
assuming host states possess sufficient capacity ‘for shaping the life circumstances 
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of their inhabitants’.52 Furthermore, adopting the language of preventive 
responsibility does not necessarily guarantee that it will not serve a morally 
imperialistic purpose such as providing a ‘licence for economic and political 
engineering’ in states lacking the desired liberal democratic structures.53  
2.1.3 The normative influence of R2P 
While proponents of R2P acknowledge that central to the debate surrounding the 
principle is the continuing question of when it is legal and legitimate to use force, 
they are concerned with the preoccupation that exists towards isolating the second 
element (the responsibility to react) to rationalise or question the validity of the use 
of force for human protection; particularly the non-consensual use of force. This 
concern is based primarily on the assessment that allowing this second reactionary 
element to dominate consideration of a broader understanding of R2P neglects to 
adequately consider its relationship within a continuum of international 
engagement; that is, the two other elements of R2P which emphasise the importance 
of preventive measures. As recognised by proponents of R2P, it is perhaps 
somewhat inevitable that rationalising the use of force would dominate 
consideration of the principle for three reasons. Firstly, there is the exceptional and 
desperate nature of the humanitarian situation confronting the international 
community and its concomitant “do something” quickly or “do nothing” dichotomy. 
Secondly, because of the hard choices and moral dilemmas associated with the 
decision to use force, there is the practical challenge of multiple and often 
contradictory criteria that need to be reconciled before action can be deemed to be 
both legal and legitimate. Finally, in recognising the political nature of the organ 
within which such decisions are made and ‘in-depth’ questioning that has taken 
place regarding the Security Council,54  particularly the actions of the P5, it is not 
surprising the use of force dominated the debate on international engagement with 
mass atrocities.  
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This appears to be a valid concern in that it illustrates a failure on the part of the 
international community, in concentrating on reaction, to understand the preventive 
tone of R2P. This is based on a commitment to assist individual states in meeting 
their obligations under the principle and moreover, to ‘help states succeed not just 
to react, once they have failed to meet their prevention and protection obligations’.55 
Explained by proponents as the single most important dimension of R2P, the ICISS 
conception diverges from earlier arguments for humanitarian intervention in the 
association it implies between the role of the state and the responsibility to 
prevent.56  The basis for this approach can be found in the UN Charter, which 
provides the foundation for a ‘comprehensive and long-term approach to conflict 
prevention’ (Article 55). Recognition of the relationship between a preventive 
mandate and broader Council concern for protecting those vulnerable to mass 
atrocities acknowledges the interconnectedness and mutually reinforcing nature of 
peace and security, development and human rights as the pillars of the UN system. 
This is significant because it illustrates the contribution made by R2P to advancing 
complementary normative frameworks related to the Protection of Civilians (POC).  
The moral foundations for POC are similar to R2P. POC is founded on protecting 
individuals (to limit human suffering through respect for human rights); legal 
underpinnings (the requirement for states to ‘uphold’ existing legal obligations 
under international law); and measures for application (in that it identifies a specific 
role for the Security Council to ‘adopt measures to protect human beings from 
suffering’).57 In practice, advancements in R2P have assisted in advancing the POC 
agenda by bringing greater precision to earlier commitments made by members in 
Security Council resolutions. References to R2P at the 2005 World Summit 
provided greater precision to resolution 1265 (17 September 1999) which expressed 
a ‘willingness to respond’ to protect civilians in armed conflict (paragraph 10) and 
1296 (19 April 2000) which noted that deliberate civilian targeting may constitute a 
threat to international peace and security (paragraph 5). By incorporating a 
preparedness to take timely and decisive action where a host state fails to protect 
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their population, R2P has contributed to the advancement of complementary 
normative frameworks, such as a POC agenda. In this regard, the 2005 World 
Summit represented an unprecedented milestone in developing consensus among 
states towards R2P and significant source of assistance in advancing 
complementary normative frameworks underpinning IHL and a POC agenda. 
2.2 The 2005 World Summit as a consensual breakthrough 
Convened as a high level plenary meeting with the participation of Heads of State 
and Government at the commencement of the sixtieth session of the General 
Assembly (14-16 September 2005), the purpose of the World Summit was to 
‘undertake a comprehensive review of progress made in the fulfilment of all 
commitments contained in the Millennium Development Declaration’ 
(18 September 2000).58  The review focused on activities related to implementation 
at the national, regional and international levels of internationally agreed 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), as well as any related outcomes and 
commitments of major UN conferences and summits concerned with economic and 
social issues. Providing the context for this review was the Secretary-General’s 
report In Larger Freedom A/Res/59/2005 (21 March 2005), which sought to bring 
together the various reform proposals being advanced into a single coherent agenda, 
organised under four broad headings: freedom from want; freedom from fear; 
freedom to live in dignity; and strengthening the UN. Comprising sixty plus 
recommendations in total, the Secretary-General’s report provided an opportunity 
for a major overhaul of the UN system. The use of force featured in the second 
section of the report (freedom from fear) whereas R2P appeared in the third section 
(freedom to live in dignity). As suggested by Gareth Evans, separating principles 
for the use of force from R2P resulted in them ‘being seen as quite separate’ rather 
than ‘inherently linked’ as they are in the ICISS conception.59 In the case of R2P, 
the report urged a recommitment from states to ‘move towards embracing and 
acting on R2P where there are potential or actual victims of mass atrocities 
(paragraph 132). More specifically, the report recommended that states decide on 
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R2P as the ‘basis for collective action’ against genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity (Annex I, paragraph 7). 
While the World Summit proved to be a ‘major disappointment’ in terms of 
securing substantial commitment from states for major reform of the UN system,60 
it did make a remarkable contribution by providing a mandate for a broad range of 
institutional reforms and activities aimed at promoting human security and 
addressing and preventing mass atrocities. Most notable, through the Summit 
Outcome members of the General Assembly formally endorsed two primary 
responsibilities consistent with the principle of R2P (and Secretary-General’s 
recommendation) that necessarily entail two corresponding actions. In particular, 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) 
declared that:  
each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability (paragraph 138). 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to 
continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and 
its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
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and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out (paragraph 139). 
In the context of advancing R2P, paragraphs 138 and 139 represent a significant 
milestone in developing consensus among states towards the principle.  
Beyond securing wider support for R2P, the focus in paragraph 139 upon the four 
IHL crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, 
made a critical contribution to clarifying the scope of R2P and overall advancement 
of the principle. By focussing on these four crimes, rather than a defined threshold 
for international engagement such as the number of civilian deaths, Security 
Council action can be directed towards the risk of mass atrocities in a particular 
crisis. This is an encouraging development for the normative advancement and 
contribution of R2P and IHL, because it means the principle is applicable to both 
the threat and not just the commission of mass atrocities. Enabling earlier 
engagement in a crisis, R2P has the dual effect of maximising the deterrence value 
of appearance on the Security Council’s agenda and in doing so, provides a greater 
opportunity to prevent mass atrocities before they occur. 
Despite this overwhelmingly positive development, there are four notable 
differences between the ICISS conception of R2P and the Summit Outcome that 
deserve attention. Firstly, in the Summit Outcome the non-consensual use of force 
is linked exclusively to the Security Council in paragraph 139, rather than primarily 
as proposed by ICISS.61 Concerned with the question of right authority, the ICISS 
report explains that the Security Council has primary, but not exclusive or sole 
responsibility, for international peace and security under the Charter. The basis for 
this assertion can be found in Article 10 which grants general authority to the 
General Assembly for matters that fall within the scope of UN authority; Article 11 
which provides a ‘fallback responsibility’ for making recommendations on matters 
of international peace and security; and the Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) 
which establishes authority in the absence of Security Council consensus to make 
recommendations for collective measures.62 While ICISS agreed that the Security 
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Council should be the ‘first port of call’ for legitimising the use of force for human 
protection, the possibility that the General Assembly may take action is 
acknowledged.63  
The second and more controversial feature is the caveat on taking timely and 
decisive action contained in paragraph 139. Proscribing a case-by-case 
determination for international action, this caveat not only maintains the highly 
criticised ad hoc discretionary basis for international engagement with mass 
atrocities, but appears to be a deliberate attempt by states to water down the 
Security Council’s responsibility, including implied obligations under R2P. Thirdly, 
one of the main ways in which text of the Summit Outcome weakens earlier 
formulations of R2P, is that while the ICISS threshold for transferring responsibility 
to the international community is if a host state proves ‘unable or unwilling’, the 
Summit Outcome  requires a much higher threshold of ‘manifest failure’ (paragraph 
139). This gives host states a significant amount of scope to argue that the 
appropriate threshold for shifting responsibility for protection to the international 
realm has not been crossed. An examination of Security Council deliberations in 
2004 on the imposition of sanctions against Sudan for crimes in Darfur reveals the 
question of whether it could be ‘definitely concluded’ that the Government of 
Sudan (GOS) ‘failed’ to meet its responsibility was a key feature.64  
Finally, contrasted with the ICISS conception of R2P, the Summit Outcome 
represents somewhat of a ‘step back’ on the basis that a number of fundamental 
components were absent.65 Specifically, the Summit Outcome contains no reference 
to criteria for intervention. In contrast, the ICISS report establishes six criteria for 
the use of force for human protection.  The first is right authority (for legitimising 
the use of force). The second is just cause (large scale loss of life and ethnic 
cleansing) which if satisfied, provides the threshold for such action.66 The next four 
precautionary criteria, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable 
prospects, all add an ‘element of prudence or precaution’ to the decision to take 
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military action.67 The Summit Outcome is also silent on  any reform mechanism, 
such as a proposed ‘code of conduct’ which calls on the P5 to refrain from the use 
of the veto in cases identified as falling within the scope of R2P.68 Moreover, the 
most significant absence is any ‘explicit recognition’ of the continuum of 
engagement proposed by ICISS,69 which covers the full spectrum from prevention, 
through reaction to rebuilding.  
These omissions lend support to the assessment that in seeking a consensus through 
a shift in language from intervention to protection, states have abandoned some of 
the central tenets of R2P, as articulated by ICISS. Incorporation of R2P in the 
Summit Outcome, despite being symbolic of an emerging normative framework, 
seemed to do little to resolve the challenge of a future Rwanda or Kosovo as it 
weakened the notion of responsibility among states. While paragraphs 138 and 139 
recognised a R2P, they did not recognise a responsibility to act beyond the use of 
peaceful means. In contrast, the Summit Outcome reaffirms a preparedness to use 
other measures to protect populations from mass atrocities.70 The result is a 
significant dilution in the text of the Summit Outcome from an ‘obligation to act’ to 
a ‘commitment’ among states to be prepared. As noted by Bellamy, this provides 
scope for states to adopt a significantly lower standard than envisaged in the ICISS 
conception of R2P.71   
While formal endorsement of the principle of state responsibility in the Summit 
Outcome may fall short of the expectations of proponents, it was nonetheless a 
significant development and evidence of a breakthrough in international politics. As 
noted by Bellamy, it was significant in that it did provide a ‘mandate for a ‘wide 
range of institutional reforms and international activities’ aimed at not only 
protecting vulnerable populations from mass atrocities, but also preventing future 
atrocities.72 At the same time, evidence of contestation among states in the lead up 
to the Summit, such as that within the US and among members of the Non-Aligned 
                                                 
67 Ibid., para 4.15-4.43. 
68 Ibid., para 6.21. 
69 Bellamy, Global effort to end mass atrocities, p.92. 
70 Ibid., p.90. Emphasis in original 
71 AJ Bellamy, ‘Whither the responsibility to protect? humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World 
Summit’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, Summer 2006, p.146;167. 
72 Bellamy, Global effort to end mass atrocities, p.67. 
C H A P T E R  T W O  
 63 
Movement (NAM),73 and in the post-Summit period (discussed further in section 
2.3), indicates that securing wider acceptance for all three elements, or the full 
continuum of engagement associated with R2P, is an ongoing challenge. As argued 
by Gareth Evans, international understanding (or lack thereof) towards the 
consequential dimensions of a responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild, 
highlights not only the disparity that exists between the ICISS conception of R2P 
and that endorsed by states in the Summit Outcome, but also the challenges 
associated with turning in-principle support for R2P into effective practice. 
2.2.1 The challenge of making the shift from principle to practice 
Evans concedes that failure by the World Summit to incorporate guidelines on the 
use of force (as developed by ICISS) into the Summit Outcome represents a 
disappointment in terms of shifting R2P from principle to practice.74 Moreover, 
despite in-principle support for the normative architecture of R2P, the text of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 provide evidence of a lack of collective understanding that 
in applying R2P, the ‘extreme’ and exceptional nature of mass atrocities and failure 
of preventive efforts constitutes the ‘beginning’ of the debate surrounding the use of 
force for human protection, and ‘not the end of it’.75 Drawing on the situation in 
Darfur from 2003 as the clearest example of this failing, Evans cautions that the 
debate surrounding how best to respond to the crisis manifested early in the conflict 
into a polarisation between “doing something” or “doing nothing”. Consequently, 
participants within this debate fundamentally failed to acknowledge and consider 
the many important ‘way-stations’ that occur in between reaction and inaction.76 
These may include other measures that fall short of the use of force such as the 
‘application of sustained diplomatic, economic and legal pressure’.77 From this 
perspective, it seems that the absence of any reference to the remaining 
responsibilities to prevent and rebuild in the Summit Outcome represents a serious 
omission with grave consequences.  
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While scholars may be critical of the ICISS attempt to utilise a shift in language to 
encourage the development of a normative consensus, Nicholas Wheeler reminds us 
of the importance of taking into consideration the socially constructed world of 
international politics and the role of language in that process. According to 
Wheeler, ‘it is a categorical error to posit a separation between words and deeds’ as 
‘the former constitute the latter by establishing the boundaries of what is possible’, 
to both ‘enable and constrain action’.78 Consistent with this constructivist 
interpretation, proponents of R2P argue that the use of discursive signifiers 
consistent with R2P provides a ‘strong basis’ for developing a consensus to bridge 
the traditional divide between legal and normative issues associated with human 
protection. Drawing on the example of the manner in which the normative 
landscape surrounding sustainable development fundamentally shifted through the 
advocacy of the Brundtland Commission, Evans argues that in-principle support for 
R2P evidences the emergence of a powerful ‘new international norm’;79 one which 
demonstrates the potential to bridge traditional ideational divides. More recent 
developments which invoke the principle of state responsibility appear to support 
this assessment.  
To this end, Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act (2002) makes reference to 
members engaging in collective action to address ‘grave circumstances’, such as 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Similarly, resolutions 1674 
(28 April 2006) and 1894 (11 November 2009) regarding the protection of civilians 
in armed conflict reaffirms the principle of R2P, as endorsed in paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the Summit Outcome. Furthermore, Security Council resolutions 1706 
(31 August 2006) and 1769 (31 July 2007) on the situation in Sudan also contain 
explicit references to the responsibility of states for the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict. The problem is, despite these significant early developments in the 
intellectual journey of R2P the challenge remained: how to shift principle to 
practice, or rather, bridge the divide between legal and normative obligations 
associated with the use of force for human protection consistent with the ICISS 
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conception of R2P? With no apparent consensus on how best to shift international 
understanding towards formal acceptance of the full continuum of engagement 
associated mass atrocities, the difficulties of operationalising the full preventive 
tone of R2P were apparent.80  
In essence, there are three challenges that would need to be addressed if the culture 
of protection envisaged by ICISS was to be realised. The first is ‘conceptual’ in 
terms of developing a fuller understanding of the ‘scope and limits’ of R2P.81 This 
includes addressing fundamental misunderstandings which interpret R2P narrowly 
through the lens of humanitarian intervention, as a ‘Trojan horse for bad old 
imperial, colonial, and militarist habits’ to develop a greater awareness of the 
relationship between the parallel and mutually reinforcing responsibilities to react 
and rebuild in order to prevent future atrocities.82 The second challenge relates to 
ensuring sufficient ‘institutional’ capacity exists within international, regional and 
national institutions to support a R2P mandate in terms of operational resourcing.83 
The third challenge is ‘political’ in terms of generating sufficient will among states 
to develop the ‘mechanisms and strategies necessary to generate an effective 
political response as new R2P situations arise’.84 Collectively, these challenges 
highlight the problem central to successfully operationalising R2P: the need to 
consolidate political support by addressing misconceptions that plague the principle, 
and at the same time build institutional will and operational capacity to ensure that 
the Security Council can resolve what has been characterised as ‘one of the cardinal 
challenges of our time’.85  
2.3 The General Assembly and R2P 
Taken collectively the three challenges outlined above support criticism among 
scholars such as Roberta Cohen that conceptual understandings of R2P remain ‘far 
ahead of international willingness and capacity’ to enforce individual elements of 
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the principle.86 Likewise, Rebecca Hamilton highlights the challenge of developing 
sufficient political will to support a culture of protection utilising the example of 
Darfur. She argues that while the current situation may be illustrative of a 
government ‘unable or unwilling’ to protect its citizens, at the same time it is 
illustrative of an international community ‘unable or unwilling’ to take appropriate 
action to protect the citizens of Darfur.87 In seeking to identify an explanation for 
why this challenge prevails, Evans offers two plausible assessments. Firstly, 
resistance towards a culture of protection can be explained with reference to the 
more traditional challenge that it necessarily poses to conceptions of sovereignty. 
While the shift in language adopted by ICISS sought to resolve this dilemma, some 
states have continued to voice their resistance. Among others, Sudan has cited 
concern for the challenge posed to state sovereignty and selective implementation 
of the principle by P5 members as the basis for continued resistance towards R2P.88  
The second assessment is more unique, in that Evans claims it is not only opponents 
but also supporters that impede advancement of R2P.89 He claims that both 
proponents and opponents have fundamentally misunderstood the continuum of 
international engagement arising from invocation of R2P by failing to realise the 
‘multifaceted character’ or preventive tone of R2P.90 It is the contention of this 
chapter that the significance of adopting such an interpretation is that it places 
greater emphasis upon the notion that R2P implies not just a responsibility to react, 
but also a responsibility to prevent and rebuild.91 Moreover, shifting emphasis from 
establishing a right to intervene towards a R2P invariably directs greater attention 
towards the consequential dimensions of the doctrine, such as the ‘conceptual, 
normative and operational linkages’ that exist between ‘assistance, intervention and 
reconstruction’.92  
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In July 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon conceded that by virtue of its 
contested nature, the culture of protection upon which R2P is premised remained a 
conceptual ‘aspiration’ rather than an operational ‘reality’.93 This assessment 
confirmed not only the importance of addressing the conceptual, institutional and 
political challenges associated with internalising a culture of protection, but 
suggested doing so would be the only way to shift in-principle support into practice. 
Consistent with this assessment and broader advocacy among proponents of R2P, 
this chapter argues that in the post-World Summit period a resounding international 
consensus exists for the need to stop selling the principle and start working out a 
comprehensive strategy for practical implementation; that is, a strategy for 
operationalising the principle and its corresponding responsibilities within the UN 
system. In January 2009 the Secretary-General presented a report based on the work 
of the special adviser on the responsibility to protect, Edward C Luck. Entitled 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect A/63/677 (12 January 2009), the report 
articulated a three pillar strategy for operationalising R2P.   
2.3.1 A three pillar strategy 
Together, the January 2009 report of the Secretary-General on implementing R2P 
and the General Assembly debate that followed in July 2009 (see section 2.3.2) 
represent two pivotal moments in advancing international acceptance of the 
principle of R2P. According to Ramesh Thakur, the fact that the debate surrounding 
R2P in the post-World Summit period moved towards ‘practical questions of 
implementation’ represented a ‘maturing’ of the principle.94 In his report the 
Secretary-General outlined a conception of R2P that was ‘narrow but deep’.95 It was 
narrow in terms of its scope being restricted to the four mass atrocities of war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity reflected in the Summit 
Outcome. However, the strategy also needed to be deep in terms of encouraging a 
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response that utilises the ‘whole prevention and protection tool kit’ available to 
states, and moreover, be incorporated ‘as a perspective’ into existing efforts to 
address mass atrocities, rather than adding a ‘new layer of bureaucracy’.96 In terms 
of the potential implications of R2P, it was argued if member states can summon 
requisite political will to act collectively in accordance with paragraph 138 the 
effects of R2P could be ‘profound’ in terms of the deterrence value exerted by the 
principle for incitement of future atrocities. Furthermore, if UN rules, procedures 
and decision-making processes were developed in line with paragraphs 138 and 
139, then the potential for abuse or likelihood of R2P ‘being used to justify extra-
legal interventions’ would be significantly reduced.97  
Driven by a desire for consolidation of the principle and seeking to operationalise 
the commitment of states contained in the Summit Outcome, the January report of 
the Secretary-General outlined three equally important and non-sequential pillars 
upon which implementation of R2P rests:  
Pillar one: the protection responsibilities of the state...the enduring 
responsibility of the state to protect its populations, whether nationals or 
not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, and from their incitement... 
Pillar two: international assistance and capacity building...the 
commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting 
those obligations. It seeks to draw on the cooperation of member states, 
regional and subregional arrangements, civil society and the private 
sector, as well as on the institutional strengths and comparative 
advantages of the United Nations system.  
Pillar three: timely and decisive response...the responsibility of 
member states to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner 
when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection...A 
reasoned, calibrated and timely response could involve any of a broad 
range of tools...[including] pacific measures under Chapter VI of the 
Charter, coercive measures under Chapter VII and/or collaboration with 
regional and sub-regional arrangements under Chapter VII.98 
The report also made a number of crucial qualifications. Firstly, individually all 
pillars are equal in both importance and strength to ensure the ‘edifice’ of R2P does 
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not lean heavily in one direction or another, or worse still ‘implode or collapse’.99 
Secondly, each must be ‘ready to be utilised at any point’ and are therefore non-
sequential in application.100 One further clarification was made that is often 
overlooked in analysis of its content. Under the heading of ‘pillar two’ and 
consistent with the ICISS conception of R2P, the role of prevention as the single 
most important element of the principle was emphasised noting that ‘prevention, 
building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient’ to the success of R2P.101 To 
support this assessment the report stressed that insufficient investment and attention 
has been given to developing preventive capacities, which ‘absorb only a fraction of 
the costs of the vital post-conflict peace operations’ conducted by the UN.102 In July 
2009 the General Assembly met to consider this report. While the debate that 
ensued was initially sought by sceptics (such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and 
Venezuela) to roll-back the commitment made at the World Summit,103 the robust 
consensus and more nuanced understanding of R2P that emerged illustrates the 
importance of consolidating support among states.   
2.3.2 Consolidating support through interactive dialogue  
Since 2009, the Secretary-General has facilitated an interactive dialogue on R2P 
through annual reports on different aspects of the principle accompanied by a 
thematic debate in the General Assembly. These debates are designed to consolidate 
support for R2P. Topics for each debate range from: implementing the principle of 
R2P A/63/677 (12 January 2009); the contribution of early warning and assessment 
to prevention A/64/864 (14 July 2010); regional and sub-regional arrangements 
A/65/877 (28 June 2011); and practical aspects of a timely and decisive response 
A/66/874 (25 July 2012). This interactive dialogue has played an important role in 
broadening consensus around R2P. It has also provided ‘valuable insights’ into 
individual elements of R2P,104 including clarifying and deepening collective 
understanding around the relationship between the two most contested elements: 
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prevention and reaction. In this regard, it is worth examining two debates in 2009 
and 2012 in more detail for their contribution to these two elements of R2P. 
As argued persuasively by Thakur, the problem with commitments of a ‘grand 
nature’ made in international forums is that they can ‘suffer many a slip’ on the part 
of states by the time action is required. Characterised as a ‘form of buyer’s remorse’ 
this ‘edging back’ by states from the commitment articulated in paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the Summit Outcome, threatened the normative capacity of R2P to influence 
international engagement with mass atrocities.105 Indeed, it was a form of buyer’s 
remorse that motivated sceptics, such as General Assembly President, Father 
Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua), to seek a roll-back in state endorsement 
of R2P by calling a General Assembly debate in 2009. In a concept note circulated 
by the President prior to the debate, it was argued that R2P has no binding status in 
sources of international law as defined by Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.106 The 
note also made other controversial claims based on concern for protecting the 
sovereignty of states and claims that R2P provides nothing more than a ‘cover to 
legitimise armed interference by rich Western powers in the affairs of poor 
countries’.107 Furthermore, the note argued the failure of the Security Council to 
respond to previous mass atrocities stemmed more from self-interest and a 
corresponding lack of political will, than an ‘absence of agreed-upon doctrine’.108 In 
a deliberate attempt to garnish opposition, an interactive dialogue with members on 
operationalising R2P was convened by the President in the Trusteeship Council 
prior to the commencement of the first General Assembly debate on 23 July 2009. 
Three of the four invited expert speakers were sceptics of R2P: Noam Chomsky, 
Jean Bricmont and Ngugi wa Thiong’o. The fourth invited expert was former ICISS 
co-chair and proponent of R2P, Gareth Evans.109 Characterised as a deliberate 
attempt to ‘paint R2P as a largely Western preoccupation’ inevitably opposing 
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North against South, peace and security against development, the outcome of the 
debate that ensued, which was an overwhelming acknowledgement of the need to 
move towards implementation of R2P, suggests sceptics manifestly failed to roll-
back support for the principle.110   
Speaking at the interactive dialogue, Edward Luck summarised the debate as being 
part of an ongoing conversation which sought to ‘enhance the rule of law and 
expand multilateral options’ for international engagement with mass atrocities.111 
Furthermore, he was hopeful the debate would dispel myths including the 
perception among critics that R2P is simply the ‘cousin’ of humanitarian 
intervention;112 presents a new legal norm with the power to ‘alter the Charter basis 
for Security Council decisions’; that sovereignty and responsibility are ‘somehow 
incompatible’; and finally, that R2P ‘favours big states over smaller ones’.113 
Ninety-four states participated in the debate representing 180 member states plus 
two observer missions (Holy See and Palestine). An examination of statements 
reveals a clear majority, representing both north and south, reaffirmed their support 
for R2P as endorsed in the Summit Outcome and the Secretary-General’s three 
pillar strategy. However, positive sentiment was not unanimous. There were four 
dissenting states who sought to roll-back endorsement: Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan and 
Nicaragua.114 Whereas India, Japan, Brazil and South Africa who had expressed 
concern towards the idea that coercive action is warranted or necessary, were more 
supportive of the central element of R2P: the notion of responsible sovereignty. 
More importantly, Indonesia, who voiced opposition towards R2P at the debate not 
only expressed support for all three pillars, but presented what has been 
characterised as the ‘landmark speech’ of the meeting by focusing upon practical 
measures for implementing R2P at the regional level.115  
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Examining individual statements, two broad areas of agreement are identifiable. 
Firstly, there was consensus that the General Assembly dialogue should not 
renegotiate R2P as endorsed in the Summit Outcome, but rather move forward as 
advocated by the Secretary-General with a practical resolution of how to make the 
shift from principle to practice. A number of African states along with Myanmar 
emphasised that the ‘task before the Assembly’ was to consider implementation of 
what had already been agreed by heads of state.116 Secondly, there was widespread 
agreement on the importance of pillars one and two (the preventive dimensions of 
R2P)117 of the Secretary-General’s strategy. In contrast, pillar three (timely and 
decisive response) was the subject of ongoing contestation. Sudan along with 
Ecuador and Pakistan claimed a lack of consensus among states towards coercive 
action under pillar three precludes efforts to move forward with implementation. A 
number of states also expressed concern with the Security Council as arbitrator of 
pillar three.118 Again, Sudan argued investing ‘privilege’ for execution of R2P 
would be tantamount to ‘given (sic) the wolf the responsibility to adopt a lam 
(sic)’.119 Despite this contention, there was agreement among states that the 
international community has a responsibility to take action where a state manifestly 
fails to protect populations at risk. Moreover, implementation of R2P must occur in 
a manner consistent with existing provisions of international law, particularly the 
UN Charter, and not authorise unilateral coercive action.120 While the Secretary-
General had sought a ‘narrow but deep’ consensus, widespread agreement on the 
fundamentals of R2P suggested consensus arising from the debate could exceed 
expectations, to be both ‘broad and deep’.121 
In support of this consensus a series of assessments about the nature and scope of 
R2P subsequently emerged among states. Firstly, that a consensus understanding of 
R2P lies first and foremost with the state as an ‘ally of sovereignty’ rather than a 
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challenge.122 Secondly, participants agreed on the preservation of the narrow scope 
of R2P to the four identified mass atrocities. In contrast, France was the only state 
to express intention to ‘remain attentive’ towards situations that broaden the scope 
of R2P, such as that following Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, where deliberate action 
by a government to refuse aid placed citizens at risk.123 Thirdly, consistent with the 
desire among architects of R2P to shift the basis of international engagement from a 
culture of reaction to a culture of protection, participants agreed that collective 
understanding must be expanded to recognise that R2P is more than the use of 
force. This implies recognition that application of pillar three ‘demands’ a broad 
range of measures that are not only military in nature, but also diplomatic, political 
and judicial as proscribed in Chapters VI, VII and VIII  of the UN Charter.124  
In the fourth assessment, R2P represents a universal principle to be applied equally 
without ‘selectivity or double standards’.125 Failure to apply the principle in this 
way would have the effect of dissolving broader support among states for R2P. The 
basis for this assessment can be found in developing states concern with past 
instances of selective intervention by the Security Council, different interpretations 
of conflict that challenge government authority, and more general scepticism about 
the West’s commitment to the full continuum of engagement embodied in R2P, 
which is premised on a dual commitment to prevention and reaction.126 Cloaked in 
the enormous promise of the ICISS report and recognising the monopoly that power 
politics among the P5 claims towards the legitimate use of force, in the eyes of 
developing states R2P could not possibly operate in a sufficiently impartial way to 
engage in human protection because implementation is reliant upon discretion of 
powerful states to take action.127 The problem is that this discretionary power grants 
authority to states to intervene, but does not impose a legal obligation to do so.  
The fifth assessment was that R2P must contribute to, rather than draw resources 
away from, broader human development activities and natural disaster responses; a 
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point emphasised by the Philippines, while Ecuador and Malaysia expressed 
concern that R2P ‘should not engender new conditionalities’ to existing 
international development assistance.128 In other words, R2P capacity-building 
should not create new conditionalities by drawing resources from traditional 
poverty reduction through economic development. At the same time, it should not 
undermine the authority of the host state. Finally, states agreed that the General 
Assembly is the venue for an ongoing dialogue on R2P. However they disagreed on 
the organ’s role. In particular, whether the Assembly should fulfil a more robust 
role to ‘guide the Security Council on when to act under Chapter VII’ or even 
become the mechanism for collective action as suggested by Venezuela.129 In 
contrast, Indonesia and South Korea reiterated an idea advanced earlier by the 
Secretary-General that the Assembly could provide a periodic review mechanism to 
record what measures, such as those under pillar one, individual states had taken to 
implement R2P.130 In summary, what emerged was a robust and remarkably 
positive recognition of R2P as endorsed in the Summit Outcome. However, what 
was lacking was agreement on how to effectively implement R2P.  
Symbolic of the next development in the intellectual journey of R2P, during a 
general debate in September 2011 Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff introduced 
the concept of Responsibility While Protecting (RWP). Supported by China and 
Russia, RWP is designed to build consensus among states towards implementation 
of the more controversial prevention and reaction elements of R2P, by providing an 
innovative and legitimate link between developing R2P and POC agendas.131 In 
response, RWP called for a renewed focus on: strengthening prevention 
(mainstreaming prevention into the work of the UN; early warning; capacity 
building and enhanced information sharing; accountability for interpretation and 
application of Security Council resolutions; and stronger analysis and assessment to 
improve decision-making within the organ. Building on this proposal, in July 2012 
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the Secretary-General released his fourth report on R2P: Timely and Decisive 
Response S/2012/578 (25 July 2012). This report and the interactive dialogue that 
followed (A/66/874) focused on pillar three, including measures available to the 
Security Council under Chapters VI-VIII of the UN Charter. A concept note was 
circulated by President of the General Assembly, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser 
(Qatar), prior to the dialogue. This note outlined the purpose of the 5th September 
interactive dialogue was to provide a forum for states to hear from expert panellists 
on progress to date in implementing R2P; consider the range of tools available for a 
timely and decisive response; and to ‘clarify and deepen’ collective understanding 
around the third pillar, particularly the relationship between prevention and 
reaction.132  
During the dialogue states endorsed the sentiment within the Secretary-General’s 
report that the question in 2012 was not whether R2P applies to a crisis, but how 
best to implement the principle. Member statements also reaffirmed the non-
sequential and mutually reinforcing nature of the three elements of R2P. The role of 
the Security Council in operationalising R2P received particular emphasis. In this 
regard, specific concerns were raised towards the Security Council’s response in 
Libya under resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973(2011) authorising the use of force 
for human protection, enforcing a no-fly zone and imposing an arms embargo. 
Concerns pointed towards selectivity and timing of the response, ineffective 
monitoring of Security Council resolutions and other matters related to 
implementation. In particular, Singapore recalled a May 2012 proposal tabled but 
later withdrawn by the S5 for the P5 to refrain from exercising their right to veto in 
cases for R2P concern.133 Calls for increased monitoring, assessment and 
accountability for Security Council resolutions also featured, particularly where the 
use of force was authorised. In this regard, the Brazilian RWP proposal was 
highlighted by Singapore as important for bringing the more controversial elements 
                                                 
132 President General Assembly, Information note for informal interactive dialogue on the report of 
the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response, 30 August 
2012, p.2. 
133 Statement by Permanent Representative of Singapore, Informal interactive dialogue on the 
responsibility to protect (5 September 2012), p.3. 
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of R2P ‘into focus’ and ‘contributing to a more honest discussion’ on advancing the 
principle.134  
In terms of the normative advance of R2P, the 2012 debate was significant in that it 
provided a timely opportunity for states to undertake a stocktake of progress to date 
with operationalising R2P in light of the NATO-led intervention in Libya and 
failure to react in Syria. More importantly, the dialogue reaffirmed the centrality of 
R2P to Security Council thinking and deliberations on mass atrocities and 
challenged claims by sceptics the R2P is simply ‘empty rhetoric’ and has done little 
to advance operationalisation of the principle.135 While the case of Libya was 
largely employed by sceptics to support the forecasted demise of R2P, it is worth 
noting that criticism of the Security Council response is usually not directed at the 
principle of R2P per se, but rather the way in which R2P was invoked to rationalise 
state action.136 It is worth noting too that the UK and Tanzania raised similar 
concerns around the scope and mode of delivery for preventive capacity-building 
measures under pillar two.137  What these concerns confirm, is that the challenge for 
proponents of R2P is no longer one of convincing states of the need to accept the 
principle, but rather broadening collective understanding around consequential 
dimensions of the three elements of R2P and alignment between existing working 
methods of the Council and an R2P agenda. 
2.4 Conclusion  
Despite a disparity between words and deeds, this chapter argues the normative 
advance of R2P has been remarkable. The principle has become an integral 
component of Security Council thinking and deliberations on mass atrocities, 
particularly what the P5 understand is possible and regarded as legitimate state 
                                                 
134 Ibid., p.2. 
135 J Pattison, ‘The RtoP and responsibility while protecting: the Secretary-General’s timely and 
decisive report on timely and decisive responses’, Human Rights and Human Welfare retrieved 13 
November 2012 <www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/roundtable/2012/panel-b/10-2012/pattison-2012a.html>.  
136 AJ Bellamy, ‘R2P – dead or alive?’ in The Responsibility to protect: from evasive to reluctant 
action? The role of global middle powers, Hanns Seidel Foundation, Institute for Security Studies, 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2012, 
p.21. Emphasis in original. 
137 AJ Bellamy, Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds, Routledge,, 
Oxon, 2011, p.47. 
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action. Examining the intellectual journey of R2P, this thesis concurs with 
Bellamy’s assessment that it is no longer a question of whether to accept and 
implement R2P, but rather ‘how to realise its goals’.138 In what is arguably the 
greatest contrast with its predecessor humanitarian intervention, R2P as articulated 
by ICISS and endorsed by states at the World Summit is about more than just 
reacting to mass atrocities. Founded upon a dual commitment to prevention and 
reaction, R2P provides a comprehensive and constructive continuum of 
international engagement that seeks to not only protect populations, but also prevent 
further conflict by rebuilding communities. With R2P founded on a commitment to 
both prevention and reaction, the future legitimacy of the Security Council is to a 
large extent dependent upon its capacity to operationalise R2P by engaging in the 
full continuum of measures and activities that characterise prevention and reaction.  
From this analysis of the intellectual journey of R2P, it is clear that invocation of 
the principle means the Security Council is not only compelled to take timely and 
decisive action to address mass atrocities, but also has a positive obligation to assist 
with developing the political, economic and societal capacity of states so as to 
prevent further human suffering. With the legitimacy of peace operations and the 
Security Council itself increasingly linked to its role in both civilian protection and 
human development, post-conflict peacebuilding has become a key feature of 
international engagement with mass atrocities. Within this framework, post-conflict 
peacebuilding should not be seen as the end of the process of conflict management, 
but rather the beginning of a new preventive process focused upon improving 
security, governance, justice and reconciliation, economic and social development 
through capacity building and accountability.139 Recognising that R2P inherently 
involves both prevention and reaction and seeking to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the challenges associated with contemporary peace operations, 
chapter three will proceed to unpack the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding to 
examine its role in addressing the complex and often multi-dimensional nature of 
human suffering associated with mass atrocities. 
                                                 
138 Bellamy, R2P – Dead or Alive, 2012, p.26. Emphasis in original. 
139 Evans, G. Ending Mass atrocities, 2008, pp.148-9. 
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From peacekeeping to peacebuilding 
In the post-Cold War period, both the demands and expectations of UN peace 
operations have shifted dramatically. Based on the premise that violent conflict 
seriously undermines economic and social development, peacekeeping has evolved 
from being narrowly conceived around a political imperative of implementing 
negotiated peace towards a more ambitious agenda aimed at addressing the causes 
and consequences of conflict through multi-dimensional peace operations. Founded 
upon a positive interpretation of peace, which perceives a linkage between liberal 
values and sustainable peace, contemporary peace operations seek to not only 
establish physical security but also ‘transplant’ prevailing understandings of social, 
political and economic organisation into post-conflict states in the hope of 
preventing further violence.1 Conceptualised as post-conflict peacebuilding, this 
positive interpretation of peace embeds the use of force for human protection within 
a broader conflict prevention framework. Recognising the link between state 
capacity to discharge sovereign responsibilities and a human development agenda, 
multi-dimensional peace operations that focus on institution building and good 
governance have become a key feature of international engagement with mass 
atrocities.  
Examining the intellectual origins of multi-dimensional peace operations, the first 
part of this chapter considers how the challenge posed by fragile or weak states has 
influenced international efforts at peacebuilding. Terminology of state-building and 
nation-building are key features of peacebuilding rhetoric. While their precise 
meaning is contested, they have made an important contribution to exploring 
meanings imbued in liberal peacebuilding, its prospects and the limitations of 
current approaches. Looking at their use by states, this chapter subscribes to Francis 
Fukuyama’s assessment that what most Western states commonly refer to as the 
process of nation-building is actually state-building supplemented with some form 
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of economic development or liberalisation.2 Consequently, UN efforts in post-
conflict ‘statebuilding’ have come to be conceived as a ‘particular form of 
peacebuilding’3 founded upon three objectives: consolidating internal and external 
security; strengthening political institutions for good governance; and promoting 
economic and social transformation.4  The problem with this approach is that 
international efforts to promote liberal democratic governing systems and market-
oriented economic growth in post-conflict states have proved disappointing.5  
Where peacebuilding efforts have re-established security, most have ‘stalled’ in 
broader measures related to economic, political and social development as they 
become caught in ‘inextricable dilemmas’ inherent in multi-dimensional peace 
operations; namely, the tensions between an ambitious mandate and limited 
resourcing or international demands versus local needs.6    
Recognising this dilemma, part two of this chapter examines critical scholarship of 
current approaches to peacebuilding.  From this it is clear that while a consensus 
exists among scholars that a common factor underpinning mass atrocities is the 
nature and capacity of the state, what remains to be resolved is how to mediate the 
tension between international demands and local expectations. This chapter argues 
what lies at the heart of the tensions identified here, as well as those around 
preventive and reactive elements of R2P, are the ‘features and functions’ of 
legitimacy within organs such as the Security Council.7 In this regard, the third 
element of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, considered in the final section of this 
chapter offers enormous, but as yet unrealised potential for addressing the challenge 
of peacebuilding. 
                                                 
2 F Fukuyama, ‘Nation-building and the failure of institutional memory’ in F Fukuyama (ed) Nation-
building: beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, p.3. 
3 A Gheciu & J Welsh, ‘Introduction’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 2009, 
p.116. Emphasis in original; TG Weiss, ‘The sunset of humanitarian intervention? the responsibility 
to protect in a unipolar era’, Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 2, 2004, p.138. 
4 No exit without strategy, Report of the Secretary-General (20 April 2001), S/2001/394, para 20. 
5 Paris, Saving liberal peacebuilding, p.337. 
6 Goetze & Guzina, Peacebuilding, statebuilding, nationbuilding, p.320. 
7 Paris, Saving liberal peacebuilding, p.346. 
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3.1 The challenge of multi-dimensional peace operations  
The quest for peace has always been the defining feature of UN peacekeeping. 
While this is still the case, fateful events in Bosnia and Somalia in 1993 raised 
questions regarding the capability of the Security Council to deal with an escalation 
in complex intrastate conflicts. Signalling a fundamental shift in both the demands 
and expectations of peacekeeping, Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin 
characterise opposing parameters of  this questioning as a ‘struggle’ between those 
who conceptualise modern peacekeeping in ‘Westphalian terms’ and those who 
employ a more ambitious ‘post-Westphalian’ conception. While both approaches 
identify a ‘positive relationship’ between liberal ideals and peace, it is the manner in 
which they define ‘exactly what’ a liberal notion of peace entails that divides them.8 
A Westphalian conception restricts peacekeeping to a narrower role of ‘ensuring the 
peaceful settlement of disputes and orderly relations between states’.9 Whereas a 
post-Westphalian or ‘second generation’ interpretation is premised upon ‘ensuring 
peace and security within states’ through democratic reform and economic 
liberalisation.10  
Since the 1990s, the UN has been engaged in a variety of peace operations based on 
multi-dimensional activities aimed at consolidating civil order by establishing the 
political, economic and social conditions to sustain a liberal idea of peace. As such, 
peacekeeping has evolved dramatically from a narrow conception concerned with 
the impartial maintenance of negotiated peace to embrace a more ambitious reform 
agenda. Institutionally, perceptions regarding the role of the UN have also evolved, 
from an international organisation devised to remove the scourge of war between 
states into the primary instrument for conflict prevention by building peace within 
states. Theoretically, this struggle between Westphalian and post-Westphalian 
conceptions of peacekeeping reflects tensions surrounding the practice of the use of 
force for human protection. It also illustrates how the debate surrounding the use of 
force for human protection has evolved from being purely concerned with 
                                                 
8 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping, pp.1-2. 
9 Ibid., p.2. Emphasis  in original. 
10 Ibid. Emphasis in original; see also DT Mason  & J Quinn, ‘Sustaining the peace: stopping the 
recurrence of civil wars’ in DT Mason & JD Meernik (eds) Conflict prevention and peacebuilding in 
post-war societies: sustaining the peace, Routledge, London, 2006, p.26. 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
 81 
rationalising the legality of international action, through the need for reform of the 
UN in order to meet the complexities of intrastate conflict, towards questioning the 
philosophical underpinnings of a liberal notion of peace in terms of whether it is 
desirable or even possible. The result, as highlighted previously in chapter two, is 
that analysis of the use of force for human protection has shifted towards emphasis 
upon the question of how rather than why, with an ‘end state’ as opposed to an ‘end 
date’ becoming the measure for assessment.11  
The problem with this end state and a post-Westphalian conception of peacekeeping 
is that it requires a considerable shift in the degree to which the UN assumes 
responsibility for administration of post-conflict territory. This raises serious 
questions regarding the role and capability, particularly around the ‘long-term 
viability’ of sole reliance upon the UN to bear the burden for activities such as post-
conflict administration and governance. Given the breadth and depth of 
contemporary peace operations it also raises questions about resourcing and the 
availability of ‘feasible’ organisational alternatives in the absence of Security 
Council consensus.12 In this regard, the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo (1999) 
and US-led intervention in Iraq (2003) conducted without Security Council 
authorisation serve as pertinent examples. These examples could be defended with 
reference to the law of belligerent occupation as codified in the Hague Regulations 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (1949) and the First Additional Protocol (1977), which entitle states 
exercising control over foreign territory during an international conflict to interfere 
in the sovereignty of the state without Security Council authorisation. However, 
while this may rationalise early post-conflict activities it was not designed to 
provide a ‘suitable legal basis’ for broader longer-term transformational activities.13  
A similar theme was adopted by the General Assembly at its 2011 interactive 
dialogue on R2P, which considered the role of regional and sub-regional 
arrangements in strengthening international engagement with mass atrocities. 
                                                 
11 Stohl, What to do with Afghanistan. See n.48 chapter two. 
12 MJ Matheson,‘United Nations governance of postconflict societies’, American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 95, no.1, 2001, p.83. 
13 C Schaller, Towards an international legal framework for post-conflict peacebuilding, Research 
Paper 3, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politick, February 2009, pp.19-10. 
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Examples of regional arrangements include the AU’s Constitutive Act (2002) for 
authorising the use of force for human protection, the AU Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework for complementing activities 
of the PBC,14 or the contribution of the AU-UN ten year capacity-building program 
to broader conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa.15 What these examples 
demonstrate, is that self-sustaining and lasting peace following mass atrocities is 
one of the most pressing issues facing the UN. Central to this issue is the question 
of whether current approaches actually improve the human rights situation in states 
that have a history of violent conflict. While extensive attention has been devoted 
within the UN to understanding conditions conducive to promoting respect for 
human rights in post-conflict situations, there has been comparatively less attention 
within the organisation devoted to examining the extent to which current 
approaches undermine respect for individual and collective human rights.  
Drawing on the mixed results of contemporary peace operations and an identified 
gap in collective knowledge, a vast body of critical scholarship examining the 
‘workings, dynamics and pitfalls’ of international peacebuilding has emerged.16 
Generally, this scholarship is polarised between those who demonstrate in principle 
support and are more concerned with the efficiency of relevant policies and 
institutions within a post-conflict transition paradigm (such as Roland Paris,17 
David Kennedy18 and Beatrice Pouligny19) and those who challenge the moral 
foundations of liberal peacebuilding because of its relationship to global power 
structures (such as David Chandler,20 Mark Duffield,21 Tim Jacoby22 and Michael 
                                                 
14 African Union, Draft policy framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development , 
undated, retrieved 14 August 2011 <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PCRDFEB06.PDF>; see also 
ICRP, Report on the General Assembly plenary debate, p.9. 
15 Secretary-General, Progress report on the prevention of armed conflict (18 July 2006), A/60/891; 
A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities (28 July 2006),  A/61/204–
S/2006/590,  paras 38-40. 
16 Goetze & Guzina, Turtles all the way down, p.320. 
17 Paris, Saving liberal peacebuilding. 
18 D Kennedy, The dark sides of virtue: reassessing international humanitarianism, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2004. 
19 B Pouligny, Peace operations seen from below: UN missions and local people, Hurst, London, 
2006; see also Pouligny, Chesterman & Schabel,  After Mass Crime. 
20 D Chandler, Empire in denial: the politics of state-building, Pluto Press, London, 2006. 
21 M Duffield, ‘Development, territories, and people: consolidating the external sovereign frontier’, 
Alternatives, vol. 32, no. 2, 2007, pp.225-246. 
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Barnett23).  Collectively, this scholarship confirms that the problem is that not all 
responses to mass atrocities, no matter how well intentioned, necessarily contribute 
towards human protection. This is because while conditions associated with 
‘underdevelopment’ may increase the likelihood of violent conflict, international 
efforts also ‘exacerbate’ vulnerability if they undermine state capacity, fuel 
exclusionary practices, generate further societal inequality or sustain resource ‘over-
dependence’.24  
Representative of the unintended consequences or ‘dark side’ of the use of force for 
human protection, this chapter subscribes to David Kennedy’s conclusion that states 
responding to the humanitarian imperative of mass atrocities often ‘mute’ 
awareness that their efforts can have ‘bad consequences’ if not properly 
implemented.25 Having studied more than two dozen peacekeeping missions since 
1945, respected non-government organisation (NGO) International Crisis Group 
(ICG), identify six ‘interlocking challenges’ that international efforts must address 
if they are to have any chance of long-term success.  According to Deputy President 
Donald Steinberg, international efforts must 
restore both state and human security, build a responsive political 
framework, kick-start the economy, balance national reconciliation with 
the need for international accountability, promote civil society and 
address the regional context so as to dampen the potential for violence 
at the regional and sub-regional level.26  
Consistent with a post-Westphalian peacekeeping agenda, the significance of these 
six challenges lies both in the practical demands they place on peace operations and 
in the manner in which they emphasise the relationship between state capacity and 
violent conflict. In the context of practical demands, this means the depth and 
breadth of political will, donor resourcing and institutional capacity required to 
                                                                                                                                        
22 T Jacoby, ‘Hegemony, modernisation and post-war reconstruction’, Global Society, vol. 21, no. 4, 
2007, pp.521-537. 
23 M Barnett, ‘Building a republican peace: stabilising states after war’, International Security, vol. 
30, no. 4, 2006, pp.87-112. 
24 R Picciotto & S Fukuda-Parr, ‘Conflict prevention and development cooperation in Africa’, State 
fragility and human security in Africa policy workshop, 8-11 November 2007, Wilton Park, p.3. 
25 Kennedy, Dark sides of virtue, p.327. 
26 D Steinberg, Tackling state fragility: the new world of peacebuilding, keynote address to the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference on Peacebuilding (1 February 2010) 
retrieved 8 February 2010 < http:www/crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6512&1=1>.  
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coordinate and sustain a broad range of activities. In terms of the relationship 
between state capacity and conflict, Steinberg’s list illustrates the problem central to 
most multi-dimensional peace operations: fragile states.   
3.1.1 The problem of fragile states 
In the period 1998 to 2007 the UN found 90 percent of peace operations involving 
the use of force for human protection had taken place within states demonstrating 
‘weak’ governance capacity.27 This finding supports the view of Robert Picciotto 
that a common risk factor underpinning mass atrocities is the ‘nature and capacity’ 
of the state,28 which is often weak or repressive in nature. Some of the most 
prominent features of fragile states which increase the propensity for violent 
conflict include economic mismanagement, a lack of social service delivery and 
inability or unwillingness to guarantee human rights. An inability to monopolise 
violence and poverty are also often key features of the fragile state narrative. While 
this thesis concurs with Picciotto’s qualification that any link between weak 
governance and violent conflict is more ‘probabilistic’ than ‘linear’ in that not all 
fragile states necessarily disintegrate into conflict, it finds that once a ‘triggering 
event’ occurs to combine a weak ‘immune system’ with failing domestic leadership, 
then the propensity for violent conflict involving mass atrocities is far more likely.29  
This finding has profound implications for international engagement with mass 
atrocities. Firstly, as a positive interpretation of peace is premised on a linkage 
between a liberal ideal of political, economic and social development and 
sustainable peace, it requires meeting a much deeper and more demanding agenda 
than simply the cessation of violent conflict. This generally involves significant 
reform of the host state through activities such as ‘development and consolidation 
of democratic governance, the rule of law, robust institutions, and a healthy civil 
                                                 
27 Peacekeeping operations principles and guidelines (Capstone doctrine draft 3), Consultation draft 
29 June 2007, retrieved 25 September 2007 
<http://pbpu.unlb.org/phps/Pages/Public/viewprimarydoc.aspx?docid=481>.  
28 Picciotto, R ‘Background paper: state fragility and human security in Africa’ in Picciotto, R & S 
Fukuda-Parr, ‘Conflict prevention and development cooperation in Africa’, State fragility and 
human security in Africa policy workshop, 8-11 November 2007, Wilton Park, p.10. 
29 Ibid. 
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society’.30 Secondly by implication, this positive interpretation of peace embeds the 
use of force for human protection within a broader conflict prevention framework in 
effect marrying the concept of international security to human development. 
Through its Human Development Report 1994, the UNDP introduced a new 
paradigm for human welfare equating security with people rather than states.31 
Replacing the traditional ‘defensive’ concept of state security, the concept of human 
security articulated by UNDP employs an ‘integrative’ understanding of the 
relationship between state security and international development.32 Broadly 
defined through two distinguishing aspects of ‘freedom from fear and freedom from 
want’, the basic characteristics and key components articulated in the report 
embedded the concept of security in a notion of human solidarity.33   
In support of the argument that human development is a matter of concern for all 
states as members of an international community, the report combines four basic 
characteristics (that human security is universal in scope; people-centred in focus; 
individual components are interdependent in nature; and is easier to realise through 
early prevention) with seven key components to guide international thinking 
(economic; food; health; environmental; personal; community and political 
security).34 Recognising that challenges may be man-made through poor policy 
choices or ‘stem from the forces of nature’,35 the report inadvertently suggested the 
distinctive language of human security could be employed as either an indicative 
call for action or a normative framework for rationalising the scope and activities 
that comprise an international response.  
Evidence of the normative contribution of the concept of human security to 
international thinking on the relationship between state security, individual freedom 
and international development, is found in the 2005 Summit Outcome where states 
agreed that  
                                                 
30 AG Sens, ‘From peace-keeping to peace-building: The United Nations and the challenge of 
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31 UNDP, Human development report 1994, p.24. 
32 Ibid., p.24. 
33 Ibid., p.24. 
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the purpose of human security is to enable all individuals to be free 
from fear and want, and to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their 
human potential (paragraph 143).  
More recently, the Secretary-General reaffirmed that the focus of human security is 
on  
fostering government and local capacities and strengthening the 
resilience of both to emerging challenges in ways that are mutually 
reinforcing, preventive and comprehensive.36  
Employing the concept of responsible sovereignty central to R2P, the 
Secretary-General explained that while states ‘retain the primary role’ for providing 
a ‘rules-based system where societal relations are mutually supportive, harmonious 
and accountable’, in cases where state institutions are weak or under threat, human 
security requires an integrated approach that addresses ‘the root causes of these 
weaknesses’ through ‘timely, targeted and effective responses that improve the 
resilience of governments and people alike’.37 With a mandate to address security, 
development and human rights, the UN system is ‘instrumental’ in addressing these 
issues.38 
While problems of security and international development have traditionally 
informed separate discourses and policy agendas, increased recognition of the 
relationship between state security, development and violent conflict has resulted in 
what scholars such as Björn Hettne describe as a ‘security-development nexus’.39 
The emergence of a security-development nexus can be attributed to increasing 
recognition within the UN that the previously distinct policy areas of security and 
development while increasingly complex are interdependent in terms of the 
institutions engaged and policy prescriptions advocated.40  To this end, a security-
development nexus provides a framework for cohering national and international 
policy to ensure future instances of the use of force for human protection adopt a 
                                                 
36 Human security, Report of the Secretary-General (8 March 2010) A/64/701, para 23. 
37 Ibid., para 20. 
38 Ibid., para 70. 
39 B Hettne,‘Development and security: origins and future, Security Dialogue, vol. 41, no. 1, 
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more holistic or comprehensive approach. This problem-solving approach is 
premised on the notion that merging security and development concerns provides 
the most effective means for international actors to address the risk factors 
associated with mass atrocities and respond in a timely, targeted and effective 
manner. From this perspective, the significance and utility of a security-
development nexus lies in the support it lends to developing a more nuanced 
understanding of R2P. Most importantly, how the continuum of international 
engagement that characterises R2P bridges the traditional divide between security 
and development.  
3.1.2 Bridging the divide between security and development 
As highlighted in the preceding discussion of a security-development nexus, there is 
a consensus among scholars, states and practitioners that reference must be made to 
‘root causes’ of conflict and risk factors underpinning mass atrocities if 
international responses are to succeed. In its report, ICISS noted that development 
or structural issues such as ‘poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of 
resources’ require greater attention if the international community is to resolve the 
causes of conflict, and not just respond to the symptoms.41 The basis for this 
assertion can be found in the UN Charter which provides the foundation for a 
‘comprehensive and long-term approach to conflict prevention’ (Article 55). 
Evidence of increased recognition of the relevance of root causes is similarly 
reaffirmed in resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, which acknowledges the interconnectedness and mutually 
reinforcing nature of ‘peace and security, development and human rights’ as the 
‘pillars of the UN system’ (paragraph 2). Underpinning these provisions in both the 
sources and practice of international law is recognition that the traditional divide 
between ‘hard issues’ of state security and ‘soft issues’ of human development 
should be ‘blurred’.42 This development in collective thinking has significant 
implications for international engagement with mass atrocities.  
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Greater recognition of the relationship or dynamic that exists between security and 
development ultimately means strengthening state capacity by increasing sovereign 
competency. Because of the multi-dimensional nature of contemporary peace 
operations, it also means transcending the traditional notion of impartially-based 
peacekeeping. It naturally follows, that peace operations increasingly include in 
addition to a military component, civilian expertise related to human rights 
monitoring, policing, judicial reform, elections, institutional development, 
reconciliation and reintegration of combatants. From a normative perspective, it is 
the mutually-constitutive relationship between perceptions of state competency and 
legitimacy that provides the framework for international engagement. A key feature 
of the ICISS conception of R2P is the liberal notion that the ‘best guarantee’ for 
protecting and promoting individual and collective human rights is to encourage the 
development of a ‘world of competent, responsible and legitimate sovereign 
states’.43 From an operational perspective, this means the most important task for 
the international community is to commit to rebuilding, reforming or strengthening 
state institutions from the outset so as to prevent future conflict.  
This assessment is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides evidence 
of a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the nature and 
capacity of a state, development and violent conflict. By implication, this approach 
requires international responses that not only ‘connect the dots’ between strategic 
priorities and humanitarian concerns,44 but also place a premium on international 
action that is consistent with the prescription advocated by the Secretary-General 
for a narrow but deep approach to R2P. In practice, this means adopting a ‘holistic 
and comprehensive approach’ to rebuilding state capacity through organisations 
such as the PBC, so as to prevent mass atrocities, rather than focus simply on 
resolving ‘proximate causes’.45 Secondly, this more nuanced understanding places a 
‘premium’ on anticipation of where violence is likely to emerge.46 Consequently, 
peacebuilding has become a key component of international engagement with mass 
atrocities.  
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3.2 Current approaches to peacebuilding  
Despite being a relatively new addition to the international conflict management 
toolbox, the intellectual origins of peacebuilding actually began much earlier. 
Writing in the 1970s Johan Galtung made a clear distinction between peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, defining the latter in a practical sense as the 
implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction 
and development.47 The liberal or democratic peace thesis advanced by Michael 
Doyle, which argued that democracies were less likely to wage war against each 
other, provided a further contribution to the development of peacebuilding and the 
associated concept of statebuilding in the 1980s.48 It was not however, until the 
release of An Agenda for Peace (1992) by former Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali that the first systematic treatment of peacebuilding occurred within 
the UN. Defined as international efforts that ‘identify and support structures 
which…strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’,49 it 
was the follow-up report, A Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995) that ensured 
peacebuilding gained prominence in international thinking on human protection. By 
2000, peacebuilding had been integrated into the workings of the UN in terms of 
framing deliberations on peace operations and broader recognition of the complex 
but indisputable link between security and development, democracy and perceptions 
of legitimacy.  
The reform-driven Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)  
S/2000-809 (21 August 2000), which recommended a fundamental shift in how UN 
peace operations were conceived, took one step further noting both a need and a 
desire for the organisation to become the primary instrument for promotion, 
development and implementation of peacebuilding. Underpinning this 
recommendation were the ‘struggles’ of the UN to successfully establish and 
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manage its two most elaborate peacebuilding operations to date in establishment of 
a transitional civilian administration in Kosovo under resolution 1244 
(10 June 1999) followed shortly thereafter with assumption of temporary sovereign 
administration in East Timor under resolution 1272 (25 October 1999) (paragraph 
76). According to the report, the dilemma for the UN was whether to ‘assume that 
transitional administration is a transitory responsibility’ and therefore ‘not prepare 
for additional missions and do badly if...once again flung into the breach’, or in 
contrast ‘prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well 
prepared’ (paragraph 78).  
In February 2001 the Security Council continued this trend refining its definition of 
peacebuilding as encompassing a ‘wide range of political, developmental, 
humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms’ aimed at preventing ‘the 
outbreak, the recurrence or continuation’ of violent conflict.50 To realise this 
preventive dimension, UN peacebuilding would engage in a multi-dimensional 
approach combining short-term targeted activities together with long-term 
systematic responses individually tailored to meet the needs of societies vulnerable 
or emerging from conflict. Programs or activities aimed at fostering sustainable 
institutions and responsive processes would be undertaken in a variety of areas 
related to  
sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, 
transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a 
culture of peace and non-violence.51  
In April 2001 a report of the Secretary-General entitled No Exit Without Strategy 
S/2001/394 (20 April 2001), added a further dimension when it examined factors 
the Security Council should assess when deciding to authorise, conclude or 
significantly alter the mandate of peacekeeping operations. The report identified 
key objectives of peacebuilding as: consolidating internal and external security; 
strengthening political institutions and good governance; and promoting economic 
and social rehabilitation and transformation (paragraph 20). Symbolic of a 
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fundamental shift in international thinking towards conflict management, this 
clarification by the Security Council demonstrates a maturing in collective 
international understanding. While it is contestable that liberal democratic and 
economic reform guarantees peace, Roland Paris notes on the whole liberal states 
do demonstrate a ‘considerable probability’ through ‘mechanisms, ideas, people and 
institutions’ to ensure conflict levels remain ‘below the threshold’ of violent 
conflict.52 Terminology of state-building and nation-building are a key feature of 
liberal peacebuilding within the UN, often employed as a signifier of international 
commitment to building a positive interpretation of peace. They are also a key 
feature of the broader debate surrounding R2P.  
In both cases the use of discursive signifiers linked to capacity-building increases 
the perceived legitimacy of international efforts to address mass atrocities. 
However, their use is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, they are problematic 
because the terms state-building and nation-building are the subject of much 
contestation over their precise nature, scope and application. Drawing on failed 
Security Council missions during the 1990s in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, 
Bosnia and Kosovo and looking at more recent operations in Darfur (2003) and 
Libya (2011), both terms have featured prominently in debates surrounding Western 
foreign, security and development policies. Despite this continued presence 
however, their exact meaning and scope remain vague with parameters for each 
only being clarified on an ad hoc basis in response to an immediate humanitarian 
need or a particular political stance. As such, the term nation-building has been 
linked to legitimising an array of disparate activities ranging from ‘regional 
stabilisation’, conflict management, conflict prevention or conventional 
development assistance on the one hand, to ‘imperial control’ on the other.53  
Secondly, in response to the disappointing record of previous international attempts, 
scholars such as David Chandler,54 Mark Duffield,55 Tim Jacoby56 and Michael 
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Barnett57  have employed critical methods of enquiry to challenge the liberal 
peacebuilding model. Further investigation of this scholarship reveals it is primarily 
concerned with how peacebuilding is pursued rather than the enterprise itself; 
despite periodic challenges to the moral foundations of liberal peacebuilding which 
claim it is best characterised as ‘international occupation’.58 These concerns are 
largely structural in that they centre on the perverse outcomes of peacebuilding and 
its effect on global power structures in terms of inclusion and exclusion.59 In his 
analysis of peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia it is the ‘illiberal behaviour’ of 
international administrators that is of concern to David Chandler, rather than the 
‘liberal orientation’ of the mission itself.60 Most notable, the relatively 
unconstrained and unaccountable exercise of power by international administrators 
and methods employed for democratic reform, which appeared to discourage local 
political activity and participation.  
The problematic use of signifiers not only restricts the utility of state-building or 
nation-building conceptually and practically as part of a broader conflict prevention 
framework, but calls into question the legitimacy of such claims. Acknowledging 
such criticism, Roland Paris argues convincingly that the challenge for the 
international community today is not the question of whether to ‘replace or move 
beyond’ a liberal peacebuilding model, but ‘how to reform existing approaches 
within a broadly defined liberal framework’.61 Furthermore, to undertake such 
reform successfully is to recognise that it has both ‘conceptual’ and ‘policy 
elements’ requiring attention.62 Paris explains that throughout the 1990s 
peacebuilding literature was dominated by a preoccupation with practical policy 
issues, with little attention given to the normative relationship between 
peacebuilding and the larger phenomena of international politics. Furthermore, in a 
more problematic development, critical scholarship overwhelmingly concerned with 
dismissing liberal peacebuilding as ‘fundamentally destructive or illegitimate’,63 has 
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served to cloud rather than clarify collective international thinking on the scope and 
contribution of peacebuilding to security and development.64 This chapter shares 
such concern. It also subscribes to the conclusion reached by Paris that the question 
is not whether this criticism is warranted or not, but what contribution it makes to 
developing a collective understanding of the ‘underlying tensions and 
contradictions’ of a liberal peacebuilding model.65 Critical research that Paris 
suggests should be pursued, mostly relates to identifying sources of legitimacy in 
international peacebuilding.66  In this regard further examination of the discourse of 
state-building and nation-building is instructive for understanding the central role of 
legitimacy in peacebuilding and the principle of R2P. 
3.2.1 State-building versus nation-building 
Examining the record of contemporary peace operations suggests that where a 
distinction is made between state-building and nation-building, the former in its 
most general form represents efforts by third party states to reshape the polity of a 
host state by re-establishing an ‘effective indigenous government’ through a 
restricted scope of activities concerned primarily with democratic governance, such 
as transitional civil administration and election monitoring.67 This restricted 
interpretation of post-conflict statehood is most accurately represented in 
sociological characterisations as an ‘institutionalist approach’,68 and within 
peacebuilding literature as a ‘problem-solving response’.69 Situated within a 
democratic ‘transition paradigm’,70 this approach assumes that top-down, externally 
driven efforts in institutional reconstruction are both the ‘primary goal’ of 
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international peacebuilding,71 and provide the principal mechanism for realising 
international human rights standards. This approach is also sequentially-based in 
that it assumes that development, economic growth and stability will necessarily 
follow the creation or reform of institutional structures. While it is problematic to 
define “success” given the record of failures, international efforts at peacebuilding 
are generally regarded as more likely to encounter some notion of success and 
therefore increased perceptions of legitimacy, if they facilitate realisation of liberal 
values such as democratic self-governance and limitations on governmental 
power.72  
Consistent with this approach the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) established under resolution 1272 (25 October 1999) to ‘support 
capacity-building for self-government’ (paragraph two), is often cited as an 
example of a more successful attempt at peacebuilding. However many, including 
former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, acknowledged in a later report S/2006/628 
(8 August 2006), that in light of a more recent escalation in violence, it was 
premature to end the mission in 2002 upon completion of traditional liberal 
indicators such as an electoral process (paragraphs 142-144 ). What this example 
demonstrates, is that defining the success (or failure) of international engagement 
with mass atrocities against a restricted scope of activities concerned primarily with 
securing democratic governance sets the course for disappointment, particularly 
within the host state. Moreover, in adopting such a narrow and pre-defined course 
for peacebuilding and by equating peace and security with the state, the Security 
Council risks undermining the positive conception of peace it seeks to establish.   
While the term nation-building shares with state-building the need for institutional 
reconstruction, it diverges in its emphasis upon the importance of international 
actors engaging in a broader scope of activities aimed at securing socio-political 
cohesion.  This broader range of activities is characterised as a ‘legitimacy 
approach’73 or ‘emancipatory peacebuilding’74 because of its increased emphasis 
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upon the relationship between local perceptions of legitimacy, stability, 
development and the protection of human rights. Similar to the previous 
institutional approach, it also subscribes to liberal values of self-government and 
limitations on governmental power,75 but supplements this focus with increased 
emphasis upon international facilitation of greater political participation and 
representation.  Representing a significant challenge to an institutionalist approach, 
its basis can be found in an increasing belief that greater local agency, through a 
sense of ‘local ownership’ or local buy-in to peacebuilding processes,76 will avoid a 
return to large-scale violence. Of central importance to perceptions of legitimacy 
within this approach is the international commitment towards generating a wider 
‘shared consciousness’ of national identity.77 Within the host state, re-establishment 
of judicial and administrative structures and DDR of ex-combatants are combined 
with activities aimed at promotion of civil society (such as human rights groups, 
NGOs and political organisations).  
As argued persuasively by Paris, it is the sheer magnitude, importance and difficult 
record of international peacebuilding that necessitates continuous reflective and 
critical enquiry of the ‘principles and methods’ that frame these missions.78 In this 
sense, critical scholarship, such as that related to the discursive frames of state-
building and nation-building outlined here, has made an important contribution to 
exploring meanings imbued in liberal peacebuilding, its prospects and the 
shortcomings of current approaches. The problem however, is that while the logic 
of state-building and nation-building seems sensible, international efforts to 
promote core elements of this peacebuilding model, such as liberal democratic 
governance and market-oriented economic growth, have proved ‘more difficult and 
unpredictable’ than expected, and in some cases delivered ‘destabilising side 
effects’.79 For this reason, what Paris characterises as the ‘global experiment’ of 
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peacebuilding by the UN, despite reaffirmation among states, scholars and 
practitioners of their support for the concept, has arrived at a ‘crossroad’.80    
3.3 Peacebuilding and R2P 
By authorising peacekeeping missions to engage in an expanded post-Westphalian 
mandate of post-conflict political, economic and social reform, the Security Council 
has de facto extended international authority into the realm of peacebuilding. This 
has significant political, financial and institutional implications, which ‘are yet to be 
addressed’ according to a 2009 study of the implications of multi-dimensional 
peace operations on UN mandates.81 More importantly, this extension of 
international authority has developed the notion upon which contemporary peace 
operations are based, that democratic ‘statebuilding’ is representative of a 
‘particular form of peacebuilding’.82 This is a significant development for three 
reasons. Firstly, as noted in section 3.1, it demonstrates the extent to which the 
practice of peacekeeping has dramatically evolved. Secondly, it demonstrates a 
developing parallel with the third element of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, in 
relation to its concern for developing the political, economic and societal capacity 
of a host state and its contribution to a broader conflict prevention framework. 
Thirdly, it highlights the dynamic, but at times problematic relationship, between 
multi-dimensional peace operations and the liberal project of democratic state-
building.  
Critical scholarship has tended to examine the philosophical basis of this 
relationship and the record of UN operations within a narrow framework of 
collective efforts by states to discharge their responsibility under the first element of 
R2P, the responsibility to react. Not least because it is this dimension of R2P where 
states, through the Security Council, are directly engaged in developing an 
international response to mass atrocities. As articulated in chapter two however, 
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ICISS prescribed a systematic approach based on priorities and activities that define 
a continuum of international engagement which includes prevention, reaction and 
rebuilding. In response, this chapter argues the question for members of the 
Security Council is not whether the international community needs to rebuild 
communities torn apart by violent conflict or what institutions and characteristics 
need to be reconstructed, but rather how to do so in order to avoid recreating the 
conditions, tensions and unsustainable structures that contributed to an escalation in 
violence in the first place. Moreover, it is the contention of this chapter that the 
third element of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, requires greater attention if the 
value of this framework for conflict prevention is to be realised.     
3.3.1 The responsibility to rebuild  
Responsibility on the part of the international community deriving from the third 
element of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, can be located in a combination of 
existing ‘general considerations’ on peacebuilding within the UN system and 
Security Council practice in different peacekeeping missions which informs a 
‘lessons learned’ category of institutional knowledge within the organisation.83  It 
can also be found in resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) on the protection of civilians 
where a link is made between   
promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable 
development…good governance, democracy…respect for…human 
rights, and preventing the recurrence of violent conflict (paragraph 2). 
Just as state responsibility transfers to the international community, and by 
implication the Security Council, if an individual state is incapable or unwilling to 
discharge its sovereign responsibilities under R2P, where individual states lack 
material capacity or political will to engage in rebuilding, a collective responsibility 
for this also accrues to the Security Council. However, as noted in chapter two (see 
section 2.2.1), while the 2005 Summit Outcome declares a commitment to assist 
states with building capacity, there is no obligation upon states to take such action.84 
The result is a further dilution of responsibility and a caveat on international 
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commitment from an ‘obligation to act’ to an intention to ‘commit as necessary and 
appropriate’.85  
As argued persuasively by Bellamy, this employs a significantly lower standard 
than envisaged by ICISS.  In the ICISS conception of R2P giving practical 
substance to the notion of obligation means that under the first element (prevent) 
states would need to address root and direct causes of conflict; under the second 
element (react) states would need to respond to ‘situations of compelling human 
need’ through the full range of coercive measures; and finally, under the third 
element (rebuild), states would need to engage in a maximalist provision of 
international assistance encompassing the full range of recovery, reconstruction and 
reconciliation activities.86 The most positive example of substance being given to 
the third element of R2P (rebuild) is the establishment in 2006 of the PBC with its 
own distinct financial fund and supporting offices. While Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding and the Brahimi Report analysed 
peacebuilding, it was not until former Secretary-General Kofi-Annan proposed to 
member states the creation of a single inter-governmental commission in his report 
In Larger Freedom (paragraphs 2 and 16), that the relationship between 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention was solidified. 
3.3.2 The Peacebuilding Commission  
Advocacy by the Secretary-General in his report In Larger Freedom for a greater 
focus upon peacebuilding and the subsequent establishment of the PBC can be seen 
as a direct response to the recommendations of the sixteen-member High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. The High-Level Panel was tasked by the 
Secretary-General to evaluate the impact of existing UN policies upon: threats to 
international peace and security in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US; 
and the increasing complexity and scope of multi-dimensional peace operations in 
intrastate conflicts. In its final report, A More Secure World A/59/565 
(1 December 2004), the panel recommended the establishment of a PBC as an 
intergovernmental advisory body to address an identified institutional gap within 
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the UN system to assist states develop their capacity to ‘perform their sovereign 
functions effectively and responsibly’ (paragraph 261). This recommendation was 
subsequently endorsed and reaffirmed by states in the 2005 Summit Outcome, 
clarifying that the main purpose of the PBC once established, would be to bring 
together all relevant actors from within and outside the UN to provide advice on 
integrated strategies for peacebuilding and to focus attention on post-conflict 
reconstruction and institution-building (paragraph 98).  In addition, it was envisaged 
that the PBC would provide advice on how to improve coordination of all relevant 
actors, develop best practices, ensure predictable financing of recovery activities 
and extend the period of international attention towards post-conflict recovery. 
Operationalised by resolutions 60/180 and 1645 (20 December 2005), the 
significance of the PBC lies in the fact that it is the first intergovernmental advisory 
body of the UN that brings together actors from both within the organisation as well 
as those outside, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
to support international efforts in states emerging from violent conflict. 
In a report to the Security Council in 2009, PBC Chair, Heraldo Muñoz, noted that 
together with the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO), the Commission continued to promote the nexus between security and 
development.87 Moreover, since establishment of the PBC, the UN peacebuilding 
agenda had expanded in both ‘scope and depth’.88 In terms of scope, this included 
the impact and relevance of the full spectrum of activities associated with human 
protection from: ‘structural prevention strategies’ such as promoting good 
governance, strengthening the rule of law, assisting with economic growth and 
fighting corruption;89 to ‘direct prevention strategies’ such as preventive diplomacy, 
targeted sanctions and arms embargoes;90 and ‘late-stage direct prevention 
strategies’ such as coercive measures including as a last resort, the use of force.91  
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In terms of depth, the contribution of the PBC and R2P to UN peacebuilding is 
threefold. Firstly, just as R2P is designed to unite organisations, agendas and actors 
at all levels, the PBC provides an umbrella to unite disparate agendas, interests and 
values among actors. In doing so, the PBC can assist in marshalling resources to 
address the sheer magnitude, complexity and confronting nature of the task at hand, 
which demands a comprehensive, targeted and multi-dimensional response. 
Through the PBC, its supporting offices and dedicated fund, the UN has 
successfully marshalled support for a range of ‘immediate response’ and ‘recovery’ 
initiatives in Burundi, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia.92 This 
includes the full range of reactionary-based activities, such as targeted initiatives 
that respond to imminent threats, and prevention-based or longer-term systematic 
initiatives to support peace agreements, political dialogue, stimulate economic 
revitalisation, or strengthen the administrative capacity of the host state.  
Secondly, the establishment of the PBC provides an institutional home in which to 
develop best practice benchmarks and at the same time makes a significant 
normative contribution to addressing obstacles that challenge the legitimacy of 
peacebuilding, which are primarily concerned with the methods employed for 
international peacebuilding. Finally, representative of its greatest contribution to 
increasing the depth of UN peacebuilding and clearest example of an attempt to 
give substance to the third element of R2P, the responsibility to rebuild, it is the role 
of the PBC established under resolutions 60/180(20 December 2005) and 1645 
(20 December 2005) in helping to ‘extend the period of attention given by the 
international community to post-conflict recovery’ that demonstrates its 
significance (paragraph 2). Specifically, as forecasted by the Secretary-General in 
his report, A More Secure World A/59/565 (1 December 2004), establishing a PBC 
facilitates strengthening of UN capacity to act in a ‘coherent and effective way’ 
while providing a forum for all relevant actors to remain engaged in the whole 
continuum of international activities from early warning to identify states at risk, 
through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuilding (paragraph 263).  
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While this chapter regards this as an overwhelmingly positive development, it 
recognises limitations exist that could potentially impede both the function and 
normative influence of the PBC. The establishment of the PBC makes a significant 
contribution towards international capacity to meet its responsibility under R2P to 
rebuild. However, the UN still needs to address the role and contribution of 
peacebuilding to preventing mass atrocities. The basis for this assertion is that the 
activities of the PBC are much broader than those envisaged by ICISS for R2P. 
Furthermore, restricting the focus of peacebuilding to the post-conflict dimension 
places serious constraints on the role that the PBC could play in the development 
and implementation of the full continuum of international engagement that 
characterises R2P. Finally, representative of the greatest source of concern among 
critics is the relationship between the PBC and the Security Council. While A More 
Secure World (2004) articulates that the PBC may provide ‘advice’ when requested 
by the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), the Secretary-General or states (paragraph 12), where a situation is 
firmly on the Security Council agenda or a UN-mandated peacekeeping mission is 
under way, the role of the PBC is restricted to providing general advice when 
requested by the Council (paragraph 16). Furthermore, the fact that the P5 constitute 
the majority of the seven Security Council members who serve on the PBC’s 
Organisational Committee also raises concerns.  
In the context of R2P, these characteristics ensure that the PBC does not 
compromise the Security Council’s primary responsibility for international peace 
and security. However, they potentially limit the influence of the PBC in the 
development, extension or renewal of operational mandates to give substance to the 
responsibility to rebuild. During their consideration of the PBC’s 2009 annual 
report this impediment was noted by the UK who highlighted the need to develop 
‘better ways for the Commission to affect the [Security] Council’s work’.93 While 
these organisational characteristics receive a great deal of attention for their 
potential to impede the normative contribution of the PBC, this chapter finds to the 
contrary that the PBC, its supporting offices and fund represent an important ally to 
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the principle of R2P. Given that normative demands or expectations are a central 
feature of international politics and understanding how they shift over time is a key 
feature of IR theory, the emergence of R2P and the establishment of the PBC are of 
fundamental significance. On a practical level, similar to R2P, the PBC provides a 
framework to mitigate tensions between longer-term preventive activities seeking to 
address risk factors with shorter-term activities to mitigate an imminent threat; unite 
disparate institutional agendas, interests and actors at all levels; and assist in 
marshalling resources to address the complex and multidimensional challenge of 
contemporary peace operations.  
3.4 Conclusion  
The question of whether a self-sustaining and lasting peace can be constructed 
following mass atrocities is one of the most pressing issues facing the UN. In 
response, a myriad of international organisations including the UN, European Union 
(EU) and World Bank have reoriented around a new liberal imperative of state-
building and peacebuilding. Just as peacekeeping has evolved dramatically in the 
post-Cold War period, so too have international perceptions of peacebuilding in 
terms of demands, expectations and what is regarded as legitimate state action. 
Consequently, peacebuilding and democracy have become key features of the 
discourse surrounding international engagement with mass atrocities. Primarily 
concerned with developing a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between state capacity for discharging its sovereign responsibilities, human 
development and conflict prevention, identifiable shifts in how peacebuilding is 
conceived by the Security Council confirm increasing acceptance of the proposition 
that robust and capable states are the best guarantee for peace. While the implied 
relationship between democracy, institutional capacity and peace is subject to 
contestation, it is the willingness of the Security Council to include post-conflict 
political, economic and social development in its deliberations on mass atrocities 
that is unprecedented. In light of this trend, it is the conclusion of this chapter that 
R2P and peacebuilding represent two developing parallels within the normative and 
ideational framework surrounding the use of force for human protection, which 
exert considerable influence on what is regarded as a legitimate state action. Closely 
aligned to the third element of R2P (the responsibility to rebuild) in relation to its 
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concern for developing the political, economic and societal capacity of a host state 
and its contribution to a broader conflict prevention framework, peacebuilding 
provides a vehicle to give effect to the preventive dimensions of R2P. Looking at 
the disparate functions of R2P posited by Bellamy, an increasing focus upon 
peacebuilding and democracy within Security Council deliberations provides both 
evidence and a practical example of a prevention-based policy agenda to address 
risk factors.    
Individually and collectively, the three chapters that comprise part one of this thesis 
are of significant evidentiary value for charting the development of international 
thinking on human protection, the intellectual journey of R2P and the evolution of 
Security Council practice in contemporary peace operations. A recurring theme 
underpinning the three chapters that comprise part one of this thesis, is that a 
distinctive language of protection, incorporating both prevention and reaction, 
exists to provide both the foundations for, and sources of contestation around, 
international engagement with mass atrocities. Central to this discourse are the 
features and functions of legitimacy. Consequently, the question of human 
protection under the umbrella of R2P is not just one of legality, but to a larger 
extent, a question of legitimacy. With the legitimacy of Security Council action and 
contemporary peace operations increasingly linked to human protection, it 
necessarily follows that R2P inherently involves both prevention and reaction.   
Representing three distinct literatures on human protection, chapters one to three 
share a common concern for establishing how shifting conceptions of legitimacy 
around human protection construct and reconstruct the bounds of normatively 
permissible agency and action. To this end, chapters one to three demonstrate R2P 
has had a significant impact upon the values, rules and meanings that underpin 
perceptions of legitimacy with regard to state identity and interests. Examining the 
nature, scope and functions of international law, legal scholarship examined in 
chapter one confirms that R2P has played a pivotal role in advancing wider 
acceptance of minimum standards of humane treatment and enhancing the 
opportunity for convergence between power and authority within the Security 
Council to enforce the provisions of international law. Building on this 
development, chapter two demonstrates that wider acceptance of R2P at the 2005 
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World Summit not only increased recognition that protection is dependent upon 
both longer-term preventive measures seeking to address risk factors for conflict 
and the shorter-term need for a timely and decisive response to halt human 
suffering, but also sharpened the focus of human protection under R2P towards the 
four atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. As the final chapter in part one, the examination of the relationship 
between pecacebuilding, democracy and R2P presented here illustrates that the 
nature and capacity of a state is of primary importance to human protection. 
Recognising that protection embodies both prevention and reaction, it is clear from 
chapters one to three that the legitimacy of Security Council action and the organ 
itself is dependent upon its capacity and willingness to engage in measures 
consistent with both preventive and reactive elements of R2P, in order to achieve 
international security within a context influenced by complex cases of human 
suffering. 
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The UN Security Council and R2P 
Reflecting upon the legal, political and ethical foundations for international 
engagement with mass atrocities serves to illustrate how the key arguments 
advanced in part one of this thesis have informed international thinking on human 
protection. In this regard, there are a number of identifiable developments 
throughout the chapters that comprise part one. These developments are significant 
because they demonstrate the conceptual foundations for international engagement 
with mass atrocities under the umbrella of R2P. With regard to the legal basis for 
international engagement with mass atrocities, chapter one argued that the question 
of human protection must be viewed as the interlocking of power and authority.1  
Viewing Security Council action in this way recognises that the process of 
international law is a socially constituted decision-making process that allocates 
meaning, rather than simply a body of rules supported by precedent to be applied 
impartially. Within this process, it is the mutually constitutive relationship between 
agents and structures or sources of international law and practice that influences 
collective understandings of the legality and legitimacy of a particular course of 
action and in turn, state action. The idea of the rule of international law is 
instructive in this regard.   
In what is arguably the greatest contrast with its predecessor humanitarian 
intervention, chapter two argued R2P is about more than just the Security Council 
reacting to mass atrocities. The notion of protection imbued in R2P is characterised 
by a continuum of international engagement that spans the full range of 
responsibilities from protecting populations to preventing further conflict to 
rebuilding communities. Within this framework, invocation of R2P means in 
addition to responding to situations where a state has failed to meet its sovereign 
responsibilities, the Security Council has a positive obligation to assist with 
developing political, economic and societal capacity so as to prevent further 
suffering. Consequently, R2P inherently involves both prevention and reaction. 
                                                 
1 Higgins, Problems and processes, p.4. 
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With the legitimacy of peace operations and the Security Council itself increasingly 
linked to its role in both civilian protection and human development, peacebuilding 
has become a key feature of international engagement with mass atrocities. Of 
primary importance to peacebuilding within the remit of R2P, is the nature and 
capacity of the state. Employing the premise that robust and capable states provide 
the best guarantee of peace, Security Council deliberations are increasingly 
incorporating political, economic and social development into development of 
operational mandates. Where action consistent with reactive elements of R2P is 
often criticised for its perceived link to forced regime change, peacebuilding as a 
preventive measure is dominated by concerns about its tendency to be authoritarian 
and its Western approach in terms of privileging ‘certain kinds of action and certain 
kinds of institutions over others’.2  In light of a disappointing track record, chapter 
three argued that the question for the Security Council is not whether peacebuilding 
should be incorporated into international engagement with mass atrocities, but 
rather how to do so in order to give full effect to the preventive dimensions of R2P 
and avoid recreating the conditions, tensions and unsustainable structures that 
contributed to large scale violence.    
As the introduction to the second part of this thesis this chapter clarifies the 
investigative framework for the two case studies on Darfur and Libya that follow. 
Drawing on the conceptual foundations for international engagement with mass 
atrocities outlined above, the first part of this chapter establishes the value of 
adopting a constructivist framework including implications for developing a more 
nuanced understanding of the role and importance of legitimacy in international 
politics. Consistent with this approach, part two of this chapter engages in a 
constructivist analysis of the communicative role of the Security Council in 
influencing state action. Because constructivism is necessarily concerned with 
understanding the intersubjective dimensions of reason and action, particularly the 
regulative and constitutive norms that underpin the functioning of organs such as 
the Security Council, it is well placed for understanding the politics of international 
engagement with mass atrocities. The third and final part of this chapter introduces 
the case studies on Darfur and Libya in chapters five and six respectively and 
                                                 
2 Orford, Moral Internationalism, p.105. 
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clarifies criteria for selection and structure of each. While both elicited concern as 
cases for R2P they appear to have taken different trajectories in terms of state 
engagement with prevention and reaction elements of the principle. Examining how 
the discursive frame of R2P has been employed by states to fulfil disparate 
functions either as a policy agenda to address risk factors or as ‘a “red flag” to 
galvanise the world into action’ against an imminent threat,3  the cases of Darfur 
and Libya demonstrate disparity in terms of which actors invoked the language of 
R2P, levels of resistance or accommodation and the international response elicited 
by references to the principle.  The investigative framework formulated for this 
thesis was heavily influenced by its ability to interpret this disparity and capacity to 
trace social processes that led to turning points in the international response.  
4.1 Investigative framework 
Theoretically, constructivism is distinct in its approach to international relations 
because of its emphasis upon the social or intersubjective dimensions of 
international politics. As such, constructivism broadly defined is concerned with 
emphasising the connection between normative change, the role of state identity and 
interests in influencing action and the mutually constitutive relationship between 
agents and structures in international politics.4 Unlike ‘systemic constructivism’ 
concerned with examining the relationship between unitary state actors, ‘unit-level 
constructivism’ is concerned with the relationship between domestic legal and 
social norms, this research utilises ‘holistic constructivism’ to accommodate the 
multi-dimensional nature of international engagement with mass atrocities.5 This 
research finds holistic constructivism the most persuasive because of the manner in 
which it transcends the traditional divide between macro (international) and micro 
(domestic) levels of analysis. More importantly, because holistic constructivism is 
necessarily concerned with the ‘dynamics of global change’ and emphasises the 
mutually constitutive relationship between international order (as provided by 
                                                 
3 Bellamy, Responsibility to protect—five years on, p.166. 
4 Reus-Smit, Constructivism, p.212. 
5 Ibid., p.221. 
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international law) and states,6 this research finds it the most relevant constructivist 
interpretation for examining the development of contemporary normative and 
ideational structures that condition international thinking on legitimacy.7 Moreover, 
it is the contention of this research that the value of adopting this form of a 
constructivist framework lies in its interdisciplinary heritage which brings to light 
the how, what and where questions of empirical research.  
Adopting a constructivist framework to investigate the role of discourse in 
international politics raises four important methodological issues. The first issue 
relates to ontology, or how the research is conceptualised through the three 
components of intersubjectivity, context and the exercise of power. While the role 
and importance of legitimacy in international politics is considered further in 
section 4.1.1, a review of shifts in international thinking, such as shifting notions of 
sovereignty, reveal  it is ‘social phenomena’ such as values, rules, distinctive 
languages, culture and ideology that creates identities and in turn influences state 
action.8 From this it can be surmised that intersubjectivity is derived from the fact 
that these social values represent more than ‘aggregated beliefs’.9 In contrast, they 
represent particular meanings which achieve stability over time to the extent that 
they create a social order. Normative and ideational frameworks associated with this 
order set expectations about how it will operate, what type of behaviour is to be 
regarded as legitimate, and possibilities with regard to identity and interests.10 This 
necessarily brings us to the next component: context. As intersubjective 
understanding may vary spatially and temporally, constructivists situate their 
research within ‘spatial, historical, and social contexts’ so as to understand how 
shifts in meaning affect people in ‘different regions and eras’ and to ‘gauge’ the 
transformative potential of established rules or practices.11 Since the third 
component within this framework, the exercise of power, is through social relations 
rather than possession of material capability, constructivists are necessarily 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p.221. 
8 A Klotz. & C Lynch, Strategies for research in constructivist international relations, ME Sharpe, 
Armonk, 2007, p.7. 
9 Ibid., p.8. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p.9. Emphasis added. 
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concerned with analysing processes and interactions to establish how different 
meanings condition identities and actions, including why some values or norms 
prevail over others.12 From this perspective, the utility of constructivism lies with its 
capacity to accommodate the dynamic and socially constituted nature of 
international politics, particularly its ability to explain why change occurs in 
response to specific activities in one situation, but not in others. 
This leads to the second issue raised by adopting a constructivist frame: 
epistemology. From this perspective, the theoretical frame of constructivism has 
been particularly influential in the design of this project. Interpretation is a key 
feature of constructivist epistemology. The value of adopting an interpretive 
approach is that it opens up analysis of international institutions to ‘communicative 
dynamics’, rather than rely only on ‘referential functions’ of normative 
frameworks.13 As defined by Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, 
communicative dynamics refers to the interplay between how states interpret 
behaviour of other states, the practice of rationalising and justifying their action (or 
inaction), and the responsiveness of other states to such reasoning.14 Consistent with 
this definition, the two case studies that follow are necessarily concerned with 
variations in the practice of the Security Council. Examined through Kratochwil and 
Ruggie’s communicative dynamics, it is the constant interplay between sources of 
international law and practice, or established rules and norms, values and ideas 
within the Council, that helps to ‘yield’ a multi-dimensional picture of the organ, 
particularly its role in advancing the principle of R2P through ‘successive 
adaptations’.15  
As most debates on R2P are concerned primarily with the applicability of the 
principle rather than how to realise individual elements, adopting an interpretive 
approach provides an opportunity to examine the role shifting conceptions of 
legitimacy play in constituting or constraining state action under the umbrella of 
R2P. At the same time, adopting an interpretive approach facilitates greater 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p.11. 
13 Kratchowil. & Ruggie A state of art, p.774. 
14 Ibid., p.769. 
15 Lowe et al The United Nations Security Council and war, p.18. 
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consideration of the contribution of international organisations to the ‘effectiveness 
of informal ordering mechanisms’ through their capacity to ‘enhance’ or challenge 
intersubjective expectations.16 Given the social nature of international politics and 
the subjectivity of the decision to use force for human protection, the problem with 
causality is that it is difficult to verify whether an important development can be 
attributed solely to a normative or ideational framework, such as R2P. A case in 
point is Kenya (2007) where disputed elections led to ethnic-related violence, and 
invocation of R2P was credited with preventing mass atrocities. While it did 
provide a discursive framework to facilitate international pressure on the Kenyan 
government for a diplomatic resolution, the problem in this case,17 is that it is not 
obvious whether success or otherwise could be attributed in a causal manner solely 
to invocation of R2P.  
Having established the importance of interpretation, the third issue raised by 
adopting a constructivist frame relates to which ‘concepts’ and ‘tools’ are the most 
appropriate for the conduct of the research.18 Recognising the centrality of the four 
concepts of agency, structure, identity and interest to constructivism, it is self-
evident that ideas and discourses are a key feature of such an approach. Moreover, it 
is the capacity of a conceptual framework to capture and explain ‘alternative 
interpretations’ to a similar situation that renders it the most appropriate for 
accommodating and explaining differences in how states conceive legitimacy.19 
This necessarily brings this examination of approach to the final issue raised by 
adopting a constructivist framework, which relates to validity, or rather, 
generalisations versus standards as method for verification.20   
Constructivists are sceptical of generalisations, favouring instead context-specific 
analysis where theory and evidence inform each other to facilitate comparative 
assessment of the coherence of alternative interpretations.21 While this aspect of a 
                                                 
16 Kratchowil. & Ruggie  A state of art, 1986, p.775. 
17 Evans, Responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocities, p.51. 
18 Klotz & Lynch, C. Strategies for research, 2007, p.18. 
19 Ibid. 
20See  Klotz & Lynch, Strategies for research, esp. chapter one ‘Constructivism’, pp.3-23. 
21 Ibid., pp.20-1. 
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constructivist approach may be critiqued on the grounds of subjectivism, 
Kratochwil and Ruggie are convincing in their assessment that  
interpretive epistemologies which stress the intimate relationship 
between validation and the uncovering of intersubjective meanings, are 
simply too well developed to be easily dismissed by charges of 
subjectivism.22 
Consistent with Hedley Bull’s call for classic approaches that rely upon exercise of 
judgement rather than scientific methods of ‘verification and proof’,23 this research 
adopts an interpretive method of analysis. More specifically, the empirical 
examination that follows in chapters five and six engages in an interpretive textual 
analysis. The motivation for selecting textual analysis is that it provides an effective 
mechanism to engage in the systemic study of communication content of specific 
sources and associated discourses across a number of settings.24 In summary, what 
this examination of the implications of the investigative framework reveals, is that it 
is the manner in which constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, Friedrich 
Kratochwil, John Ruggie and Christian Reus-Smit emphasise the importance of 
established normative considerations, the role of identity, and the relationship 
between actors and systemic or organisational structures, which demonstrates 
consistency with the objectives of this research.  To this end, the value of engaging 
in a constructivist examination, is that it provides a framework capable of locating 
the ‘subtleties’ of texts, developing a greater understanding of the relationships that 
exist between them (their intertextuality),25 and appreciation for the manner in 
which documentary sources such as Security Council resolutions, meetings records 
and reports guide how states perceive and understand specific situations, the actors 
contained therein and possible sources of influence. In this regard, legitimacy plays 
a central role in this process. 
                                                 
22 Kratchowil & Ruggie A state of art, 1986, p.765. 
23 H Bull ’International theory: the case for the classical approach’, World Politics, vol. 18, no. 2, 
1966, p.361.  
24 Druckman  Doing research, pp.167-72; 257. 
25 D Silverman, Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analysing talk, text and interaction, 2nd 
edn, Sage London, 2001, p.122. 
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4.1.1 The importance and role of legitimacy 
This chapter continues the tradition of legal and political scholarship examined in 
part one concerned with the structures and processes of international governance. 
More specifically, this thesis shares with this scholarship a concern for the decision-
making process that sets the parameters for international engagement with mass 
atrocities, particularly sources of normative influence in that process. A recurring 
theme throughout the three chapters that comprise part one is the importance and 
role of legitimacy. Legitimacy as it is employed throughout this thesis represents a 
‘normative belief’ among states that ‘a rule of an institution ought to be obeyed’.26 
Unpacking this definition further, this thesis subscribes to Ian Hurd’s assessment 
that legitimacy represents  
a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution…defined by 
the actor’s perception of the institution…[which] may come from the 
substance of the rule from the procedure or source by which it was 
constituted.27 
To understand the centrality of legitimacy to international engagement with mass 
atrocities this thesis employs a two-dimensional interpretation. Firstly, legitimacy is 
understood in the substantive sense to locate shifts in the way ideas and beliefs 
towards what is regarded as legitimate action are conceived and employed by states 
within international politics to contest, rationalise or reinforce established rules and 
practices. Secondly, by implication, legitimacy is understood to contain a 
procedural element in that shifts in collective understanding may influence 
institutional processes and organisational outcomes, such as resolutions, member 
voting or even the ‘general orientation’ of an organisation.28 As demonstrated in 
chapter one, international human rights standards have proved a source of 
significant influence in how states conceive legitimate statehood and the 
establishment of rules that differentiate ‘permissible’ from ‘impermissible 
behaviour’.29 Likewise, shifts in values, norms and beliefs that underpin 
                                                 
26 I Hurd, After anarchy: legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2007, p.7. 
27 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
28 Kratochwil & Ruggie, A state of art, p.756. 
29 TG Weiss, DP Forsythe, RA Coate, & KK Pease, The United Nations and changing world politics, 
5th edn, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 2007, p.357. 
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international engagement with mass atrocities have resulted in liberal governance 
becoming the prevailing model for post-conflict political, economic and social 
organisation.30 
Looking at the contribution of organs, such as the Security Council, to international 
governance is instructive for understanding the multi-dimensional nature of 
legitimacy. The Security Council provides an important forum in international 
governance for dialogue, agenda formation, policy coordination, and as a means 
through which to endorse or contest prevailing norms, values or ideas.31 By 
implication, the Security Council also plays the role of ‘dispenser of collective 
legitimacy’ when it endorses a particular course of action.32 On the other hand, the 
legitimacy of the Council is itself dependent upon perceptions that its decision-
making processes are ‘proper and correct’ in that they reflect established rules and 
practice as set out in the UN Charter and other sources of international law. The 
legitimacy of the Security Council is also contingent upon being ‘reasonably 
successful’ at pursuing goals consistent with prevailing values.33 Securing 
legitimacy among Council members is important because it implies that a ‘measure 
of social consensus’ has been reached.34 While this assessment may reflect the 
historical role played by legitimacy in shaping international engagement with mass 
atrocities, the complex relationship between legitimacy and consensus within the 
Security Council requires further clarification to fully understand the interplay 
between these two important characteristics of international politics; particularly, 
their role in influencing international engagement with mass atrocities.  
Ian Clark captures the essence of this complex and dynamic relationship in his 
assessment that while legitimacy and social consensus are ‘intimately connected’, 
they are independent.35 While securing legitimacy to a degree ‘subsumes a measure 
of social consensus’ securing consensus is not in itself ‘sufficient’ to ensure 
                                                 
30 Goetze & Guzina, Turtles all the way down, 2008, p.322.. 
31 Kratochwil & Ruggie State of art, 1986, p.758. 
32 Ibid. 
33 M Barnet & M Finnemore Rules for the world: International organisations in global politics, 
Cornell, Ithaca, 2004, p.166. 
34 Clark, Legitimacy in international society, p.191. 
35 Ibid. 
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conceptions of legitimacy will follow.36 What this assessment serves to illustrate is 
that consensus reinforces the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy in that it 
‘touches’ both substantive and procedural elements.37 It touches substantive 
legitimacy in its requirement for widespread agreement on the substance of 
normative precepts that underpin prevailing models for international engagement 
with mass atrocities, such as the notion of responsible sovereignty. At the same 
time, it touches procedural elements of legitimacy in its requirement for legal 
authority through the provisions of the UN Charter and widespread agreement on 
action authorised by the Security Council in the name of human protection.38  
Further examination of the interplay between consensus and legitimacy reveals 
while each remain more of an aspiration of international responses to human 
suffering than a feature, it is variations in how legitimacy is conceived and 
employed in different circumstances by states that raises questions regarding the 
process of validation afforded by consensus.39  These questions relate to whether 
the agreement associated with securing consensus is more important as a social 
value, because it demonstrates ‘concurrence’ with deeply held societal beliefs,40 the 
process of reasoning that accompanies securing consensus is more important 
because of its role in validating knowledge or truth claims, or whether it is the 
‘procedural benefit’ agreement delivers to a divided international community that is 
of greater value.41 Just as human rights has been particularly influential in linking 
individual and collective rights to perceived obligations of states to protect those most 
vulnerable, through its humanitarian focus IHL has made remarkable inroads into 
ending impunity for the most serious breaches of international law. In the case of 
IHL, the relationship between legitimacy and consensus has been constitutive and 
constraining. Representative of a widely accepted body of rules codified into law, 
IHL gives practical effect to protection through both prevention and reaction. In terms 
of prevention, IHL constrains state action by placing practical restrictions on both the 
means and methods of warfare. This has not only exerted significant influence on the 




39 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
40 Ibid., p.193. 
41 Ibid., pp.193-4. 
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conduct of hostilities by states, but also the development of weapons for 
contemporary warfare as they have adapted to address prohibitions on means that 
cause unnecessary, prolonged or serious harm (such as expanding bullets or anti-
personnel landmines). With respect to reaction, IHL provides a comprehensive 
framework for prosecuting harm, particularly for serious violations involving 
systematic and large scale violence such as genocide.  The progression of common 
Article 3 establishing a minimum standard of humane treatment into customary 
international law, through general acceptance as law by states as articulated in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (Article 33(1)(b)), provides a further 
example of the relative importance of IHL and mutually constitutive relationship 
between legitimacy and consensus. 
It is apparent from this brief examination of consensus that legitimacy is both 
constitutive and constraining. In the case of the former it empowers states taking 
action regarded as legitimate in three important ways. Firstly, states who command 
legitimacy have the benefit of being able to ‘draw on’ the active support of other 
states through guaranteed investment of ‘resources and energies’.42 Secondly, states 
who command legitimacy can compel ‘compliance’ from other states. Thirdly, 
states who command legitimacy derive benefit from ‘low levels of opposition’.43 
From an institutional perspective, legitimacy increases when decisions and actions, 
identity and declared interests, are ‘socially sanctioned’ by members and broader 
communities of interest.44 On the other hand, legitimacy constrains international 
action because in making a claim for legitimacy states seek to rationalise their 
identity, interests and practices by appealing to prevailing normative and ideational 
frameworks.  
Employing Kratochwil and Ruggie’s concept of communicative dynamics confirms 
while legitimacy licences state action through ideational frameworks (the realm of 
possibility with reference to institutionalised values and ideas) and communication 
(the practice of justification), it also constrains state action through its structuring 
                                                 
42 Reus-Smit, International crises of legitimacy, p.163. 
43 Ibid., p.164. 
44 Ibid., p.158. 
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effect.45 It is through this practice of legitimation that the ‘architecture’ of social 
norms, values and ideas that underpins conceptions of legitimacy is constituted and 
re-constituted by states,46 and thus creates structures in international politics as it 
constructs and reconstructs the ‘bounds of normatively permissible agency and 
action’.47 It is also through communicative dynamics that ‘discrepancies’ or 
disagreement among members towards a perceived disparity between the 
‘constitutional design’ and actual ‘practice’ of an organisation may be challenged.48 
Indeed, the willingness of the Security Council to engage in the use of force for 
human protection was challenged throughout the 1990s in this manner.  Drawing on 
an inconclusive legal debate surrounding the use of force and the perceived failure 
of the international community in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and 
Kosovo, opponents challenged the emerging practice of humanitarian intervention 
on the basis that it was incompatible with the provisions of the UN Charter for 
sovereignty and non-intervention, and therefore the intended purpose and role of the 
Security Council. Central to this opposition was the belief that a more permissive 
interpretation of international law licensing the use of military force contradicted 
the perceived impartiality of UN peace operations.  
While it is the contention of this chapter that communicative dynamics is integral to 
understanding the intersubjectivity of legitimacy, it is important to note however, 
this understanding of legitimacy is not entirely value free. As a principle of 
justification, the definition of communicative dynamics advanced here implies 
‘equal dialogical participation and other-perspective taking’ are ‘indispensable 
ingredients’ of the practice of legitimation.49 Contrasted against the narrow 
membership, privileged institutional status of the Security Council and 
inconsistency in application of specific provisions of the UN Charter by the P5, this 
suggests the practice of legitimation taking place in the Council rarely satisfies 
these characteristics. Recognising this limitation to an ideal process of legitimation, 
                                                 
45 Reus-Smit. Constructivism, pp.218-9. 
46 Reus-Smit, International crises of legitimacy, p.172. 
47C Reus, Smit ‘Society, power, and ethics’ in C Reus-Smit, C. (ed) The politics of international law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p.282. 
48 Kratochwil & Ruggie A state of art, p.756. 
49 C Bjola, ‘Legitimacy and the use of force: bridging the analytical-normative divide’, Review of 
International Studies, vol. 34, no.4, 2008, p.640. 
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it must be noted that communicative dynamics is also premised on the belief that 
‘truth, inclusiveness, and sincerity’ represent a ‘realistic common denominator’ for 
establishing the ‘value-orientations’ of states making a claim for legitimacy.50 Put 
simply, this illustrates that context is important for states making claims for 
legitimacy or challenging established normative and ideational frameworks.  
There is one further clarification on how legitimacy is conceived that must be made 
before this chapter proceeds to clarify the context of the Security Council. As noted 
by Christian Reus-Smit, because of its ‘inherently social nature’, many scholars 
frequently conflate the concept of legitimacy as described here with other social 
values associated with securing consensus, such as ‘rationality, justice, legality and 
morality’.51 This is problematic because it fails to recognise that it is often the 
interplay between notions of rationality, justice, legal and moral authority that 
constitutes the philosophical framework within which claims to legitimacy are made 
or challenged. As clarified by Reus-Smit, legitimacy draws on such values and 
exists in a complex relationship with them (just as it does with consensus), but is 
distinct in that it requires ‘social recognition’ to exist.52 Consequently, while 
legitimacy may be ‘grounded’ in intersubjective meanings and values related to 
agency and structure,53 it is ‘dependent’ upon social endorsement through a process 
of ‘interaction, communication and accommodation’.54 Representing a social 
concept in ‘the deepest sense’,55 the discursive practice of legitimation is heavily 
dependent upon  
the prevailing architecture of social norms, upon the cultural mores that 
govern appropriate forms of rhetoric, argument, and justification, and 
upon available technologies of communication.56 
Recognising the centrality of communication to the ascription of legitimacy, it is the 
sociological orientation of constructivism, particularly its concern for identifying 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Reus-Smit, International crises of legitimacy, p.160; see also Hurd, After anarchy, p.44. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., p.161. 
54 Ibid., p.172. 
55 Ibid., p.159. 
56 Ibid., p.163. 
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‘social structures, influence routes and popular discourses’,57 which provides both 
the impetus for this research and theoretical frame for the case studies that follow. 
As noted in part one, the use of force for human protection exists at the intersection 
of international law and international politics. Theoretically, the value of a 
constructivist framework lies in its emphasis upon the mutually constituted nature 
of communication between them. Specifically, how politics conditions international 
law as an institution and how international law structures international politics 
within organs such as the Security Council.58  
4.2 Security Council procedure and practice 
As the principal organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security, 
the Security Council is unique in its privileged position, procedure and practice. As 
outlined above, constructivist concern for developing a fuller understanding of the 
mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures is well placed for 
understanding the manner in which international law functions through 
deliberations of this organ.59 However, to fully appreciate the significant 
communicative role of the Security Council in providing a contemporary forum for 
international dialogue, argumentation and legitimation of state action for human 
protection, it is necessary to briefly consider the Council’s historical development 
through the UN Charter, before considering procedure and practice of the organ. 
Representative of a concerted effort on the part of drafters to construct effective 
barriers to international aggression, the UN Charter also represents a deliberate 
attempt to address identified weaknesses of its predecessor, the League of Nations, 
established by the Treaty of Versailles (1919).60 Contrasting the UN with its 
predecessor a number of similarities are apparent. Firstly, as an international 
organisation comprising member states, under the Covenant of the League of 
Nations (including amendments to December 1924), the League of Nations was 
premised on preventing war through a similar notion of collective security to that 
                                                 
57 Navari, Introduction: methods and methodology, p.3. 
58 Reus, Smit, Politics of international law, pp.11-2. 
59 Ibid., p.41. 
60 UN, About the United Nations: history, retrieved 15 June 2011 
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm>. 
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adopted by founders of the UN: to ‘promote international cooperation and to 
achieve peace and security’ (Article 4). Secondly, disarmament and settling 
international disputes through negotiation and arbitration were primary goals of the 
League (Article 5), just as they are for the UN. Thirdly, similar to UN, the League 
relied upon three principal organs to give effect to specific provisions of the 
Covenant: an Assembly, Council and Secretariat led by a Secretary-General 
(Article 10).  
However, as a precursor to the UN, the League Covenant also contains a number of 
key differences with the UN Charter and by implication, the Security Council. As 
an executive organ the League Council was ‘functionally ineffectual’ because of 
specific provisions in the Covenant related to representation, voting procedure and 
authority (Article 2). On the first point of difference, membership was problematic 
as it did not contain all major powers of the time.  The US was not a member 
whereas Germany (1926-33), Japan (until 1933) and Italy (until 1937) were 
members for only a limited period,61 while the UK and France as colonial powers, 
were members throughout the League’s existence. Membership of major powers 
was problematic as they either withdrew to pursue expansionist claims which was 
the case with Germany, Japan and Italy, or in the case of France and the UK, 
challenged the legitimacy of the organ because of their association with 
colonialism. In contrast, drafters of the UN Charter sought to ensure major powers 
were ‘willing to become’ and ‘remain members’ of the organisation.62 Voting 
procedure also constrained the effectiveness of the League Council because each 
member, regardless of status (permanent or non-permanent), could effectively veto 
decisions (Article 5). The basis for this constraint can be found in a tension between 
Article 4 which granted one vote to each member of the League Council and Article 
5 which proscribed ‘decisions at any meeting... require the agreement of all the 
Members…represented at the meeting’ (Articles 4-5). This shortcoming served as a 
lesson for drafters of the UN Charter, where the inclusion of procedural constraints, 
which proscribe a requirement for a three-fifths majority vote within the Security 
Council and the right to veto a resolution among the P5 (Article 27), can be 
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explained as an attempt to include mechanisms to address the tension in voting 
procedure which constrained the effectiveness of the League Council.  
The final constraint on the League Council which drafters of the UN Charter also 
sought to address, relates to an omission within Article 10 of the League Covenant 
clarifying the procedure for determining a threat to international peace or security 
and specific provisions for taking enforcement action.63 Confronted with a threat to 
international peace and security, the authority of the League Council was confined 
in scope to crimes of ‘aggression’ and territorial disputes between states (Article 
10), to provide advice, and where it was determined a threat existed, exhausting 
economic sanctions first (Article 16). As discussed in chapter one, in contrast the 
UN Charter empowers the Security Council with a broader mandate to consider 
challenges to international peace and security beyond sources of aggression 
(Articles 39-42). Furthermore, the Charter vests authority in the Security Council to 
take all necessary means, including military measures, rather than simply 
recommend actions or provide advice to other states on how to respond. 
Procedurally, the Security Council is also distinct in that provides a number of 
avenues for bringing matters to the Council’s attention, contains more flexible 
arrangements for drafting of resolutions and proceedings are published openly for 
public access. Each of these is addressed in turn in the following section as they 
relate to the case studies in chapters five and six. 
4.2.1 Security Council procedure 
Aside from periodic meetings, there are two avenues for bringing matters of 
concern to the Council’s attention. Firstly, under the Provisional Rules of 
Procedure of the Security Council S/96/Rev.7 (1983), the President may call a 
meeting at the request of any member of the Security Council (Rule 1). Secondly, a 
dispute or situation may be brought to the attention of the Council through existing 
provisions of the UN Charter: by any member of the UN or state which is not a 
member if it accepts provisions of the Charter relating to pacific settlement of 
disputes; if referred by the General Assembly (Article 11); and by the Secretary-
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General (Rules 1-5). Once a matter is placed on the Council’s agenda, proposed 
resolutions or any relevant substantive motions are normally presented to the 
Council in writing (Rule 31). If a draft resolution is proposed by a member of the 
Security Council, it is not necessary for it to be seconded before going to a vote 
(Rule 34), and a draft resolution can be withdrawn at any time as long as no vote on 
content of that resolution has taken place (Rule 35).   
UN members who are not a member of the Security Council may be invited to 
participate in meetings at the Council’s discretion, but they do so without the right 
to vote on any resolution before the Council when it is considered that their interests 
are directly affected or when a member brings a matter to the attention of the 
Council under Article 35(1) of the UN Charter (Rule 37). In these circumstances the 
member may submit a draft resolution to the Council for vote, but only if 
accompanied by a request by a member of the Council (Rule 38). The Council may 
also invite members of the Secretariat or others persons to provide information or 
assistance in its deliberations (Rule 40). Finally,  unless it is decided to convene a 
private meeting, Security Council deliberations are generally public in nature with 
official records of meetings and any relevant supporting documents published ‘as 
soon as practicable’ (Rules 48 and 54). Where a private meeting is held, a 
communiqué is issued instead (Rule 55). 
Looking at the practice of the Security Council, this thesis subscribes to Ian Hurd’s 
assessment that the ‘scope’ of the Security Council’s authority under the Charter 
while an important source of influence in perceptions of legitimacy, is somewhat 
‘less relevant’ than ‘its practical capacity to persuade’.64 Drawing on Kratochwil 
and Ruggie’s concept of communicative dynamics, what Hurd is alluding to is the 
normative force of the Security Council to ascribe legitimacy through its unique 
position as the international organ responsible for international peace and security, 
and role as the primary forum within the UN for contestation of prevailing values, 
rules, expectations and norms that underpin international engagement with mass 
atrocities. According to Hurd, there are three ‘symbols’of Security Council 
legitimacy: the politics of setting the Council’s agenda, membership (particularly, 
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election of non-permanent members) and the role of the Council in authorising the 
use of force by states.65 Consistent with Hurd’s analysis this thesis is primarily 
concerned with the latter, however, recognises the effect the former two may have 
upon Security Council practice, including the process of legitimation associated 
with the use of force for human protection.  
4.2.2 Security Council practice 
The practice of the Security Council in the post-Cold War period is full of examples 
of states seeking to secure collective legitimation for the use of force for human 
protection.  In many instances ‘great energy’ has been expended by states to 
associate their actions with the legitimacy embodied in the Security Council itself.66 
Interestingly, underpinning these efforts is an expectation that a shift in values, 
norms or ideational frameworks that grant legitimacy would ‘alter’ the actions of 
other states.67 Once such a shift is internalised to become a widely shared belief, it 
fundamentally alters the decision-making environment for all states, even those who 
have not been ‘socialised’ to the perceptions and its accompanying rules of 
behaviour.68 This is because it affects every state’s expectations about the likely 
behaviour of all states. This process of internalisation within Security Council 
practice can be further defined as the social process by which an individual actor 
‘apprehends an “objective” reality and endows it with meaning shared by others’.69 
One example is UN peacekeeping, which demonstrates the importance of symbols 
to international politics, particularly the ‘power’ of the Security Council to ‘transfer 
legitimacy to the acts of others’ through a process of internalisation.70 According to 
Hurd, the label of peacekeeping is treated in a similar manner to a ‘commercial 
trademark’ in that the Security Council as the institutional forum where the process 
of legitimisation occurs ‘guards it jealousy’, while the international community as 
consumer regards its presence as a ‘signal’ that the nature and scope of the mission 
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69 Ibid., p.41. 
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is endowed with the appropriate legal and moral authority.71 It necessarily follows 
that states not involved in the Council’s decision to authorise peacekeeping, will 
respond differently towards a conflict once it is legitimised as such by the Security 
Council. 
However, just as perceptions of legitimacy are not fixed, precise characteristics and 
content of the peacekeeping label is not fixed. This is problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, because shifting perceptions expose future applications of the label of 
peacekeeping and its accompanying process of legitimisation, to competing 
interpretations by states which may be ‘self-serving for those involved’.72 Secondly, 
shifting perceptions fuel existing criticism towards the ad hoc approach of the 
Security Council and inconsistency in application of specific provisions of the UN 
Charter, particularly by the P5, which critics argue challenges the legitimacy of the 
Council and its role in the process of legitimisation. Empirically, this confirms 
opening up the study of Security Council deliberations surrounding human 
protection to interpretive analysis highlights the importance of perceptions of 
legitimacy and the social process of legitimation to both the history and practice of 
the organ. Moreover, viewed through a constructivist lens, what this brief 
discussion of shifting perceptions of legitimacy serves to reaffirm is the mutually 
constitutive nature of the relationship between international law and politics in the 
two case studies that follow. 
4.3 Introduction to case studies 
This research is primarily concerned with establishing the influence of R2P in 
Security Council decision-making towards addressing human suffering associated 
with mass atrocities. More specifically, this thesis is concerned with establishing the 
extent to which R2P has influenced international engagement with mass atrocities 
to mobilise state action consistent with an ICISS culture of protection (to prevent, 
react and rebuild). As noted in chapter two, shifts in how states conceive legitimacy 
have been central to securing consensus and formal recognition of the concept of 
responsible sovereignty. Chapter three demonstrated linking international 
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legitimacy for contemporary peace operations to the protection of civilians has had 
a twofold structuring effect on international thinking concerned with mass 
atrocities. Firstly, increasing linkages between legitimacy of peace operations and 
protection of civilians has resulted in widespread recognition among scholars and 
practitioners that international responses cannot ignore the burdens of protection set 
out under the principle of R2P if they are to avert further atrocities. Secondly, 
shifting conceptions of legitimacy have significantly expanded the ‘ideational 
matrix’ around human protection.73 Examined through the concept of 
communicative dynamics this chapter finds the discursive frame of R2P has been 
employed in two ways within international politics that fulfil two disparate 
functions.  
According to Alex Bellamy, the problem is that while references to R2P is both a 
welcome and positive development in international politics, invocation of the 
discursive frame of R2P by states invariably involves a choice between two 
different approaches. In the first instance, invocation of R2P by states is used to 
describe a ‘political commitment’ to halt mass atrocities and prevent further 
suffering. Based closely on the commitment of states at the World Summit, 
invocation of R2P in this manner emphasises prevention to license a ‘broad based 
policy agenda’ focused upon ‘upstream prevention’ of atrocities’.74 Upstream 
prevention as it appears here involves proactive international engagement in a state 
to address risk factors for mass atrocities through systematic measures aimed at 
preventing a crisis occurring, rather than only responding to a crisis once it occurs. 
In practice, upstream prevention includes 
encouraging the internalisation of the principle of discrimination within 
armed forces…helping states and societies to build the capacities they 
need to resolve differences without recourse to violence...and 
persuading political leaders that they are likely to pay costs for the 
commission of mass atrocities. 75  
In the second instance, references to R2P license a normative call to action. 
Emphasising reaction, states invoke the distinctive language of R2P to ‘elevate’ 
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specific issues ‘above normal politics’ and in doing so, provide a ‘catalyst for 
international action’ to address an imminent threat of atrocities.76 Consequently, the 
act of labelling a particular crisis as a case for R2P serves as a ‘red flag’ for 
generating necessary political will among states to ‘mobilise’ a timely and decisive 
response.77  In this sense, invocation of R2P by states is based on a moral 
imperative to take emergency action to halt human suffering.  
While Bellamy argues that the principle of R2P as it has been employed by states 
represents a ‘policy agenda requiring implementation’ rather than a ‘red flag to 
galvanise the world into action’,78 it is his conclusion regarding the incompatibility 
of the two functions which is of primary interest to this research. According to 
Bellamy, while states can (and do) switch between the two functions of R2P, they 
cannot ‘sustain’ a political commitment to prevention and its associated policy 
agenda while employing R2P as a ‘speech act’ to mobilise an international 
response.79 It necessarily follows that when states invoke the distinctive language of 
R2P they make a choice regarding how they will employ the principle to rationalise 
their actions.80 Consequently, the choice they make between R2P as a policy agenda 
or normative call to action, affects collective understanding of the ‘role and impact’ 
of the principle upon international action.81 It is on this premise that the case studies 
that follow in chapters five and six were selected.   
4.3.1 Selection of case studies 
Beyond general concern for large scale human rights violations, R2P situations are 
most accurately defined as those where mass atrocities involving genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, are  
actually occurring or imminently about to occur, or where the 
situation could deteriorate to this extent in the medium or longer 
term unless appropriate preventive measures are taken. They are 
situations, actual or reasonably foreseeable, that should engage the 
attention of the international community simply because of the 
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particularly conscience-shocking character of the conduct actually or 
potentially involved.82 
However, identifying cases for R2P is problematic. Firstly, because evidence of 
‘requisite quality’ to confirm mass atrocities are occurring is not always available.83 
Secondly, where such evidence does exist, subjective assessments by the 
international community can arrive at disparate conclusions. In the case of Darfur 
the question arose in 2008 as to whether violence was a continuation of mass 
atrocities that occurred in 2003-04, or in contrast represented a new conflict ‘much 
less distinguishable from many others’.84 Thirdly, as explained by Gareth Evans, it 
is even more difficult to identify cases with confidence where the risk of mass 
atrocities can be characterised as being in the medium to longer-term.85 While 
developing early warning capacity has received attention through the General 
Assembly (2010), the ‘enterprise’ of developing credible and reliable criteria for 
inclusion of a state on any R2P watchlist remains ‘an art rather than a science’.86  
Despite the absence of any firm criteria, there are five factors identified by Evans 
that should be considered in identifying a situation or case for R2P concern.  
The first factor identified by Evans relates to whether there is a past history of mass 
atrocities within the state perpetrated either by a group or a repressive government 
against each other or both. The second is whether any tensions exist that have given 
rise to past conflict regarding issues such as ‘constitutional or legal status, political 
representation, group or individual discrimination, economic wealth and 
opportunity, repressed cultural identity’.87 The third factor relates to the capacity or 
‘strength’ of a state’s institutional structures for resolving tensions peacefully.88 The 
fourth factor relates to the ‘receptivity’ or perceived openness of the state in 
question to external assistance or sources of political and social influence, as 
‘closed’ states or those who seem to be ‘indifferent’ to what the international 
community thinks of them, are more likely to demonstrate indifference to their own 
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populations.89 The final factor to be considered is the quality of leadership of the 
state in question, as states with ‘good leadership’ tend to be more resilient in 
resolving problems, including a past history of atrocities, continuing tensions, and 
even weak institutions of governance’.90  
While this list is by no means exhaustive, it relies on subjective judgements and is 
dependent upon a case-by-case analysis of the risk of situations deteriorating over 
time, it does narrow the focus of international attention towards cases for preventive 
action. As argued by Evans, employing these considerations does not mean states 
identified are candidates for the use of force, rather they demonstrate a case for 
‘R2P concern’, because of a perceived risk or vulnerability that the current situation 
could deteriorate putting a state’s population at risk of becoming victims of new 
mass atrocities if preventive measures are not put in place.91 Taking these 
considerations into account together with the two functions of R2P identified by 
Bellamy, the case studies presented in this thesis on Darfur and Libya represent two 
post-2005 situations where the principle of R2P featured in Security Council 
deliberations on the capacity and willingness of a state to protect its citizens.  
Demonstrating consistency with the five considerations identified by Evans as cases 
for R2P concern, the primary rationale for selecting these two case studies is their 
disparity. That is, disparity in which actors invoked the language of R2P, levels of 
resistance or accommodation, the international response elicited by references to the 
principle, and finally, how states conceived legitimacy. Providing extensive 
documentation of Security Council deliberations over the course of the crises, the 
case studies presented here were also selected on their suitability for tracing social 
processes that led to invocation of R2P. Consistent with the qualitative 
methodology of process tracing,92 the cases of Darfur and Libya presented here 
offer a comprehensive yet bounded historical narrative of P5 interactions. As such, 
they provide an invaluable source for locating other factors, unfolding dynamics 
and events that led to various turning points in the international response to each 
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crisis. The value of locating these social processes is that it offers a practical 
mechanism for understanding the effect of R2P on international engagement. More 
specifically, whether R2P could be credited with driving international action (state 
action could be attributed to the use of R2P language) or alternatively, states only 
invoked R2P because they had agreed on the seriousness of the problem and were 
willing to permit action.  
Despite praise for the role of Africa in advancing R2P and the sustained efforts of 
the AU to engage in capacity-building so as to prevent atrocities, many scholars 
argue Darfur serves as an example of the perceived failure of R2P to exert any 
considerable influence on responses to the crisis. For instance, Bellamy argues 
international engagement with the crisis in Darfur didn’t perceptibly change as a 
result of labelling the crisis as a case for R2P. Moreover, looking at the most 
‘significant development’, the ICC indictment of President al-Bashir, while 
seemingly catalytic in eliciting a decisive international response needs to be 
balanced against the criticism of Security Council inaction to protect Darfurians and 
the systematic under-resourcing of peace operations.93 In the case of Libya, the 
Security Council set a precedent when it passed Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) 
authorising a no-fly zone and the use of all necessary measures, including the 
coercive use of force, to address widespread and systematic attacks on civilians. 
Compared to Darfur, resolution 1973 was distinct because of a ‘convergence’ 
between perceptions of legality and legitimacy, political will and operational 
capacity and speed. Libya was also unusual in the clarity of the threat of mass 
atrocities, short time-frame and role of regional organisations in supporting 
intervention.94 With prevention dominating the debate around R2P until Libya,95 
invocation of R2P reframed the debate as a question of a timely and decisive 
international action to protect vulnerable populations. Unfortunately, while the 
passing of resolution 1973 should have been a ‘vindication’ of R2P, it was quickly 
followed by ‘buyers regret’ when NATO-led action seemingly exceeded its human 
protection mandate.96  
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4.4 Conclusion 
While there are a multitude of analyses examining the legality of individual 
instances of the use of force, foreign policy imperatives of individual members of 
the Security Council and practical challenges of contemporary peace operations, 
few have sought to qualitatively examine the debate surrounding prevention and 
reaction for evidence of a procedural shift consistent with the ICISS conception of 
R2P (to prevent, react and rebuild). Recognising this gap, the research presented in 
chapters five and six seeks to build on the interdisciplinary focus of the scholars 
examined in part one, ‘interweaving’ various legal, political and ethical 
perspectives.97 By adopting an interpretive approach to analysis of the documentary 
record of Security Council deliberations on human protection, this research seeks to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of how R2P has influenced international 
engagement with mass atrocities. It is the contention of this chapter that the 
distinctive language of R2P has significantly expanded the normative and ideational 
framework surrounding human protection. Examined through a constructivist 
conception of communicative dynamics, it is the constant interplay between sources 
of international law and practice, established rules and norms, values and ideas, 
which helps to yield a multi-dimensional picture of the role of the Security Council 
in advancing R2P through successive adaptations.    
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Case study one—A policy agenda for Darfur   
In April 2003, rebel forces attacked El Fasher the capital of North Darfur in 
response to marginalisation of mostly African communities by the Islamist-Arabic 
Government of Sudan (GOS), led by President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. 
Grievances among marginalised communities revolved around the ‘divide-and-rule 
tactics’ of the GOS and denial of their share in political power and national wealth.1 
Fearing rebel mobilisation among Darfur tribes, the GOS launched a brutal counter-
insurgency on Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa populations detaining, intimidating, 
torturing and killing those connected by kinship or settlement.2 The impact of the 
conflict that followed was profound. Between 2003 and 2006 violent clashes 
between rebel movements and Sudanese armed forces, including the government 
sponsored militia the Janjaweed, resulted in excess of two million people becoming 
displaced.3 By 2007, over four million of Darfur’s estimated seven million 
population were dependent upon humanitarian aid for basic necessities such as 
food, water, shelter and health care.4 While rebel groups committed serious human 
rights violations, it was the primary responsibility of the GOS for systematic 
violations of human rights, including commissioning of mass atrocities, which drew 
international condemnation. Once on the Security Council’s agenda, it was the 
constitutive relationship between R2P, ethnic identity and state institutions that set 
the parameters for international engagement with the crisis.    
For the Security Council, Darfur represents one of the most complex peacekeeping 
operations, testing both the authority and solidarity of the organ. With 20,888 
personnel deployed,5 the joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) represents the largest mission authorised by the Council and arguably 
the most ambitious attempt at civilian protection. Within the Security Council, 
                                                 
1 Briefing by Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur (30 November 2009), S/PV.6227. 
2 International Crisis Group (ICG), Sudan: justice, peace and the ICC, Africa Report No. 152, 17 
July 2009, p.3. 
3Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur (28 July 2006), S/2006/591, para 3. 
4 F Stewart & G Brown, Fragile states, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human security and 
ethnicity (CRISE), Working paper No. 51, Oxford University, January 2009, p.84. 
5 AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur deployment as at 31 January 2013.  
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references to R2P have been employed to encourage compliance by the GOS with 
peace processes and to debate the merits of international intervention, including the 
use of force for human protection. As a result of the perceived reluctance of the 
Council to assume responsibility for human protection and systematic under-
resourcing of peace operations, the case of Darfur is often cited as an example of 
the failure of R2P to exert any considerable influence on international engagement 
with mass atrocities. Setting the effectiveness of the international response aside, 
this raises questions regarding the contribution of Darfur to international thinking 
on R2P, particularly, state commitment at the World Summit and subsequent 
interactive dialogues within the General Assembly.  
Seeking to understand the complexities of the conflict and the contribution of R2P 
to international thinking on human protection, part one of this chapter examines the 
factors in Darfur eliciting concern as a case for R2P. Central to these concerns is the 
position and role of the GOS. Having established that the GOS denied civilian 
protection, this chapter turns its attention to the practice of the P5. Through an 
interpretive examination of Council meeting records part two traces how the 
distinctive language of R2P was employed to justify action (or inaction) and 
secondly, how the P5 engaged with the full continuum of R2P (to prevent, react and 
rebuild). Employing Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P involves a choice 
by states between a policy agenda to address risk factors and a normative call to 
action seeking to mitigate an imminent threat, the final part of this chapter reviews 
discursive signifiers identified in part two to establish the choice made by the P5. 
From this it is clear that while deliberations were framed around the need to address 
the “root causes” of conflict and recognise the link between “security, development 
and sustainable peace”, formulation of an international response was also guided by 
the more immediate need for a “rapid response” to halt human suffering.  
5.1 A case for R2P concern 
Underlying the conflict in Darfur are decades of tensions over land, water and 
grazing rights predominantly between nomadic Arab herdsmen migrating from the 
north and settled African farmers in the south. Exacerbating these tensions are a 
range of factors around: chronic underdevelopment; environmental issues related to 
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competition over oil, gas and gold reserves, Nile waters, timber and agricultural 
land; and the relative position and role of the state in divergent ethnic identities. In 
Darfur, the interplay between land degradation, desertification and conflict is 
‘particularly strong’.6 In response to these tensions, national and international 
debates have been infused with a discourse whose meaning shifts to accommodate 
different values and interests. This includes the terms “government”, “rebel”, 
“Arab” and “African” which have all had different meanings temporally and 
spatially and are often oversimplifications of a much more complex and fluctuating 
situation.7 This discourse has influenced the political and ideological landscape 
within which conflict in Darfur is located. Within this landscape, the problem is that 
what binds Darfurians together in terms identity, is often as great as what divides 
them.8 Despite the absence of firm criteria, chapter four identified five factors that 
elicit R2P concern: existing tensions; history of atrocities; strength of a state’s 
institutional structures for governance; the perceived receptivity or openness of the 
state; and the quality of political leadership.9 A multidimensional and complicated 
conflict, because of ‘deep and overlapping political, economic, environmental 
dimensions’,10 Darfur elicits concern against each factor, as follows.    
5.1.1 Existing tensions  
Sudan is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, language and religion. Broadly, the 
population of Sudan can be divided into four main groups: African (52 percent), 
Arab (39 percent), Beja (6 percent), plus foreigners or other groups (3 percent).11 
Geographically, Sudan’s northern regions are characterised as largely Arab (Sunni 
Muslim) and the southern primarily African (Christian/Animist). While this 
dichotomy captures the location of dominant groups, it fails to account for the 
ethnic and religious diversity that exists. Within this dichotomy African groups 
                                                 
6 Briefing by Executive Director, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (20 July 2011), 
S/PV.6587; see also PD Williams, ‘Thinking about security in Africa’, International Affairs, vol. 83, 
no. 6, 2007, p.1032. 
7 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the UK and Northern Ireland (14 June 2006), 
S/PV.5462. 
8 A de Waal, ‘Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external 
engagement’, African Affairs, vol. 104, no. 415, 2005, pp.181-2. 
9 Evans, Responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocities, pp.74-5. 
10 Briefing by Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sudan (8 February 2005), 
S/PV.5120. 
11 Stewart & Brown, Fragile States, p.83. 
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include the Dinka with the largest population of around two million, the Nuer 
located mostly in the south and in Ethiopia, the Fur primarily in Darfur, the 
Zaghawa who include leaders of rebel groups in Darfur and are dominant in 
neighbouring Chad, and Beja located in the east of Sudan and in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea.  Arab groups include the Danagla, Gaalien and Shaigia located primarily in 
the north and Baggara located in Darfur and the southern region of Kordofan.12 
Situated along the western border of Sudan, Darfur means the ‘land of the Fur’.13 
While the Fur have a historical connection to the region they represent a minority of 
Darfur’s population which comprises many different ethnicities and tribal identities, 
including African Tunjur, Masalit, Daju  and Zaghawa, plus Arab Baggara, Rizeigat 
and Abbala.  
 
Source: United Nations, Sudan, Map No. 4458 Rev. 2, March 2012. 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 de Waal, Who are the Darfurians, p.181. 
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Seeking to understand the mutually constitutive relationship between ethnicity, the 
Sudanese state and violence, this thesis finds Alex de Waal’s 2005 examination of 
Darfurian identity and its implications for international engagement instructive. 
According to de Waal, there are four ‘overlapping processes’ of identity formation 
that are of primary importance.14 Individually, these four processes highlight the 
main currents of political, economic and social organisation complicating conflict in 
Darfur. Collectively, they provide an insight into the normative and ideational 
frameworks influencing conceptions of legitimate statehood to differentiate 
permissible from impermissible behaviour. Analysis of Sudanese state formation 
tends to favour north and south without recognising the contribution of the Dar Fur 
sultanate. In an attempt to redress this ‘Nilocentric historiography of Sudan’ de 
Waal explains polarised Arab and African identities central to conflict in Darfur 
originated during the first process of indigenous state formation, associated with 
independence of the Dar Fur sultanate (1600-1916).15   
Formation of the Sudanese state was centred on the Keira sultanate, located in Jebel 
Marra, south Darfur. Non-Arab identity was founded upon a ‘core Fur-Keira 
identity’ brought together with a combination of identities characterised as Fur-
Kunjara (the largest clan) and other southern groups, to form a Fur polity.16 In the 
north, dominant groups included: nomadic Bedouins (Arab desert nomads), camel 
owners with the capacity for long-distance trade, who were important to sultan 
wealth; and settled non-Arab Zaghawa who married into the ruling Keira family and 
were administrators and soldiers. Claims to Arab genealogy played an important 
role in state institutions as it introduced a ‘literate tradition’, the possibility of 
increased trade with the Arab world and Islam as the state religion.17   With Arab 
identity grounded in northern populations, emphasis upon African ethnicity by 
southern groups led to the emergence of a concurrent identity.  
Building on this early model of state formation, the second process of identity 
formation involved greater integration with Islamic ‘currents’ from West Africa and 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., pp.183-4. 
16 J Flint & A de Waal, Darfur: a new history of a long war, Zed Books, London, 2008, pp.6-7. 
17 de Waal,  Who are the Darfurians, 2005, pp.185-7. 
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the Nile Valley between 1883-1898 and later again in 1980-1999.18 The genealogy 
of Arab tribes migrating into Darfur between the fourteenth and eighteenth 
centuries can mostly be traced to Juhayna groupings and the Prophet Mohammed, 
which introduced a distinctive moral geography. Within this geography all land was 
regarded as belonging to Allah, with entitlement to settle belonging to ‘those who 
happen upon it’.19 This led to Darfur becoming a contested ‘chequerboard’ of land 
use between farmers and nomadic herders.20 From the eighteenth to twentieth 
centuries tribal groups consolidated to create new identities such as the Rizeigat in 
the south-east. When Rezeigat were awarded territorial jurisdiction (hakura) by the 
Fur sultan, tensions escalated with nomadic Abbala (camel men) in the north. This 
was because Abbala who settled were subject to the ‘administrative authority of the 
sultan’s provincial governor’, rather than recognised as ‘quasi-autonomous tribal 
units’.21 During the second phase (1980-1999) Darfur gained prominence as a 
Muslim constituency to be mobilised, with Islam providing the ‘path to 
enfranchisement’.22  
In the third process of identity formation, the conquest of Dar Fur in 1916 and 
incorporation of an independent Dar Masalit sultanate in 1922-23 signalled a new 
direction. Through British annexation native administration was introduced creating 
a hierarchy of tribal administrators with executive and judicial powers to normalise 
the ‘status of different tribal authorities’, establish coherence between competing 
ethnic identities and provide a mechanism to police subjects, particularly 
immigrants from the west.23  Geographically, native administration formalised the 
division of the Dar Fur sultanate into provinces and the allocation of territorial 
jurisdiction (hakura), now “dars”, to Baggara in the south. Closely linked to 
identity formation, dars created a legacy through the introduction of legal 
jurisdiction and tribal ownership of native land.  The availability of free land, a 
tradition of hospitality towards settlers and customary practice of adopting the 
                                                 
18 Flint, & de Waal,  Darfur: a new history of a long war, p.9. 
19 de Waal, Who are the Darfurians, p.190. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p.188. 
22 Ibid., p.191. 
23 Ibid., p.192. 
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‘legal code of host populations’, 24  supported allocation of dars.  By the 1970s dars 
had become ethnically diverse, with substantial populations relocating from the 
north. With an obligation for settlers to adopt the customary law of host 
populations, dar ownership became equally concerned with power hierarchies as 
much as land use. While native administration ceased in 1971, centralised 
administrative authority and an obligation to adopt custom and practice of the 
dominant ethnic group became entrenched.  
In the fourth and final process, ideological development of Arab and African 
identities occurred simultaneously with militarisation in Darfur, ranging from the 
spread of small arms, through organisation of militia in 1987-89, including a coup 
in 1989, to full-scale conflict in 2003. During this period ‘fear and violence’ 
became a powerful driver in forging polarised identities.25 Set against the backdrop 
of Sudanese political processes (north versus south) and wider African and Middle 
Eastern processes, complex identities were simplified into an Arab and African 
dichotomy. While the Islamist-Arabism of the GOS provided initial support for 
polarisation, Arab lineage and a strong connection with Libyan leader Colonel 
Muammar Qadhafi’s supremacist ideology (founded upon Arab annexation across 
the Sahara and Sahel) instigated a renewed Arab and African dichotomy.26 
Government attacks upon the ‘Fur heartland’ of Gulu in 1987, 2002 and 2004, 
delivered a ‘symbolic strike’ at Fur legitimacy as well as a ‘tactical assault’ on a 
primary source of opposition.27 Consequently, polarisation evolved into an agenda 
of domination by Khartoum over marginalised peripheries, with violence the 
primary means to dissolve opposition.  
5.1.2 History of atrocities  
Marginalised Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities share a basic pattern of 
grievances that revolve around denial of their share of political power and national 
wealth. In the case of the latter, issues include the provision of assistance to 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, compensation to victims of 
                                                 
24 Ibid., p.193. 
25 Ibid., p.197. 
26 Flint & de Waal,  Darfur: a new history of a long war, p.22. 
27 de Waal, Who are the Darfurians, p.198. 
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conflict, seed money for reconstruction and development and arrangements to 
ensure transfers from the GOS in Khartoum to regions.28 Since February 2003 the 
GOS has responded to insurgency by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on behalf of marginalised 
communities through its proxy militia the Janjaweed. Recruited largely from 
migrant Rizeigat and Abbala communities without customary land rights, the 
Janjaweed conducted a ‘drain and swamp’ campaign on behalf of the GOS aimed at 
driving civilians from villages, disbanding opposition and denying rebel forces a 
support base.29 Central to this campaign was encouragement by the GOS to 
systematically ignore IHL and IHRL. In April 2004 a fact-finding mission 
despatched by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to investigate allegations of serious human rights violations, found a 
‘disturbing pattern of disregard for basic principles of human rights and 
humanitarian law’ for which Sudanese armed forces and Janjaweed were 
responsible.30 Furthermore, the mission found consistency in allegations that 
government forces and the Janjaweed had carried out ‘indiscriminate attacks against 
civilians, rape and other serious forms of sexual violence, destruction of property 
and pillage, forced displacements, disappearances, and persecution and 
discrimination’.31 While the report indicated rebel forces also committed violations, 
it was the failure of the GOS to discharge its sovereign responsibilities to protect 
civilian populations that was of primary concern.  
Evidence encountered during the mission to support this finding included reports 
from refugees in Chad and IDPs in Darfur of well-coordinated air strikes by 
Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunships targeting markets and wells in villages.32 
Occurring weekly and lasting up to ten days, a ground attack by Janjaweed, 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or a combination of both usually followed. 
                                                 
28 Briefing by Special Envoy for AU Inter-Sudanese Talks on the Conflict in Darfur, 
(18 April 2006), S/PV.5413. 
29 ICG, Sudan: justice, peace, p.3. 
30 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and follow-up to the world conference on human rights: situation of human rights in 
the Darfur region of Sudan (7 May 2004) E/CN.4/2005/3 p.3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC S/PV.5687 (7 June 2007); Edmond Mulet, 
Assistant-Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations, S/PV.5849 (11 March 2008). 
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Destruction of property, livestock and essential supplies (such as flour, millet and 
crops), poisoning of wells with corpses and burning homes, markets and mosques, 
became a familiar feature of these attacks.33 Other violations reported to the mission 
included killing and enforced disappearance, particularly among men and boys; 
forced abduction, widespread rape and other sexual violence against women and 
girls; torture, such as severe whipping; or cruel and degrading treatment, such as 
stripping victims of their clothes to publicly humiliate them.34 In terms of sovereign 
responsibility, the mission found a ‘prevailing climate of impunity’ where the GOS 
had done little or nothing to prevent attacks on civilians, failed to take any 
‘meaningful action’ to bring perpetrators to justice and was continuing to ‘permit 
the Janjaweed to exercise a reign of terror’ in Darfur. The report concluded that 
despite claims by the GOS that it was engaged in a ‘concerted effort to re-establish 
law and order’ and ‘effective accountability’, there was ‘widespread denial’ of 
civilian protection.35  
Providing further evidence of the failure of the GOS, a commission of inquiry 
established under resolution 1564 (18 September 2004) arrived at a similar 
conclusion. Comprising five international legal and human rights experts, a team of 
forensic, military and violence against women specialists, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) spent eight weeks in Darfur and in 
neighbouring Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea collecting evidence from both 
governmental and non-governmental sources. The Commission’s final report 
S/2005/60 (25 January 2005) concluded that Sudanese officials, Janjaweed and 
some rebel groups were responsible for indiscriminate acts of violence, including 
the killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, 
pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur (paragraphs 233-236 and 
241-244). Evidence in the report gave serious weight to the call for international 
action and was a key factor in the Security Council decision that followed in March 
2005 referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. While the GOS consistently 
denied responsibility for the Janjaweed and attacks on civilians by government 
                                                 
33 E Reeves,‘Darfur and international justice’, Dissent, Summer, 2009, p.17. 
34 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,2004, paras 29-32.  
35 Ibid., para 36.  
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forces, evidence discovered suggested otherwise.36 In the case of SAF, Khartoum 
accepts that violations of IHRL and IHL had occurred but argued these represent 
‘individual excesses rather than state policy’ and were ‘natural, or inevitable, 
consequences of an armed conflict’.37 Not surprisingly, ICC investigations arrived 
at a contrary conclusion finding mass atrocities committed in Darfur were a 
‘consequence of a strategic decision by Sudanese officials’ and not a ‘by-product of 
conflict, inter-tribal clashes or climate change’ as defended by the GOS.38  
5.1.3 Institutional capacity  
Earlier in chapter three this thesis argued a common risk factor underpinning mass 
atrocities is the ‘nature and capacity’ of the state,39 which is often weak or 
repressive in nature. Some of the features of weak states which increase the 
propensity for violent conflict include economic mismanagement, lack of social 
service delivery and lack of capacity or willingness to guarantee human rights. 
While there is no universally accepted definition of weak states and in the absence 
of any ‘concrete metrics’ to evaluate capacity in each area of sovereign 
responsibility, discursive signifiers such as “weak”, “fragile” or “failed” are often 
employed by scholars and policymakers to identify states demonstrating reduced 
capacity for governance in what are commonly considered to be core 
responsibilities and functions of statehood: economic, political, security and social 
welfare.40 This explanation is based on a 2008 study conducted by US Permanent 
Representative to the UN and former Brookings Senior Fellow, Susan Rice, 
together with former Centre for Global Development Research Fellow, Stewart 
Patrick, which examined the drivers of state performance. In the study, Rice and 
Patrick defined weak states as lacking the capacity and/or will to  
foster an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic 
growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and accountable 
                                                 
36 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan: Emmanuel Akwei 
Addo (28 February 2005), E/CN.4/2005/11, paras 33-35. 
37 R Cryer ‘Sudan, Resolution 1593, and international criminal justice’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 19, 2006, p.198. 
38 Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC (8 June 2011), S/PV.6548. 
39 Picciotto & Fukuda-Parr, Conflict prevention and development cooperation , p.10. 
40 SE Rice & S Patrick, Index of state weakness in the developing world, Brookings, Washington 
DC, 2008, p.5. 
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political institutions; to secure populations from violent conflict and to 
control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their 
population.41  
Since independence in 1956, Sudan has been characterised by fragility, poverty, 
inequality and violence. As the largest state on the African continent, covering 2.5 
million kilometres with a population of 43.2 million and an average life expectancy 
of 58.9 years,42 Sudan is ranked the highest of the eight African states that appear in 
Rice and Patrick’s index of state weakness. However, to fully appreciate the 
institutional weakness of Sudan, it is necessary to engage in a more ‘fine-grained’ 
assessment.43  Looking at 141 developing states as classified by the World Bank, 
and drawing on a variety of internationally recognised reports and development 
indices, Rice and Patrick’s 2008 study identified twenty indicators that individually 
represent proxies for core state functions and collectively provide a ‘snapshot in 
time’ of the relative institutional effectiveness of states.44  
With ten representing strongest performance and one weakest performance, 
aggregated these indicators score Sudan’s overall performance at 3.29 out of a 
possible ten.45 In terms of performance across individual indicators, Sudan scores 
worst in the three areas of security (fourth behind Afghanistan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Somalia), conflict intensity (ranked the worst) and human 
rights violations (equal worst with Iraq). When scores are collated into functional or 
‘basket’ categories with a highest possible score of ten,46 critical weaknesses appear 
in two areas of state responsibility: security (scoring 1.46) and political (scoring 
2.06).47 Sudan scores only marginally better in the areas of social welfare (scoring 
4.59) and economic (scoring 5.05).48 With marginalisation of Fur, Masalit and 
                                                 
41 Rice & Patrick, Index of state weakness,  p.8. 
42 Amnesty International, ‘Sudan’, Annual report 2011, retrieved 29 October 2011 
<www.amnesty.org/en/region/sudan/report-2011>. 
43 Rice & Patrick, Index of state weakness, p.8. 
44 Ibid, p.3. 
45 Ibid, p.8. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Scoring of security is based on conflict intensity, political stability, absence of violence, incidence 
of coups, human rights violations and territory affected by conflict, while political scoring is based 
on government effectiveness, rule of law, voice and accountability, control of corruption and 
freedom. 
48Scoring of social welfare is based on child mortality, primary school completion, 
undernourishment, population with access to improved water sources and sanitation facilities and life 
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Zaghawa communities a central feature of conflict in Darfur, it is not surprising that 
Sudan also performs poorly in indicators related to individual rights and freedoms. 
Looking at political rights and civil liberties, the Freedom in the World Survey 
(2010) rates states on a seven point scale derived largely from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), where a rating of one represents the most 
free and seven the least free.49 In states rated as “not free” there is generally an 
absence of political rights, accompanied by widespread and systematic denial of 
basic civil liberties.50 Of the forty-seven states deemed “not free”, Sudan appears in 
fourth position (behind North Korea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and Libya) and 
is allocated the lowest possible rating of seven (least free).51  
In the context of concerns about sharing of national wealth and underdevelopment 
among marginalised communities, the extent to which conflict is undermining the 
ability of Khartoum to raise revenue is another indicator that warrants attention. The 
question that arises is whether the state is acting towards its limit in terms of ability 
to raise tax revenue, natural resource royalties and aid, or whether the failure to 
raise revenue is due to irresponsible government. Despite significant growth in the 
exploration of natural resources across Sudan, tax revenue as a share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) has not increased comparatively. Typically, tax revenue is 
an average of 16 percent for sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, Sudan has averaged: 
6.2 percent (1991-93); 6.5 percent (1994-96); 6.1 percent (1997-99); and 5.4 
percent (2000).52 The conclusion to be drawn is that while conflict may undermine 
the ability of Khartoum to raise revenue, since coming to power in 1989 the 
Sudanese government has not been able or willing to pursue taxation at a level that 
would enable improvement in the provision of services to Darfur’s wider 
population.  
                                                                                                                                        
expectancy, while economic scoring is based on gross national income per capita, GDP growth, 
income inequality, inflation and quality of regulation. Ibid., p.9. 
49 A Puddington ’Methodology summary’, Freedom in the world 2010 survey release, retrieved 18 
January 2010 < http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.crm?page=505>. 
50 Rice & Patrick, Index of state weakness., p.3. 
51 Ibid., pp.4-5. 
52 Stewart & Brown, Fragile states, p.91. 
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5.1.4 Receptivity or openness  
Despite continued assurances of their commitment to securing a political settlement 
and willingness to cooperate with the international community to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance and address security and development issues polarising the 
population, the GOS adopted a policy of non-cooperation. In practice, this 
translated into a variety of counter-productive activities characterised by an ongoing 
commitment to be party to various peace agreements without any implementation 
mechanisms or action in support of a political settlement; violations of ceasefire 
agreements; continuation of impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities; repressive 
censorship of potential sources of criticism or opposition; restricted access to 
vulnerable populations and movement of peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel; 
seizure of humanitarian assets; and a refusal to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Examples supporting this assessment include evidence of the GOS and militia 
engaging in indiscriminate attacks on villages and inciting local government 
authorities to block fuel deliveries for bores and water pumps,53 despite pledging to 
disarm and demobilise militias through an inclusive political process to share 
wealth and generate development.54 Other actions of the GOS counter-productive to 
human protection include delayed processing of equipment at Khartoum airport for 
up to eight months despite assurances it would facilitate immediate clearance for 
humanitarian assistance;55 restricted or no access to IDP camps in south Darfur; 
seizure of humanitarian assets through high-jacking or ambush of aid convoys; and 
moreover, kidnapping of humanitarian personnel.56 By March 2009 it was estimated 
that non-cooperation by the Sudanese government had impeded approximately forty 
to fifty percent of humanitarian capacity in Darfur. 57 
Despite commitments to justice in various declarations, there has been a lack of 
‘any real progress’ in prosecuting war crimes and human rights abuses or repealing 
                                                 
53 Briefing by Under Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs, (19 May 2006), S/PV.5441. 
54 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the US (9 May 2006), S/PV.5434. 
55Briefing by SRSG (Sudan) (18 September 2006), S/PV.5528; Statement by President of the 
Security Council (25 May 2004), S/PV.4978. 
56Briefing by Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (6 December 2007), S/PV.5792 
57Briefing by Director, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (20 March 
2009), S/PV.6096. 
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legal immunities that safeguard security and armed forces from prosecution.58 
While courts and investigative mechanisms have been created, evidence of 
proceedings is either non-existent or confirms the GOS has failed to connect those 
responsible to alleged crimes. A significant source of evidence eliciting concern in 
this regard is the National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS) which exploits 
its broad powers to harass, intimidate, arrest and detain human rights activists 
(including those located in IDP camps), journalists, those openly critical of the 
ruling National Congress Party (NCP) or civilians suspected of supporting rebel 
forces. Of primary concern is the failure of Khartoum to repeal NISS immunity 
from prosecution for human rights violations. Among its activities, the NISS has 
engaged in censorship of Sudanese press, resulting in the closure of the Rai Al 
Shaab newspaper (affiliated with the opposing Popular Congress Party) and 
sentencing of the deputy editor-in-chief and head of the political news desk to five 
and two years prison respectively.59 Despite censorship being lifted in 2005 both 
were reported to have been tortured or suffered ‘ill-treatment’ while in detention.60  
Responding to indictment by the ICC, President Bashir has continued to move 
freely visiting Chad and Kenya as late as July-August 2010,61 and Malawi in 
October 2011 for a regional trade summit.62 As a further act of defiance and 
contradictory to the permanent promise of compliance and justice, Khartoum’s 
reaction to the Harun case is ‘indicative’.63 Despite a April 2007 judgement by the 
ICC finding ‘reasonable grounds’ that Ahmad Muhammad Harun (former Minister 
of State for the Interior and Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs) and 
Janjaweed leader, Ali Abd-Al Rahman (aka Ali Kushayb), had joined to persecute 
attacks on civilians; systematically organise recruitment, funding and arming of 
Janjaweed to support SAF; and incited mass atrocities including crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, investigations by the GOS failed to connect Harun or 
                                                 
58 Henry, Darfur in the shadows, 2011, p.24. 
59 Amnesty International, Annual report 2011.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Amnesty International, Annual report 2011.  
62 Amnesty International, Malawi must arrest Sudan’s al-Bashir during visit, retrieved 29 October 
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Kushayb to mass atrocities.64 Challenging the authority and legitimacy of the ICC, 
the GOS subsequently appointed Harun as chair of a committee responsible for 
investigating human rights violations in Darfur and the UNAMID monitoring group 
responsible for oversight of peacekeeping forces.65 Together the examples cited 
here confirm that the GOS has systematically engaged the international community 
in a never-ending process of peace negotiations, supported by the permanent 
promise of compliance and justice.66 Gerard Prunier makes the point convincingly 
that this is a clever strategy since a preference by the Security Council for 
engagement has enabled the GOS to avoid international demands so long as its 
response appears ‘progressive’ and commitments are made in good faith.67 This has 
had significant implications for peace processes as rebel forces approach 
negotiations on the basis of mitigating ‘worst fears’, rather than pursuing ‘best 
hopes’.68  
5.1.5 Leadership  
The primary narrative of political and economic marginalisation associated with 
polarisation of Arab and African identities in Darfur is outlined in the Black Book of 
Sudan: Imbalance of Wealth and Power. Published in 2000 anonymously, the 
authors were later revealed to be intellectuals associated with the leadership of rebel 
JEM forces in Darfur. Seeking to demonstrate the effect an Arab and African 
dichotomy has had on access to power, the authors contrasted the origins of 
ministers appointed since independence in 1956 against population distribution 
between north and south. The book concludes that successive Sudanese 
governments have disproportionately appointed northern elites to 60-80 percent of 
ministerial positions.69 This northern dominance of state institutions is based on an 
Arab political discourse, which supports claims to dominance and exclusion. 
Interestingly, rather than a united group, northern elites comprise individuals with 
                                                 
64 Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC (7 June 2007), S/PV.5687. 
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66 Ibid., (5 June 2012), S/PV.6778. 
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disparate interests who regularly compete for power among themselves. This has 
resulted in a ‘series of unstable’ governments or military regimes.70  
Darfur is of central importance because it represents ‘one of the most populous 
regions’ and a stronghold for government opposition.71 At the time of the 2008 
Census, Darfur accounted for 19 percent (7,515,445 persons) of Sudan’s population, 
slightly less than south Sudan at 21 percent (8,260,490 persons). Through processes 
such as the Census, the NCP was able to systematically create the conditions to 
support domination of state institutions through delineation of electoral districts; 
limiting voter registration; co-opting traditional leaders and buying tribal loyalties 
in areas of opposition; and inflating Arab support for the NCP.72 Consequently, the 
Census became a flawed process with implications for any subsequent electoral 
processes or attempts at democratisation. This was largely because of the 
constraints imposed by restricted registration upon political representation among 
opponents of the NCP, such as populations in areas under rebel control; IDPs in 
Darfur who boycotted the Census because of perceptions that registration would 
lead to reprisals (including loss of right to return to tribal homeland or reallocation 
to Arabs who settled in the area during conflict); and residents of three major cities 
in Darfur (Nyala, El Fasher and Geneina) where only nineteen to thirty percent of 
households were counted.73  
As a result, presidential and parliamentary elections in April 2011 re-electing 
President Bashir took place among allegations of fraud and vote-rigging.  For the 
GOS this had the dual effect of guaranteeing dominance of state institutions while 
dissolving opposition by encouraging withdrawal from the electoral process through 
disenfranchisement. With concerns regarding power sharing and political 
representation common among marginalised communities, it is not surprising that 
the quality, practices and mechanisms for ensuring accountability of Sudan’s 
leadership feature consistently in Security Council deliberations. Combined with the 
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other factors examined here, this provides compelling evidence for invocation of 
R2P.   
5.2 Security Council deliberations 
The Security Council is briefed on instances of human suffering in specific 
countries or as a thematic issue through reports of the Secretary-General or key 
personnel, such as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) and 
Under Secretary-Generals for humanitarian affairs, political affairs and 
peacekeeping. As set out in the rules and procedure of the Security Council, verbal 
or written reports are generally only made in relation to issues already on the 
Council’s agenda. Somewhat breaking with this tradition, Darfur first appeared in 
deliberations in December 2003 when Jan Egeland, Under Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, brought the displacement 
of six hundred thousand Darfurians to the attention of the Council during an open 
debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.74  This was the first report of 
Egeland to the Council in the role and on Darfur. The next time Darfur was 
discussed was in May 2004 when several humanitarian and human rights 
organisations briefed members on the situation in Darfur during a three hour arria 
formula meeting. Noting ‘grave concern’ towards reports of large scale human 
rights violations but remaining optimistic about the possibilities for cooperation 
provided by the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed some four 
weeks earlier, presidential statement S/PRST/2004/18 (25 May 2004) was issued 
emphasising the need for the international community to ‘respond rapidly and 
effectively to the consolidated appeal for Darfur’. This ensured Darfur was now 
firmly on the Council’s agenda.  
From December 2003 to January 2013 there were 172 substantive references to 
Darfur in Security Council deliberations resulting in a total of thirty-four resolutions 
and thirty-four presidential statements (a summary of meeting records reviewed 
appears at Appendix A). The nature and scope of these references reflect a variety 
of deliberations, ranging from situational reports on the crisis in Darfur, to fact-
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finding or mission updates, progress reports on ICC investigations, the use of 
Darfur as an example during thematic debates or indirect references during 
deliberations on north-south tensions and broader regional security arrangements. 
As the official account of Security Council deliberations, verbatim meeting records 
offer a valuable source for understanding how states engaged with mass atrocities in 
Darfur. Of primary interest, is which states among the P5 invoked the discursive 
frame of R2P. Employing Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P invariably 
involves a choice between prevention and reaction, this review is looking for the 
use of discursive signifiers by the P5 relevant to the disparate functions licensed by 
references to prevention or reaction.   In the case of prevention, this is likely to take 
the form of references to a longer-term focus and addressing “root causes” of 
conflict, an emphasis upon “security and development”, “conflict prevention”, 
“capacity building” or links between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In the case of 
reaction, discursive signifiers are likely to take the form of references to a short-
term focus upon addressing the immediate need for a “rapid response”, calls for a 
sense of “urgency” or greater emphasis upon the narrow task of “security” and 
peacekeeping. Examining meeting records and associated documents, including 
resolutions, presidential statements and secretariat reports, it is the contention of 
this thesis that international engagement with Darfur can be categorised into two 
distinct periods. 
5.2.1 Establishing responsibility for protection   
Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council adopted its first resolution 1556 
(30 July 2004) on Darfur, referencing the notion of responsible sovereignty upon 
which R2P is premised. Proposed by the US,75 resolution 1556 called upon 
Khartoum to fulfil earlier commitments to facilitate international humanitarian 
relief including access to affected populations (paragraph 1); advance an 
‘independent investigation’ in cooperation with the UN into violations of IHRL and 
IHL (paragraph 14); and impose limited sanctions, with the possibility of targeted 
sanctions against individuals at a later date (paragraph 6). During deliberations, the 
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UK characterised adoption of resolution 1556 as a ‘vital step forward’ in the 
Council’s consideration of Darfur. Moreover, adoption of resolution 1556 
underlined the commitment of the Security Council to ‘ensure that all Governments 
fulfil that most basic of obligations – the duty to protect their own citizens’.76 
During voting two states abstained. Among the P5, China abstained on the basis 
that the inclusion of mandatory measures granting the GOS thirty days to disarm the 
Janjaweed and punish human rights abusers or face economic sanctions, would 
complicate any peace processes.77 The other state to abstain was Pakistan.  
Over the next six weeks Council deliberations focussed on progress of the GOS 
towards meeting the requirements of resolution 1556. Meeting for the third time on 
2 September 2004, members were briefed by SRSG (Sudan), Jan Pronk. Reviewing 
action taken by the GOS to improve security, investigate alleged abuses and lift 
restrictions on humanitarian assistance, Pronk noted Khartoum had failed to disarm 
and neutralise the Janjaweed or address the culture of impunity that existed. Where 
the GOS is unable to protect populations, the responsibility of the GOS to ‘seek, 
request and accept’ international assistance was noted.78 The only state to reference 
the possible transfer of responsibility for civilian protection to the Security Council 
was the Philippines, who rationalised support for resolution 1556 with reference to 
the  responsibility of the international community to help states achieve the capacity 
and will to protect populations, and in ‘extreme necessity’ assume such 
responsibility itself.79 
The fourth meeting of the Council on Darfur resulted in its second resolution 1564 
(18 September 2004) supporting the expansion of AU monitoring activities into 
Darfur (paragraph 2) and calling for the Sudanese government to end the prevailing 
climate of impunity and submit to the AU the names of Janjaweed disarmed or 
arrested for alleged abuses (paragraph 7). At the same time, resolution 1564 
requested the Secretary-General ‘rapidly establish’ an international commission of 
inquiry to investigate reports of IHRL and IHL violations by all parties with a view 
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to determining whether acts of genocide had occurred (paragraph 12); called on all 
member states to urgently fulfil pledges to support humanitarian efforts (paragraph 
13); and declared a willingness to consider measures under Article 41 if the 
Sudanese government failed to comply (paragraph 14). Four states abstained from 
voting on resolution 1564, including China and Russia (the other abstentions were 
Pakistan and Algeria). In statements immediately following the vote, China and 
Russia referenced the need to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. 
Rationalising abstention, Russia characterised the threat of sanctions as ‘far from 
the best method’ to induce compliance, whereas China rationalised their response 
with reference to a general opposition towards sanctions.80    
For the remainder of 2004, briefings by the AU Chairman, Secretary-General and 
SRSG (Sudan) attempted to shift the focus and framing of discussions within the 
Council towards greater recognition of the relationship between peace, security and 
development.81  In response to increasing instability and the failure of the GOS to 
meet its obligations under resolutions 1556 and 1564, the need for the Security 
Council to adopt a ‘tripartite approach’ focused on the mutually reinforcing 
priorities of ‘humanitarian assistance, security and protection’, gained increasing 
prominence.82 In practice, this meant adopting a ‘three pronged approach’ aimed at 
facilitating deployment of a third party AU force, speeding up negotiations between 
the GOS and rebel forces and ending impunity to ensure accountability of political 
leaders.83 Meeting in Narobi, Kenya, and preceding a closed meeting with the AU 
Chairman, Special Envoy for IGAD and representatives of SLM/A, the Secretary-
General reminded participants of their responsibility for civilian protection, 
recalling that this responsibility transfers to the international community, and by 
implication the Security Council, once a sovereign state is unable or unwilling.84  
The following day the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1574 (19 November 
2004) welcoming: a commitment among parties to reach a Comprehensive Peace 
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Agreement (CPA) for Sudan by 31 December 2004 (paragraph 1); the efforts of 
donor states to convene a conference on ‘reconstruction and economic 
development’ following the signing of a CPA (paragraph 4); the signing of 
Humanitarian and Security Protocols for Darfur and ongoing Abuja peace talks 
between the Sudanese government, SLM/A and JEM, aimed at ‘resolving the crisis’ 
(paragraph 10). In a statement following the vote, China emphasised the need for 
‘economic rehabilitation and development’ once there was a CPA for Sudan and 
moreover, recognised that ‘reconciliation, stability and development in Africa’ were 
part of a broader international responsibility.85 Seeking to capitalise on momentum 
surrounding signing of a CPA, a briefing by the SRSG (Sudan) in early February 
2005 emphasised that ‘peace and development are indivisible’ in Darfur.  
Moreover, following the signing of a CPA the Security Council need to support an 
operation that was ‘catalytic’ and not ‘turn-key’ in order to replace reliance upon ad 
hoc external relief with sustainable development. This meant adopting a 
comprehensive approach to addressing all causes of conflict in a ‘holistic’, but 
‘balanced way’, through a light footprint for operations.86  
The next phase of deliberations in February 2005 commenced with a review of the 
ICID report, with the Secretary-General calling for ‘urgent action’ by the Security 
Council to find a way to ‘halt the killing’ and protect vulnerable populations.87 In an 
attempt to pressure members to act on ICID recommendations the Secretary-
General called an emergency session of the Security Council on 8 March 2005. 
Resolution 1590 (24 March 2005) was subsequently adopted unanimously, 
authorising a Chapter VII operation to: support implementation of the CPA and 
protect civilians by force if necessary (paragraph 4) and encourage the Sudanese 
government, SLM/A and JEM to ‘rapidly’ resume the Abuja peace process 
(paragraph 7). In the deliberations that followed, Under Secretary-General 
Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, emphasised the immediacy of 
problems in Darfur and cautioned members must not ‘accept the status quo’ with 
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regard to the ending of impunity and improving security in Darfur.88 In response, 
resolution 1591 (29 March 2005) submitted by the US, was adopted. Outlining in-
principle agreement for a no-fly zone over Darfur and establishing a sanctions 
committee to monitor implementation of measures to freeze assets and economic 
resources of suspected war criminals (paragraph 3), resolution 1591 encountered 
three abstentions. Among the P5, Russia and China abstained (as did Algeria) citing 
concerns over targeting of individuals through sanctions and the ‘practical ability’ 
of the Council to implement such sanctions,89 given it lacked mechanisms such as a 
surveillance systems or even airport monitoring.  
Up until this point US opposition towards the ICC, together with the reluctance of 
China and Russia to criticise Khartoum, prevented adoption of more robust 
measures. In March a compromise was reached with the US and China agreeing to 
abstain on a draft resolution S/2005/218 (31 March 2005) sponsored by the UK 
referring the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the ICC (paragraph 1). 
Together, continued pressure exerted by the Secretary-General, international NGOs, 
media and the ICID report (25 January 2005) galvanised the Council into action. 
ICID’s recommendation for a referral to the ICC was premised on a range of 
factors, including: the alleged offences represented a threat to international peace 
and security; as state officials were suspected of mass atrocities it would be difficult 
to investigate them in Sudan; the authority of the ICC and Security Council might 
persuade high-level offenders to submit to trial; and the ICC was the best organ to 
ensure a fair trial, could be activated without delay and its proceedings would not 
impose a significant financial burden on the international community (paragraph 
572).90  
Following a five month deadlock over how to respond, the Security Council 
adopted resolution 1593 (31 March 2005), representing the first time the Council 
had invoked Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. As a result, the ICC subsequently 
initiated proceedings against seven individuals, three of which eventually 
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surrendered to ICC jurisdiction. For the remaining four, arrest warrants were issued 
including the indictment of President Bashir. The vote on resolution 1593 resulted 
in two abstentions among the P5 in China and the US (Algeria and Brazil also 
abstained). China cited respect for Sudanese sovereignty and concerns the absence 
of Sudanese consent would compromise a political settlement in Darfur and 
potentially the north-south peace process too. Not surprisingly, the US rationalised 
abstention with reference to broader concerns towards the ICC exercising 
jurisdiction over nationals of a state not party to the Rome Statute. In contrast, 
Russia argued efforts to address impunity through the ICC made an important 
contribution to securing a ‘long-term political settlement’ in Darfur.91 Predictably, 
Sudan responded by condemning efforts to accommodate a US threat to veto if the 
resolution contained provisions to defer the matter under Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute as ‘double standards’ and confirmation that the ICC was a ‘tool’ for major 
powers.92  
Towards the end of 2005, Security Council deliberations shifted their focus towards 
how to deliver civilian protection, including the possibility of a UN peace operation. 
Adoption of resolution 1651 (21 December 2005) signalled the commencement of 
the seventh round of AU-led peace talks in Abuja. Securing unanimous support, 
resolution 1651 extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until March 2006 
(paragraph 1). Two days prior to the vote, Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland 
provided a brief on the situation in Africa, calling upon member states to show a 
‘sense of urgency’ towards the need to rebalance security and humanitarian efforts 
in Darfur through increased resourcing (personnel).93 Consistent with Egeland’s 
recommendation, France identified a critical role for the Security Council as 
humanitarian aid alone could not substitute addressing root causes of conflict and 
suggested that human security as articulated in the Summit Outcome, provided a 
‘potential vehicle for cooperation’ in Darfur. Adopting a more pragmatic approach, 
China maintained its position that the international community should place greater 
emphasis upon eliminating ‘root causes’, while Russia cited the need for a 
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‘comprehensive view that accommodates the linkages between humanitarian and 
security considerations’.94  
By January 2006, following the expiration of the December 2005 deadline for a 
peace agreement, the SRSG (Sudan) and Special Envoy for AU Inter-Sudanese 
Talks, Salim Ahmed Salim, recommended that international support should have a 
broad mandate and be part of a ‘unified approach’ comprising humanitarian, 
political, police, legal, human rights , reconstruction and economic development 
instruments’.95 Consistent with this recommendation, Salim reported that the AU 
was actively seeking a negotiated settlement in Darfur that included peacebuilding, 
security, unity, cohesion and good governance. Building on these developments the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1663 (24 March 2006) which set in motion a 
revision of operational paragraph four to expedite planning for transition from the 
existing AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN operation and paragraph six 
regarding support for AMIS during transition. This was followed five days later by 
resolution 1665 (29 March 2006) extending the mandate of the panel of Experts 
assisting the 1591 sanctions committee by submitting names of individuals seen as 
obstacles to securing a political settlement in Darfur. However, the sanctions 
committee was not able to agree on a final list. Acting on a US initiative, the 
Security Council ‘circumvented the impasse’ provided by the need for consensus in 
the sanctions committee by adopting resolution 1672 (25 April 2006) identifying 
four individuals.  
Among the P5, China and Russia abstained citing concerns the resolution would 
undermine the Abuja peace process plus failure by the sanctions committee to 
clarify criteria for inclusion in the list resulted in less than ‘convincing’ evidence to 
support the vote. In contrast, the US supported targeted sanctions as the ‘first step’ 
in the Security Council fulfilling its responsibilities under previous resolutions and 
to persuade parties to the conflict that the international community is ‘serious about 
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restoring peace and security’.96 In a subsequent meeting a couple of weeks later, the 
US took this point further arguing 
If the idea of an international community is to mean anything, if the 
founding principles of the United Nations are to be more than just 
dreams and if the notion of our responsibility to protect the weakest 
and the most powerless among us is ever to be more than just an 
empty promise, then the Security Council must act. We must …seize 
this momentous opportunity to restore hope to the people of Darfur.97 
Resolution 1679 (16 May 2006) was the next to be unanimously adopted, calling 
upon parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) to implement it without delay 
and expressing an intention to consider taking ‘strong and effective measures’, 
including targeted sanctions against individuals or groups, attempting to block or 
violate the DPA (paragraph 1); and seeking to accelerate planning for transition 
from AMIS to a UN operation (paragraph 3).  
Despite support for resolution 1679 Russia cautioned against not securing consent 
from the GOS for a UN operation. Similarly, China voiced concerns over 
invocation of Chapter VII, indicating that while they supported the resolution, a 
lack of objection ‘should not be construed as a precedent for future action’.98 
Following a Security Council mission to Sudan and Chad in June 2006, France also 
cited concerns with the seemingly ‘premature reference’ to Chapter VII forecasting 
the establishment of a UN operation, suggesting that it had compromised the 
transition from AMIS as it enabled the GOS to ‘take a harder line’.99 Capitalising 
upon confusion surrounding international action in IDP camps, the GOS incited 
demonstrations, signalling the start of a larger challenge to international authority 
and the legitimacy of Security Council action. 
5.2.2 Challenging international authority and legitimacy   
In what can be characterised as a test of Security Council authority, resolution 1706 
(31 August 2006) was adopted despite P5 abstentions by China and Russia (Qatar 
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also abstained). In subsequent statements China and Russia repeated earlier 
concerns about the absence of Sudanese consent for a UN operation together with 
what seemed to be an ‘unnecessary’ rush to a vote given dialogue among parties 
was planned for a forthcoming meeting of the Council.100 Resolution 1706 
envisaged extension of the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) into Darfur through 
deployment of 17,300 soldiers and a 3,300 strong police force (paragraph three), but 
was never implemented. Coming twelve months after the 2005 Summit Outcome, 
resolution 1706 represented the first explicit reference to primary responsibility of a 
state for civilian protection and manifest failure of the GOS to discharge its 
responsibility. Adhering to a policy of non-cooperation, Khartoum initially refused 
the deployment. However, six months later President Bashir agreed to a hybrid 
UN-AU force provided it compromised one hundred percent African personnel; 
leaving it hybrid in name and funding only. The Security Council countered by 
seeking agreement for what would be an AMIS force “rehatted”. African forces 
volunteering troops for the hybrid force comprised personnel with no transport or 
communications, administrative capacity, combat helicopters, armour and often 
only minimal bedding, cooking and clothing. This seriously compromised their 
capacity to engage in civilian protection or pressure the GOS to do so.101  
In response to renewed fighting in September 2006, US actor George Clooney 
addressed the Security Council cautioning if the GOS refused to comply with 
resolution 1706 the international community would ‘need men with shovels and 
bleached white linen and headstones’ rather than peacekeepers.102 In response, 
Russia and the UK called for ‘immediate action and urgency’ to address the ‘dire 
humanitarian and security situation’. In what is the most direct reference to R2P, 
France reiterated the responsibility of the GOS to accept the deployment, including 
if necessary, assistance from the international community as set out in the Summit 
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Outcome and earlier resolutions.103 One week later during a briefing by the SRSG 
(Sudan) reporting that Khartoum was continuing to block access to humanitarian 
assistance, the UK cited a ‘moral imperative’ to act, focussing upon the primary 
responsibility of Sudan then the international community, if required.104 However, it 
was not until ten months later that resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) was adopted with 
unanimous support to establish an AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).  
In the deliberations accompanying resolution 1769, cooperation of the GOS was a 
key feature as were multiple references to the need for a longer-term ‘multifaceted’ 
approach giving ‘equal footing’ to humanitarian support, political settlement and 
social and economic development.105 During an open debate on peace and security 
in Africa four weeks later, the Secretary-General noted that Darfur provided a 
reminder of how much needs to be done before transformation from the traditional 
‘culture of reaction’ underpinning international engagement with mass atrocities, 
towards a culture of ‘effective prevention’ is complete.106 As such, UNAMID 
represented a new era in cooperation between regional organisations which sought 
to ‘harness the advantages’ of the UN’s universal character and the AU’s regional 
character, to both respond to the immediate crisis and prevent future conflict. 
Representing an ‘experimental marriage of universalism and regionalism’,107 
UNAMID became a metaphor for an integrated approach to address economic and 
social causes of conflict, at least in theory.  
Drawing on the Secretary-General’s reference to a cultural shift, China agreed 
addressing root causes was central to transcending a ‘reactive role as fire fighters’ 
and to ‘gain more leverage’ in preventing conflict.108 While France recommended 
that the Security Council consider what ‘specific feature’ in conflict prevention 
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would trigger intervention in the absence of an ‘open crisis to justify action’.109 In 
his concluding statement, President of the Security Council Pascal Gayama 
(Republic of the Congo), recommended a comprehensive approach with an 
appropriate balance between short-term and long-term objectives based on three 
elements: structural prevention (to address root causes), operational prevention 
(early-warning, protection of civilians and response to the immediate crisis) and 
systematic prevention (preventing spill-over).110 In contrast, US President George 
W Bush labelled the conflict in Darfur as genocide, calling upon the Security 
Council to ‘do something’.111 
By November 2007, five weeks ahead of transition from AMIS, UNAMID had 
reached a crossroads because of under-resourcing in critical areas such as transport. 
Despite these challenges the Security Council remained optimistic, with France 
suggesting the deployment of UNAMID was a reflection of the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the Security Council in its primary role of maintenance of 
international peace and security’.112 On 31 December 2007 AMIS soldiers “re-
hatted”. Despite this development, deployed forces remained inefficient and under-
equipped.113 The situation on the ground had also become more complex. In 2003 
when conflict broke out there were only two major rebel groups, namely JEM and 
SLM/A. By 2007 insurgents had splintered into a confusing array of competing 
factions comprising up to two dozen groups, making it incredibly difficult to keep 
the peace.114 By February 2008 emphasis had shifted towards managing a growing 
gap in expectations among Darfurians towards international action. The Security 
Council was reminded that it needed to accept that steps towards peace would be 
incremental and take longer than expected. More importantly, to be effective the 
Council would need to start planning for recovery and be more active in post-
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conflict recovery. In response, the UK advocated the need for the Security Council 
to progress four tracks of political, security, humanitarian and justice equally.115  
Throughout 2008 frustration in the Council towards the ineffectiveness of 
UNAMID to encourage GOS compliance or secure a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict continued to build. During a thematic debate on peace and security in 
Africa in April, where a concept paper on conflict prevention was presented, China 
reiterated its recommendation for a multifaceted approach based on the cooperative 
efforts of the UN and AU to address three pillars: security, development and human 
rights.116 One week later, a briefing by the Under Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs noted that after five years of conflict and four years of 
Security Council engagement, there was still ‘no lasting solution’.117 By mid-year 
the situation had deteriorated with the credibility of the Security Council at stake. 
Looking at the number of resolutions adopted that were contingent upon follow-up 
action, the meeting recommended the mobilisation of a short-term response as a 
priority to demonstrate solidarity, denounce insecurity, and to create an 
environment to support long-term activities.118 China cautioned towards focussing 
solely on immediate needs, arguing that ‘hasty action disregarding objective 
conditions’ would be ‘dangerous’.119 In July the Security Council adopted 
resolution 1828 (31 July 2008) extending the mandate of UNAMID. The only state 
to abstain was the US, citing concerns with language added to the draft resolution 
which undermined efforts to bring President Bashir and others to justice. The US 
went further in its criticism, noting that while the Security Council sought to end 
suffering in Darfur it had 'fallen far short’ in its responsibility to protect civilian 
populations.120 In support of the resolution, China recommended a dual-track 
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strategy with equal emphasis upon peacekeeping and political settlement to 
establish mutual trust among all parties to the conflict.121  
Seeking to rebuild international confidence, a briefing by António Guterres, UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in January 2009 examined 
implementation of R2P, including the importance of prevention, the specific role of 
the Security Council, together with the notion of a shared or common 
responsibility.122 Deliberations suggested that peacekeeping in Darfur was not just a 
test of the mission, but also the political will of the Security Council. As such, a 
unified voice and unequivocal political message was critical.123 Consistent with this 
finding a July 2009 briefing by the Under Secretary-General Peacekeeping 
Operations, reiterated while responsibility for peace and stability in Darfur rested 
ultimately with the GOS, the international community had an important role to play 
in creating the conditions to support peace, including providing concrete incentives 
to reach an agreement and guarantee it will be implemented. However, Russia was 
not convinced arguing that because the indictment of President Bashir had not 
contributed to a peaceful settlement in Darfur progressing the peace process should 
take priority over justice.124  
In response, the UN and the AU announced support for ushering in a new ‘domestic 
process’ in April 2011 through a Darfur-based Political Process (DPP). Designed 
specifically to provide a mechanism for ordinary Darfurians to promote and 
implement the peace agreement negotiated between the government and rebel 
leaders at Doha, the DPP was also intended to overcome lack of support among 
rebel groups and their constituencies for the DPA. In the absence of an effective 
peace agreement, however, the goals of this process were not clear.125 A report later 
in the month by the President of the Security Council on implementation of the DPP 
noted that President Bashir had failed to repeal emergency laws as the first step in 
implementation or taken action consistent with any of the other reforms 
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recommended by the UN.126 With the status of Darfur being a key issue in the Doha 
negotiations, in May 2011 Khartoum undertook the controversial move of creating 
two additional states (central and southeast) within Darfur despite a pledge to 
undertake a referendum in July 2011. Rebel forces were quick to criticise 
Khartoum’s actions as a deliberate attempt to weaken regional power bases through 
divide and rule politics.127  
In an effort to build confidence in, and enhance the efforts of UNAMID, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 2003 (29 July 2011) with unanimous support. 
The resolution extended UNAMID for a further twelve months (paragraph 1) and 
emphasised the need for the mission to ‘make full use’ of its Chapter VII mandate 
(paragraph 3). More importantly, resolution 2003 introduced new measures, through 
the Secretary-General, to monitor the mission’s rules of engagement and provide 
periodical reports to the Security Council to ensure close alignment with relevant 
resolutions (paragraph 24). In articulating their support, the UK, China and US 
referenced the contribution of resolution 2003 to facilitating a political settlement in 
Darfur. Consistent with its approach to date, China emphasised the need to pursue a 
‘dual track strategy’ with ‘equal emphasis’ on peacekeeping and political processes, 
in order to realise ‘peace, prosperity and development’ in Darfur.128  
Symbolic of the intent underlying resolution 2003, the UK noted that Darfur was 
‘entering a critical period’. As such, resolution 2003 signalled a new approach 
within the Council focused upon providing an ‘enabling environment’ in 
combination with closer monitoring of UNAMID to maximise delivery of its ‘core 
tasks’ in civilian protection and humanitarian access.129 Consistent with this focus 
on enhancing existing mechanisms and continuing its preference for a negotiated 
solution, the Council has continued its efforts to secure cooperation among parties 
and develop a collective position. Based on the Doha process and DPP, regional 
facilitation has become a central element of international engagement in Darfur. 
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5.3 R2P as a policy agenda or catalyst for action 
Perceptions of legitimacy and the social process of legitimation are important 
elements of both the history and practice of the Security Council. With human 
protection located at the intersection of international law and politics, shifting 
conceptions of legitimacy have significantly expanded the ideational and normative 
framework within which the debate around Darfur revolves. Employing Bellamy’s 
assessment that invocation of R2P by states involves a choice in how they employ 
the principle, between a policy agenda and a normative call to action, this part 
reviews discursive signifiers identified in deliberations around Darfur to establish 
the choice made by the P5 and furthermore, how they engaged with the full 
continuum of R2P (to prevent, react and rebuild). As outlined in chapter four, 
according to Bellamy the disparate nature of the two functions of R2P renders them 
incompatible. In practice, this means states cannot sustain a political commitment to 
a policy agenda and its associated focus upon prevention while also employing R2P 
as a speech act to mobilise international engagement. It also means the choice states 
make between R2P as a policy agenda or normative call to action affects collective 
understanding of the role and impact of the principle upon international engagement 
with mass atrocities. During 2004-2013 R2P was employed in various ways in 
deliberations on Darfur. While some references were direct and others implied, this 
thesis concurs with Bellamy that debates around Darfur were ‘deeply infused with 
the language of R2P’.130 Where this thesis diverges from Bellamy is in its 
assessment of P5 engagement with preventive and reactive elements of R2P most 
commonly associated with a policy agenda and normative call to action 
respectively.   
Prior to invocation by states, R2P was utilised by civil society to bring Darfur to 
international attention. Advocacy by NGOs including Amnesty International, 
International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, made an important 
contribution to the debate around Darfur by bringing the crisis ‘out of the 
shadows’.131 Around the same time, an interview with Mukesh Kapila, Human 
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Rights Coordinator for Sudan, on the UN’s Integrated Regional Information 
Network (IRIN) ‘blew the ratings’, when Kapila declared that Darfur was ‘the 
world’s greatest humanitarian crisis’ and that the only difference between Darfur 
and Rwanda were ‘the numbers involved’.132 With an established link to the UN, 
previous experience with genocide in Rwanda and R2P gaining increasing attention, 
significant pressure was exerted upon the Security Council to consider the crisis as 
a case for R2P concern. Within the Security Council, references to R2P were 
employed to rationalise a variety of activities, demands and positions ranging from 
encouraging compliance by the GOS to debating the merits and modes of 
international intervention, including the use of force for human protection.  
As a result of a seeming reluctance to assume responsibility for civilian protection 
and systematic under-resourcing of peace operations, the case of Darfur is often 
cited as the failure of R2P to exert any considerable influence upon international 
engagement with mass atrocities. This is largely because while framing calls for 
protection in Darfur with the language of R2P contributed to recognition of the 
‘severity’ of the crisis and mobilising international attention towards the conflict, it 
failed to activate sufficient political will among states to agree on an ‘explicit and 
convincing response’.133 Seen through the lens of the international response since 
2003, particularly the reluctance of the Security Council to authorise intervention 
without the consent of Khartoum, critics suggest that the norms of non-intervention 
and sovereignty exerted greater influence among the P5, in spite of declared support 
for R2P.134 Despite these criticisms and in light of the discursive signifiers 
identified in part two, it is the contention of this chapter that R2P made a significant 
contribution to the ideational and normative framework informing international 
engagement in Darfur as well as broader thinking on the use of force for human 
protection, both as a normative call to action and a policy agenda.  
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5.3.1 A catalyst for action   
The list of deliberations and decisions of the Security Council examined in section 
5.2 is far from exhaustive. Despite this limitation, a number of consistencies with 
broader developments occurring during the period of review are distinguishable. 
Firstly, the two periods of engagement identified broadly align with the intellectual 
journey of R2P, from inception by ICISS and wider acceptance by states at the 
World Summit, to more recent activities of the General Assembly aimed at moving 
the principle from words to deeds through annual interactive dialogues. Secondly, 
discursive signifiers employed by states during the two periods broadly align with 
the disparate functions of R2P identified by Bellamy. Between July 2004, when the 
Security Council adopted its first resolution on Darfur, and April 2006, some six 
months after endorsement of R2P at the World Summit, discursive signifiers 
employed by both the Secretariat and P5 reflect a preoccupation with reaction. 
Reflective of broader deliberations across the UN, invocation of R2P in this early 
period of engagement manifested into identifying evidence to build a convincing 
case for R2P and then articulating primary responsibility of the GOS for civilian 
protection.  
Drawing on the notion of responsible sovereignty, this invariably involved 
clarifying Sudan’s obligations under international law, encouraging compliance 
through suasion and highlighting the possible implications of non-compliance. 
Within the Secretariat, this was followed by triggers and mechanisms for 
transferring responsibility for civilian protection to the international community. 
Early examples include a statement by the SRSG (Sudan) noting responsibility of 
the GOS for civilian protection and if unable to guarantee such protections, 
establishing the need to ‘seek, request and accept international assistance’ to do 
so;135 and a reminder by the Secretary-General that the international community, 
through the Security Council, has a responsibility for protection where a state is 
unable or unwilling.136 Reflective of broader debates around R2P taking place at the 
time, particularly those concerned with the notion of responsible sovereignty and 
consistency of the principle with international law, the P5 emphasised reaction by 
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highlighting the primary responsibility of the GOS while Secretariat staff also 
emphasised reaction by highlighting the implied responsibility of the Security 
Council for civilian protection in the event of non-compliance by Khartoum. 
Having established responsibility for civilian protection, international engagement 
with Darfur began to shift its focus towards the more immediate task of mitigating 
the threat posed by an acute humanitarian crisis. Consistent with the reaction 
element of R2P, both the Secretariat and P5 employed the language of R2P to serve 
as a normative call to action. Seeking to mobilise an international response, 
deliberations on Darfur were framed around the urgency, immediacy and severity of 
the humanitarian crisis. This included calls for the Secretary-General in resolution 
1564 (18 September 2004) to ‘rapidly’ establish an international commission of 
enquiry (paragraph 12) and for member states to ‘urgently fulfil pledges’ to support 
humanitarian activities (paragraph 13). The need for the Security Council to show a 
‘sense of urgency’137 and take ‘urgent action’ to ‘halt the killing’138 featured 
consistently in deliberations. Similarly, emergency meetings of the Security Council 
were called seeking to instigate immediate action to a dire situation.  
Adopted in March 2005 in response to a call to implement recommendations of the 
ICID report, resolution 1590 (8 March 2005) invoking Chapter VII referenced the 
immediacy of the problem in Darfur and called on parties to the conflict to resume 
the Abuja peace process ‘immediately’ (paragraph 7). However, with continued 
violence and an unprecedented scale of human suffering, confusion towards the role 
and contribution of the Security Council gained momentum. In the absence of a 
coordinated strategy on Darfur and dominated by a fear of an ‘Iraq scenario being 
played out’ in terms of an inability to secure consensus leading to unauthorised 
action,139 the central challenge for the Security Council became operational in terms 
of how to protect civilians rather than normative; that is, how to ‘close the gap’ 
between declared aspirations for Darfur and abuses that continued to occur.140  
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The turning point in international engagement came in the latter part of 2006 when 
both the P5 and Secretariat began to realise the extent to which Darfur would test 
the Security Council’s authority and commitment to parallel human protection and 
peace agendas. Signalling the start of a movement towards greater consideration of 
how to deliver civilian protection, the P5 continued to demonstrate reluctance to 
transfer responsibility for civilian protection to the international community. In 
practice this meant that while the UK noted a ‘moral imperative’ for international 
action, the transfer of responsibility for human protection from the GOS to the 
Security Council was still on an “as required” basis.141 Complicated by a preference 
among the P5 for a negotiated political settlement to Darfur, this caveat on reaction 
reflects the qualification for a case-by-case determination for international 
responses contained in the 2005 Summit Outcome (paragraph 139).  This caveat not 
only maintains the highly criticised ad hoc discretionary basis for international 
action, but in effect represents a more deliberate attempt by states to water down the 
Security Council’s responsibility, particularly implied obligations under R2P. In 
this regard, statements in support of resolutions along with rationalisation for 
abstentions by the P5 provides further insights and possible explanations for 
hesitancy to assume implied responsibilities under reactive elements of R2P.  
In the case of abstentions, resistance towards implied responsibility and any 
associated call to action could be explained through the importance of existing trade 
and political relationships with Khartoum. China, and to a lesser extent Russia, have 
reliably defended Khartoum in the Security Council. While they have resisted use 
of the veto, abstentions could be seen as a means to dilute the possibility of more 
robust measures while seemingly supporting the prevailing will of the P5. Russia is 
a dominant supplier of military equipment to Khartoum,142 while China is a net 
importer of oil from Sudan. In 2005 Sudan exported $3.4 billion worth of goods to 
China, 96 percent of which were petroleum products. At the time Sudan was 
producing 370,000 barrels per day of crude oil, by 2008 production was up to 
                                                 
141 Statement by the Permanent Representative for the UK and Northern Ireland (18 September 
2006) S/PV.5528. 
142 RW Williamson Sudan and the implications for responsibility to protect, Policy analysis brief, 
Stanley Foundation, Iowa, October 2009, p.6. 
  	    
 ͳ͸͸
512,000 barrels per day based on Chinese demand.143 In exchange for supply of oil, 
Beijing has been relatively supportive of Khartoum diplomatically and to a large 
extent has a vested interest in securing peace and stability in Sudan through a 
negotiated settlement. France has a deep interest in Sudan’s neighbour Chad. As 
conflict in Darfur spilled-over into Chad destabilising its government, France’s 
encountered conflicts between its interests and policies.144 In terms of the US, its 
record on Darfur is ‘mixed’.145 Despite rhetoric claiming genocide had occurred, the 
US abstained from the vote referring Darfur to the ICC allowing it to pass through. 
While US rhetoric has put pressure on Khartoum, it has failed to impose any 
‘commensurate obligation’ on the international community to react.146 This includes 
the Obama administration, who as president elect demanded ‘more robust action to 
end the carnage in Darfur and to ensure the full implementation of CPA’, but has 
done little since to instigate such measures.147  
Reviewing support for subsequent calls to action dominant during 2004-2006, there 
are a number of fundamental omissions from deliberations concerning the 
international response which also comprised its effectiveness. Omissions included 
the question of ‘strategic purpose’ (in terms of what mandated forces would do 
under a reaction scenario) and ‘concept of operations’ (in terms of what counts as 
success, strategy to be adopted for reaction, and tasks that will need to be 
undertaken by the mission to achieve this).148 Largely reflective of the focus and 
content of the continuing broader international debate on R2P, which at the time 
also focussed upon reaction in terms of when and whether to intervene, not how to 
do so and with what aim in mind,149 it is not surprising that Darfur became symbolic 
of the challenges associated with implementing R2P.    
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5.3.2 A policy agenda for prevention   
By August 2006, when the Security Council encountered its greatest challenge to its 
authority and legitimacy through resolution 1706, discursive signifiers employed by 
both the Secretariat and P5 began to align more closely and frequently with the 
second function identified by Bellamy: a policy agenda aimed at addressing risk 
factors for conflict. While members of the P5, such as China, Russia and France, 
were in late 2005 employing discursive signifiers consistent with the preventive 
element of R2P, to emphasise the importance of addressing ‘root causes’ and 
adopting a ‘comprehensive view’ to link humanitarian and security concerns,150 
from 2006 onwards Council deliberations increasingly featured references to the 
parallel goals of security and development; accountability; and values and 
conditions associated with a liberal notion of peace. Consistent with the full 
continuum of R2P (to prevent, react and rebuild) deliberations were framed around 
the need to adopt a longer-term focus on building regional and local capacity so as 
to avoid further atrocities. Central to this reformulation, was greater consideration 
of the difficult question of how to implement an R2P mandate. In supporting 
resolution 1769 (31 July 2007) establishing UNAMID, France captured the essence 
of the challenge facing the Security Council and international thinking on R2P 
noting that the most difficult task posed by the crisis in Darfur was mobilising a 
strong and decisive response to political, security and humanitarian challenges. In 
addition to peacekeeping, this would require activities aimed at addressing risk 
factors, such as humanitarian support, political settlement and reconstruction.151  
Developed largely in response to division and frustration with elements of an R2P 
agenda yet to be settled (particularly prevent and rebuild), demands for an 
“integrated”, “comprehensive”, multi-track or “tripartite approach” with coherence 
across all matters relevant to peace, security and development, quickly became a 
feature of Security Council deliberations. In practice, this meant expanding the 
existing narrow focus on peacekeeping to include rehabilitation, reconstruction and 
economic and social development to “uproot” the sources of conflict. Advocacy by 
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some states including those who had previously abstained such as China, Russia 
and the US, for a longer-term and comprehensive approach, could be criticised as 
an attempt to dilute the possibility of more robust measures while seemingly 
supporting the prevailing will of the P5. However, the shift towards the use of 
discursive signifiers in the case of Darfur emphasising prevention and 
demonstrating greater consistency with a policy agenda to address risk factors, 
reflected shifts in the broader normative and ideational landscape surrounding R2P 
in the UN following endorsement at the World Summit. While this landscape was 
characterised by wider acceptance of R2P following the World Summit, it was also 
characterised by confusion regarding how to implement R2P and the relationship 
between individual elements of the principle, particularly prevention and reaction.  
In this regard, a concluding statement of the President of the Security Council from 
28 August 2007 is instructive for two reasons. Firstly, in the case of Darfur it 
clarified the three elements upon which a ‘comprehensive or global approach’ 
would be based: ‘structural prevention’ to address root causes; ‘operational 
prevention’ to ensure early warning and inclusion of appropriate measures to 
address immediate crisis; and ‘systematic prevention’ to prevent spill-over of 
conflict into neighbouring states.152 Secondly, reflective of the broader debate 
surrounding how to operationalise R2P within the UN, the statement provided a 
prelude to the development of the three non-sequential pillars by the Secretary-
General, as the foundation for implementing R2P. Set against this backdrop, the 
establishment of UNAMID was reflective of a strengthening of international 
engagement with the full ‘continuum of conflict’ from prevention to peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding.153  
Despite various examples of P5 members highlighting the need to develop the 
potential of African states to ‘counter crisis through prevention, resolution and post-
conflict peacebuilding’,154 and ongoing commitment to longer-term prevention, 
references to the immediate needs of Darfur resurfaced. In March 2008 a briefing 
by the Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations cautioned that 
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UNAMID was not a substitute for political engagement; rather it is one element in a 
broader strategy that must include urgent international engagement to encourage 
and pressure parties to ‘lay down weapons and commit to dialogue’.155 Seen to be 
responding to an emerging challenge to manage expectations on the ground towards 
UNAMID, the ongoing reluctance to follow warnings up with more robust 
measures, a deteriorating humanitarian situation, and increased questioning 
regarding the authority and legitimacy of the Security Council, the discursive frame 
of R2P was employed once again as a normative call to action. Critical of the 
Security Council for not being ‘tough enough on Sudan’, the US recommended 
adopting a short-term focus on improved security, as it was not expecting much 
from political activities.156  
Facing mounting criticism that the situation had not improved despite being on the 
Council agenda for a number of years and moreover, that the international 
community had ‘conspicuously failed to take the steps necessary to protect the 
people of Darfur’,157 the US began to highlight constraints of peacekeeping as part 
of larger effort of political reconciliation and development.158 In contrast, the UK 
advocated the need to take a ‘strategic approach’ to implementation of CPA, 
UNMIS and UNAMID in which broad cooperation was vital.159 In October 2010 
focus shifted towards redefining the role of the Security Council as one for creating 
an enabling environment to support longer-term preventive measures. Reflective of 
the development of broader international thinking on R2P through General 
Assembly interactive dialogues on: implementation (2009); early warning (2010); 
and regional and sub-regional arrangements (2011), in July 2011 the US and UK 
outlined the conditions necessary for establishing an enabling environment, 
including the conditions required to sustain an R2P agenda. To this end, resolution 
2003 (2011) signalled a new approach by the Security Council in the absence of any 
effective action by Khartoum, to strengthen international engagement through the 
                                                 
155 Briefing by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (11 March 2008) 
S/PV.5849. 
156 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the US (24 June 2008) S/PV.5922. 
157 Grono, Darfur: the international community’s failure to protect, p.621. 
158 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the US (23 January 2009) S/PV.6075. 
159 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the UK and Northern Ireland (14 June 2010) 
S/PV.6338. 
  	    
 ͳ͹Ͳ
introduction of review mechanisms and measures to improve alignment with 
existing decisions.  
Taken collectively with other deliberations, it is the contention of this chapter that 
R2P as it was employed by the P5 to frame discussions on Darfur is more 
accurately described as a policy agenda to address risk factors, despite R2P also 
being employed to bring atrocities onto the international agenda and as a call to 
action up until 2006. More importantly, while this chapter concurs with Bellamy 
that invocation of R2P invariably involves a choice by states as to how they employ 
the principle, it finds the international response elicited by references to R2P was 
fluid, demonstrating consistency with both a policy agenda and a normative call to 
action. This finding is based on evidence from deliberations of two distinguishable 
periods of engagement that broadly align with the disparate functions licensed by 
references to R2P. Across these two periods of engagement, discursive signifiers 
consistent with a policy agenda to address risk factors in order to prevent further 
atrocities are predominant. However, intermittent use of discursive signifiers 
consistent with a normative call to action to address an imminent threat, are also 
evident after 2006.  
In effect, R2P was just as fluid as the response it elicited. Where states emphasised 
the need to expand the focus of peacekeeping to include preventive measures, 
international action could be attributed to invocation of R2P as a policy agenda to 
address risk factors. Led by France in 2007, advocacy for the need to supplement 
peacekeeping with activities such as humanitarian support, political settlement and 
reconstruction in order to avert further atrocities and subsequent actions to integrate 
these activities into the operational mandate for UNAMID, provides one example. 
Advocacy by  the US and UK in 2011 for the need to identify conditions necessary 
to sustain an R2P agenda for peace, security and development lends further support 
to this assessment. However, it is also evident from repeated emergency meetings of 
the Security Council between 2004 and 2006 to instigate immediate action to a dire 
situation, that invocation of R2P by the P5 was also concerned with elevating the 
crisis on the international agenda.  
As a normative call to action, R2P was employed to publicly persuade the GOS and 
other states to meet their R2P commitments, and privately to discourage the 
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incitement, commission or escalation of atrocity crimes by serving as a reminder to 
real and potential perpetrators that ‘impunity is not what it used to be’.160 In terms 
of escalating the crisis, this chapter finds the use of the distinct language of R2P 
was central to establishing the existence of an existential threat to civilian 
populations and the need for extraordinary measures to address an unprecedented 
scale of human suffering.  Acknowledging that invocation of R2P as a normative 
call to action did not escalate the crisis sufficiently to spur a decisive response, it is 
the contention of this chapter that international engagement cannot be understood 
solely through the lens of R2P. Alongside R2P there were a multitude of other 
factors, unfolding dynamics and events internationally and nationally that led to 
various turning points in the international response.  
Factors influencing international engagement can be grouped into three broad 
categories: national interest and national security; domestic and political pressures; 
and other fundamental foreign policy considerations. Confronted with large scale 
human suffering, the first two categories can impact upon calculations of the 
relative value of action in terms of costs, benefits and opportunities to influence 
international engagement. The third category represents ideological and ethical 
beliefs plus lessons learned through previous experience.161 In the case of Darfur, 
P5 interest in securing a CPA between North and South Sudan together with the 
common interpretation of R2P as predominantly involving military action and a 
coordinated non-intervention campaign by the GOS, constrained the adoption of 
timely and decisive response. Mindful of political, military and financial constraints 
associated with a continuing presence in Iraq and noting that a wider commitment 
to R2P by states through the World Summit occurred when some of the worst 
violence in Darfur had taken place, this chapter subscribes to Edward Luck’s 
assessment that it was ‘a stretch to expect’ that R2P alone would resolve the scale 
of human suffering taking place at such an early point in its intellectual 
development.162    
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Recognising that the international response elicited by invocation of R2P 
demonstrated consistency with both a policy agenda and a normative call to action, 
this chapter finds where states demonstrated a preference for prevention, R2P 
appears to have been a key driver of international action. However, where states 
emphasised reaction, agreement among the P5 on the seriousness of the crisis 
appears to have driven invocation of R2P.  Reflective of a broader debate around 
the relative value of R2P in terms of costs, benefits and opportunities to influence 
prevention and reaction, the two functions identified by Bellamy can essentially be 
reduced to a choice between “making a difference” versus “escalation”. It is evident 
from shifts in the way the P5 employed R2P in Darfur, particularly simultaneous 
emphasis upon prevention and reaction or making a difference and escalation, that 
the relationship between the policy and speech act functions of R2P were more 
‘symbiotic, dynamic and mutually reinforcing’ than suggested by Bellamy.163  
5.4 Conclusion 
Concerns about ongoing events in Darfur are informed by R2P, as are 
considerations of future courses of action. Recognising that interests and values do 
not always align, but in some cases may pull in a similar direction, this thesis finds 
international engagement with Darfur was guided by a mix of values and interests. 
As a case for R2P concern, Khartoum’s denial of human protection and role in 
being the ‘prime mover’ behind a campaign of ethnic cleansing by ‘unleashing’ 
Janjaweed militias, provides compelling evidence.164 At the same time, R2P made a 
significant normative contribution to international engagement with mass atrocities. 
Evidence includes the mandates of both AMIS and UNAMID to protect civilians, 
which developed in response to the ongoing debate around R2P.165 With the US 
adamantly opposed the ICC, and China and Russia harbouring strong concerns 
regarding the challenge to sovereignty posed by R2P, their agreement to action 
which appeared to conflict with their declared interests and existing policies 
provides further compelling evidence of the normative contribution of R2P. Once 
on the international agenda, it was the constitutive relationship between R2P, ethnic 
                                                 
163Ibid., p.358. 
164 Grono, Darfur: the international community’s failure to protect, p.625. 
165 Badescu & Bergholm, Responsibility to protect and the conflict in Darfur, p.304. 
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identity and state institutions in Darfur that set the parameters for international 
engagement in terms of sovereign responsibility, accountability for atrocity crimes, 
political transition and human development. Within the Council, R2P was employed 
by the P5 as a vehicle to encourage compliance by the GOS with peace processes 
and to debate the merits, nature and form of international intervention, including the 
use of force for human protection. Through the process of legitimation, references 
to R2P encouraged a shift from a culture of reaction as the foundation for 
international engagement with mass atrocities, towards a culture of prevention 
similar to that envisaged by ICISS. While Darfur provides evidence that there is still 
a long way to go in this transition, the more recent focus of the Security Council 
upon developing an enabling environment to pursue the full spectrum of R2P 
activities, to prevent, react and rebuild, as evident in deliberations since October 
2010, is encouraging.  
Employing Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P by states invariably 
involves a choice as to how they employ the principle, this chapter finds that 
deliberations were framed predominantly around the need to address the root causes 
of conflict and adopt a comprehensive approach in order to prevent further 
atrocities. However, Council deliberations were also guided at times by more 
immediate calls for urgent action to halt human suffering. It is therefore the 
contention of this chapter that the international response elicited by references to 
R2P in Darfur was more fluid than the sharp distinction between a policy agenda 
and a normative call to action suggested by Bellamy. While R2P may not resolve 
conflict in Darfur, it has led to a strengthening of international engagement with 
mass atrocities. In contrast, international engagement in Libya in 2011 was framed 
around the need for timely and decisive action to protect vulnerable populations. 
This would suggest that the debate around R2P within the Security Council and any 
resulting choice by the P5 is far from settled. 
    
Case Study Two—a call to action in Libya 
In February 2011, when lawyers seeking justice for victims of the Abu Salim prison 
massacre (1996) were arrested by Libyan security forces, few anticipated that 
within a month the Security Council would make its first egregious human rights 
referral to the ICC and authorise the use of force for human protection with 
reference to R2P against a ‘functioning de jure government’.1 Moreover, few 
anticipated that the events of February would result in liberation from a repressive 
regime and the first democratic elections in Libya in over forty years. Taking place 
in the wake of popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, anti-government 
demonstrations across Libya quickly turned to civil conflict as Colonel Muammar 
al-Qadhafi commenced a crackdown on protestors, instructing government forces to 
‘cleanse’ cities of disloyalty ‘alley by alley, road by road’ and ‘house by house’.2 
When security forces fired live ammunition into a crowd of protesters gathered 
outside the High Court in Benghazi killing hundreds and stormed hospitals to kill 
wounded civilians,3 armed opposition groups quickly mobilised. Set against the 
backdrop of hesitancy and lack of support for action in Darfur, the swift and 
unprecedented response of the Security Council caught many by surprise.  
As the first major intervention under the umbrella of R2P, Libya became an 
exemplar of the timely and decisive response envisaged by the Secretary General 
under pillar three of his strategy for implementing R2P. By implication, Libya 
became a test case for both the principle of R2P and international engagement with 
mass atrocities more generally. Responding to a rapidly escalating crisis, the P5 
demonstrated unanimous support for referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC 
and imposition of sanctions. However, the use of force to establish a no-fly zone to 
protect civilians under resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) received a mixed response. 
As a case for invocation of the principle of R2P, Libya became controversial 
                                                 
1 PD Williams & AJ Bellamy, ‘Principles, politics and prudence: Libya, the responsibility to protect 
and the use of military force’, Global Governance, vol. 18, no.3, 2012, p.273;275. 
2 ‘Al Jazeera, No let-up in Gaddafi offensive, 17 March 2011, retrieved 2 February 2013 < 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/2011317645549498.html >. 
3 Briefing by the Secretary-General (25 February 2011) S/PV.6490; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
Prosecutor, ICC (4 May 2011) S/PV.6528. 
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because some states believed civilians would only be safe if Qadhafi was no longer 
in power. While others argued civilians could be protected without third party 
intervention and that a political settlement was the only solution to the crisis.4 At 
the heart of this debate lie divergent perceptions of the legitimacy of the use of 
force without the consent of a host state. While resolution 1973 passed, invocation 
of the language of R2P to justify the use of force to protect civilian populations 
during Operation Odyssey Dawn and the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector, 
‘cast a long shadow’ with grave implications for future international engagement, 
including the current conflict in Syria.5  
Seeking to understand the contribution of R2P in formulating an international 
response, part one of this chapter examines factors in Libya eliciting concern as a 
case for R2P. Recognising that Libyan authorities had a history of failing to provide 
civilian protection, this chapter turns its attention to the deliberations of the P5. 
Through an interpretive examination of Security Council meeting records, part two 
traces how the language of R2P was employed to justify action, and secondly, how 
the P5 engaged with the full continuum of R2P (to prevent, react and rebuild). 
Examined through the lens of Bellamy’s proposition, that invocation of R2P by 
states invariably involves a choice in how they employ the principle, between a 
policy agenda to address risk factors and a normative call to action to address an 
imminent threat, part three reviews discursive signifiers identified in Security 
Council deliberations to establish the choice made by the P5. From this it is clear 
that while deliberations were framed around the immediate need to halt human 
suffering and avert mass atrocities, unanimous support for a UN mission with an 
explicit peacebuilding mandate seven months into the crisis, demonstrates that the 
international response was also guided by longer-term post-conflict considerations.   
                                                 
4 JM Welsh ‘Civilian protection in Libya: putting coercion and controversy back into RtoP’, Ethics 
and International Affairs, vol. 25, no. 3, 2011, p.260. 
5 Statement by the Representative of Singapore to the General Assembly Informal interactive 
dialogue on the responsibility to protect (5 September 2012), para 6. 
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6.1 A case for R2P concern 
Taking place in the wake of popular uprisings across the Arab world, including in 
Tunisia and Egypt, anti-government demonstrations in Libya were founded upon 
popular aspirations for democracy, freedom and rights.6 A key factor influencing 
the international response to the 2011 uprising was the state’s track record in human 
rights. Prior to the uprising Libyan authorities under the leadership of Qadhafi 
consistently demonstrated that they did not tolerate criticism or dissent.7 Attempting 
to dissolve opposition, freedom of expression, association and assembly were 
severely restricted in a climate of entrenched impunity for perpetrators of human 
rights violations. Within this climate, dissident voices were systematically silenced 
through imprisonment, denial of access to justice and enforced disappearances. 
Extrajudicial executions together with the ill treatment and torture of detainees were 
also consistent features of Libyan approaches to dissent. It is this track record of 
human rights violations combined with the public declarations of Qadhafi to anti-
government protestors that ‘either I rule over you or I destroy you’,8  which framed 
the political and ideological landscape within which the 2011 conflict was situated. 
Despite the absence of firm criteria for invocation of R2P, chapter four identified 
five factors that elicit international concern: existing tensions that exacerbate 
conflict; history of atrocities; strength of a state’s institutional structures for 
governance; perceived receptivity or openness; and the quality of political 
leadership.9 Chapter five argued that the case of Darfur elicited concern against 
each of these criteria. The same is true for Libya. Both in terms of the behaviour of 
Libyan authorities prior to the 2011 uprising as well as their response to popular 
demands for change following the protests. Concerns against each are outlined 
below.    
                                                 
6 Statement by the Representative for Libya Arab Jamahiriya (25 February 2011) S/PV.6490. 
7 Amnesty International, ‘Libya’, Annual report 2010, retrieved 2 May 2013 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/libya/report-2010>. 
8 Statement by the Representative of Libya Arab Jamahiriya (25 February 2011), S/PV.6490. 
9 Evans, Responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocities, pp.74-5. 
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6.1.1 Existing tensions  
Located in the north of Africa and representing the fourth largest state on the 
continent, with a total land area of 1.75 million square kilometres, Libya has a 
population of approximately 6.4 million.10 Gaining independence in 1951, Libya 
was the first state in Africa to secure freedom from colonial rule. 
 
Source: United Nations, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Map No. 3787 Rev. 4, June 2004.11 
                                                 
10 World Bank, ‘World view’, World development indicators 2013, retrieved 5 May 2013 < 
http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi>, p.22. 
11 This map represents Libyan Arab Jamahiriya until 2011.   
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Rich in oil, in 2009 Libya was performing strongly in key socio-economic 
indicators but was a state of contradictions.  According to the World Bank, Libya 
demonstrated high GDP growth (lifting from $27.3 billion in 1998 to $93.2 billion 
in 2009) and relatively high income per capita (estimated at $16,430 per capita).12 
According to UNICEF, Libya also performed strongly in terms of “human 
development”, ranking fifty-five out of 182 states, and demonstrated high rates of 
literacy (95 percent for males and 78 percent for females aged fifteen and above).13 
Despite substantial wealth and high levels of socio-economic achievement, Libya 
was characterised by disparity in development across the broader population. 
Compared to other oil-rich Arab states, popular opinion in Libya attributes lack of 
development to ‘poor planning, insufficient piecemeal development and pervasive 
corruption’.14 With oil wealth concentrated in a ‘narrow elite’ and Qadhafi’s 
children and extended family accruing substantial wealth from businesses in the 
health, construction, hotel and energy sectors, popular opinion in Libya was one of 
resentment and disaffection.15 Libya’s population also includes a significant 
proportion of foreign migrant workers, largely from sub-Saharan African states, 
estimated to be 2.5 million in 2011.16 When anti-government protests progressed 
into civil conflict in February 2011, migrant workers introduced a regional 
dimension to the conflict as many sought refuge in neighbouring states. 
Traditionally, Libya was divided into three regions: Tripolitania, Fezzan and 
Cyrenaica. Politically, Libya became an Italian colony in 1911 following 
displacement of the Ottomon Turks. By the late 1930s, Italy controlled the 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica regions. Government encouragement for settlement 
resulted in approximately one hundred and fifty thousand Italians migrating to 
Libya, accounting for one fifth of the population.17 As a result of the North Africa 
                                                 
12 ICG, Popular protest in North Africa and the Middle East: making sense of Libya, Middle 
East/North Africa report no. 107, Cairo/Brussels, 6 June 2011, p.1. 
13 ICG, Popular protest in North Africa and the Middle East: making sense of Libya, Middle 
East/North Africa report no. 107, Cairo/Brussels, 6 June 2011, pp.1-2.  
14 ICG, Popular protest in North Africa and the Middle East, p.2. 
15 Ibid. 
16 H Gurman, ‘Migrant workers in Libya’, Foreign Policy in Focus (23 March 2011), retrieved 2 
June 2013 < http://www.fpif.org/articles/migrant_workers_in_libya>. 
17 Human Rights Council (HRC), Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  (1 June 
2011) A/HRC/17/44, para 22. 
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campaigns during World War II, state infrastructure was largely destroyed and 
Libya became impoverished, underpopulated and divided politically, economically 
and religiously among its three regions. After the fall of Tripoli to Allied Forces in 
January 1943, Libya was placed under UN trusteeship until November 1949 when 
the General Assembly passed a resolution for Libya to be constituted as an 
independent and sovereign state.18 Libya subsequently achieved independence on 
24 December 1951 under the rule of King Muhamad Idris al-Mahdi al-Senusi. The 
1951 Constitution created Libya as a federal state, with each province represented 
by a separate parliament. An amendment in 1963 ended this federal system, leading 
to centralised government.  
Concentration of national wealth from oil created resentment among sections of the 
population. In 1969 a group of military officers, led by Colonel Qadhafi, staged a 
military coup against King Idris bringing Qadhafi to power. Libya was subsequently 
declared an Arab republic.19 The early years of Qadhafi’s leadership were 
characterised as transitional, during which he sought to consolidate his power 
through the one-party system of the Arab Socialist Union. A popular revolution was 
announced in 1973 in which Libya would participate directly in governance of the 
state through people’s committees. The General People’s Congress subsequently 
declared “popular rule” and the state was renamed the Great Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; the word ‘Jamahiriya’ was created to describe the ‘state of 
the masses’ and to reflect the liberation of Libya from colonial rule as well as 
‘partisan and bureaucratic obstacles’.20 In 1977 revolutionary committees were 
established to maintain support for the ideology of Qadhafi’s regime, summarised in 
the “green book”. In 1979 Qadhafi relinquished his position of Secretary-General of 
the General People’s Congress to ‘devote himself to revolutionary work’, while in 
1990 the Congress appointed him as Supreme Leader and his instructions were 
granted ‘the force of law’.21  
                                                 
18 Ibid., paras 22-23. 
19 African Union, Country Profile: Libya, retrieved 21 April 2013 
<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Country%20Profile%20LIBYA.pdf>. 
20 HRC, International Commission of Inquiry in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , paras 24-6. 
21 Ibid., para 27. 
     
 ͳͺͲ
In effect, through these developments Qadhafi became both Head of State and head 
of government, exercising absolute power. Members of his family were appointed 
to key command positions in military intelligence and telecommunications, while 
his second son, Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, was appointed general coordinator of the 
Popular Social Command who oversaw the legislature. The autocratic leadership of 
Qadhafi, was founded upon resentment coupled with the pursuit of socialism, Islam 
and absolute power. Consequently, independent institutions, civil society, political 
parties and a judiciary to provide justice and redress were absent under Qadhafi’s 
leadership. Furthermore, similar to the Bashir government in Sudan, Libya became 
dominated by a repressive centralised government, with violence the primary means 
to disband opposition.  
Similar to many other African states, tribes are an important foundation of social 
organisation in Libyan history because they brought geographically isolated 
groupings of nomadic people together.22 Common tribal heritage has provided the 
basis for close cooperation and alliances with neighbouring states, particularly Chad 
and Sudan, but also indifference and conflict. Consequently, Libyan relationships 
with African states are more likely to be based on opportunity and need, rather than 
history and kinship.23 Ethnically, most Libyans claim descent from Bedouin Arab 
tribes of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulayn. Libya also has a considerable Amazigh 
population largely residing in the Nafusa Mountain region, near the border with 
Tunisia. Tensions between the Qadhafi regime and Amazigh populations have been 
a constant feature of Libyan politics resulting in bans on the teaching of native 
berber language or use of traditional names for children; denial of this ethnic group 
in population counts; and a policy of marginalisation by government authorities.24   
It is a similar story for the ten thousand or so nomadic Tuaregs that reside in a 
contiguous region within the Sahara and Shael and Tebu residing primarily in the 
Tibesti Mountain Range in the south of Libya along the border with Chad. While 
                                                 
22 Ibid., paras 20-21. 
23 A de Waal, ‘African roles in the Libyan conflict of 2011’, International Affairs, vol. 89, no.2, 
March 2013, p.378. 
24 G Smith, ‘Small rebel victory big moment for persecuted Berber tribes’, The Globe and Mail  (21 
April 2011), retrieved 1 April 2013 < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-
mideast/small-rebel-victory-big-moment-for-persecuted-berber-tribes/article1995361/>. 
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Qadhafi has solicited ‘good relations’ with Tuareg communities in Mali and Niger 
and ‘absorbed’ large numbers of Tuareg  rebels into military forces as mercenaries 
to fight opposition, Libyan authorities have sought to expel Tebu who have entered 
southern Libya and in many cases resided there for many years. Frustrated with 
their insistence on remaining in Libya and with mounting resentment among local 
Arab communities towards Tebu populations, in December 2007 Libyan authorities 
withdrew ration books, identity cards, passports and papers from Tebu and issued 
instructions to expel them on the basis of being foreigners.25 At the same time, 
evidence of Tuareg rebels from Mali and Niger being recruited to form Qadhafi’s 
mercenary forces, has fuelled resentment among local Arab populations towards 
populations suspected accurately or inaccurately, to be of Tuareg descent. 
Collectively, it is marginalisation of minority populations such as the Amazigh, 
Tebu and Tuareg together with an entrenched culture of impunity and concentration 
of state wealth and power that led to popular resentment and disaffection towards 
the autocratic leadership of Qadhafi and provided the foundations for a popular 
uprising.  
6.1.2 History of atrocities  
The Arab Spring which started in Tunisia in December 2010, when Mohamed 
Bouazizi set himself on fire in a pro-democratic protest in the town of Sidi Bouzid, 
by spring 2011 had gained momentum in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria and Bahrain. 
These popular uprisings delivered mixed results in terms of displacing existing state 
leadership.26 In Tunisia and Egpyt leadership was relinquished following 
widespread protests, but in Libya, Yemen, and Syria thousands were wounded or 
killed. In Bahrain, protestors were confronted with force resulting in deep divisions 
and a high human cost, but were successful in securing government commitment to 
reformation, reparation and reconciliation.27 While these conflicts have different 
political, social and historical bases, they are characterised by a common aspiration 
among populations seeking progress through freedom and democracy and to end the 
                                                 
25 ICG, Popular protest in North Africa and the Middle East, p.23. 
26 See S Bellal & L Doswald-Beck ‘Evaluating the use of force during the Arab spring’, Yearbook of 
international humanitarian law, vol. 14, December 2011, pp.3-35. 
27 Amnesty International, Year of rebellion: human rights in the Middle East and North Africa, no 
date, retrieved 15 April 2013 <http://amnestymena.posterous.com/pages/introduction-90956 >. 
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reign of longstanding autocratic governments. This was certainly the case in Libya 
where the arrest of lawyers representing the families of victims of the Abu Salim 
massacre triggered protests, initially in Benghazi and later Tripoli, that rapidly 
spread to cities and towns across Libya. The Abu Salim massacre (1996) involved 
the death of 1,250 civilians, largely political prisoners from the eastern regions, 
allegedly executed under the supervision of Qaddafi’s head of internal intelligence, 
Abdullah Senussi at the Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli.28 The introduction of 
legislation to outlaw dissent, which attracted punishments of life imprisonment, 
torture or the death penalty, made such action permissible among government 
officials. Government forces responded to the uprising by attacking protestors in 
Benghazi and other eastern cities. When protests spread to the capital Tripoli and 
other western cities of Misratah, Zawiya, Zuwara and Zintan, government forces 
employed excessive force such as firing live ammunition into crowds of protestors, 
killing hundreds. Doctors treating casualties were not permitted to document those 
wounded or killed. With security forces positioned in hospitals, injury became a 
signifier of opposition,29 often leading to arbitrary arrest or enforced disappearance 
by government forces and foreign mercenaries recruited to dissolve opposition.30  
In an emergency session on 15 March 2011, the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
established an International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (ICIL) under 
resolution A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 to investigate all alleged violations of IHRL in 
Libya; establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated; identify those responsible; and make recommendations on 
accountability measures, with a view to ensuring those individuals responsible were 
held accountable (paragraph 11). This included actions of Qadhafi government 
forces, thuwar (anti-government forces) and members of the NATO-led Operation 
Unified Protector. Comprising three members: Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt) (Chair), 
Asma Khader (Jordan) and Philippe Kirsch (Canada), the commission was 
supported by a secretariat within the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
                                                 
28 JJ Myers, Exit the colonel: the hidden history of the Libyan revolution, Interview with W Chorin, 
Carnegie Council, retrieved 20 November 2012 
<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20121023/index.html>. 
29 Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC (4 May 2011) S/PV.6528. 
30 Human Rights Watch, World report 2012: Libya, retrieved 15 April 2013 
<http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-libya>. 
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Human Rights (OHCHR). In conducting its investigation ICIL considered all 
actions and violations committed before, during and following the 2011 uprising. In 
June 2011, the Commission reported A/HRC/17/44 (1 June 2011) that it had 
established direct contact with former government officials, the interim National 
Transitional Council (NTC), civil society and individuals across Libya. The 
Commission met more than 350 people, including over 100 doctors, medical staff, 
patients and members of families in ten hospitals; thirty people detained in Tripoli 
and Benghazi; and over 140 displaced persons located in Libya, transit points or in 
refugee camps in neighbouring states (paragraphs 2-3).  
Consistent with reports from NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, the Commission found in their final report, some nine months later 
A/HRC/19/68 (8 March 2012), that Qadhafi forces had:  
x Employed excessive force against protestors, leading to significant deaths in a 
number of towns and cities, suggesting a central policy of violent repression 
(paragraph 22); 
x Systematically executed and tortured large numbers of civilian prisoners in 
detention centres (paragraph 35); 
x Arbitrarily detained persons and refused legal protections to those suspected of 
supporting anti-government revolutionary brigades or thuwar, including family 
members and peaceful protestors (paragraph 42); 
x Tortured and ill-treated detainees in a widespread and systematic manner, with 
methods including severe beatings on the soles of feet (falaqa), electric shock 
on genitalia, burning, threatening detainees with dogs, suspension over doors or 
from bars, being locked in small spaces or solitary confinement for extended 
periods, plus rape and other forms of sexual violence (paragraphs 45, 48 and 
52); 
x Engaged in indiscriminate attacks on civilians utilising unguided weapons 
(paragraph 80), such as mortar-fired cluster munitions into residential areas and 
anti-vehicle mines parachuted in by rockets. Government forces were also 
     
 ͳͺͶ
reported to have laid tens of thousands of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle 
landmines in various regions.31  
In summary, the ICIL concluded that crimes against humanity and war crimes were 
committed by Qadhafi forces. These included acts of murder, torture, enforced 
disappearance and sexual violence committed as part of a ‘widespread and 
systematic attack against a civilian population’ (paragraph 118). Furthermore, as a 
‘direct consequence of the legacy of the Qadhafi era’, accountability mechanisms in 
Libya were deficient or non-existent (paragraph 101) through the ‘deterioration’ of 
the legislative framework, judicial system and national institutions (paragraph 123), 
suggesting an entrenched culture of impunity.  
While the commission’s findings relate directly to the uprising in February 2011, 
the means and ends identified in the report apply equally to Libya prior to the 
conflict. A significant source of evidence eliciting concern in this regard were 
Libya’s security forces who exploited the autocratic leadership of Qadhafi to harass, 
repress, arrest and detain, journalists, sources of dissent or civilians suspected of 
supporting thuwar forces during and immediately prior to the 2011 uprising. NGOs 
such as Amnesty International have consistently documented the culture of fear and 
persecution that paralysed the Libyan population. A recent review of conditions 
preceding the uprising found 
Draconian legislation outlawed dissent and the establishment of 
independent organisations…Special courts were sentencing opponents 
after grossly unfair trials…Foreign nationals were living under risk of 
arrest, indefinite detention for “immigration offences” and torture and ill-
treatment. Discrimination against women existed in law and practice. The 
death penalty and other cruel punishments such as flogging were 
prescribed for a wide range of “offences”.32 
Of particular concern, was the failure of Libyan authorities to repeal immunity for 
security forces or loyalists from prosecution and disciplinary measures for human 
rights violations.  
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Amnesty International, Year of rebellion. 
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In the case of anti-Qadhafi thuwar forces, the ICIL report A/HRC/19/68 (8 March 
2012) concluded that they had committed serious violations, including unlawful 
killing, arbitrary arrest, torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians and pillaging. Furthermore, ICIL found that the thuwar were 
targeting sub-Saharan migrant communities together with dark-skinned Libyan 
communities because they were perceived, often inaccurately, to be Qadhafi’s 
African mercenaries recruited from neighbouring states such as Sudan, to dissolve 
opposition. In the case of Tawergha communities, this included blocking access to 
towns, burning and destruction of houses and public buildings, with the aim of 
removing populations (paragraph 59). Further evidence is provided in examples of 
thuwar targeting Arab Mashashiya towns, perceived as loyalist to Qadhafi, citing 
looting of vacated towns and beating of displaced persons attempting to return 
(paragraphs 60-61). In light of an entrenched culture of impunity and the absence of 
judicial and national institutions, gaining central control over detention facilities 
and establishing effective institutions for accountability was identified by ICIL, the 
Security Council and NGOs, as an enormous challenge and transition priority for 
the new government.  
6.1.3 Institutional capacity  
In chapter three this thesis argued a common risk factor underpinning mass 
atrocities is the nature and capacity of the state, which is often weak or repressive in 
nature. Key features of weak or repressive states which increase the propensity for 
violent conflict include economic mismanagement, lack of social service delivery 
and lack of capacity or willingness to guarantee human rights. Consistent with this 
explanation, chapter five found that weak or repressive states often lack the capacity 
and/or will to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent and accountable 
political institutions.33 In the case of Libya, the capacity of the state was strong. 
However, despite Libya’s strong economic performance effective judicial and 
national institutions were largely absent due to Qadhafi’s forty-two years of 
autocratic leadership. To fully appreciate the institutional performance of Libya, it 
is necessary to engage in a closer assessment.  
                                                 
33 Rice & Patrick, Index of state weakness, p.8. 
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Drawing on Rice and Patrick’s 2008 Index of State Weakness examined in chapter 
five,34 this thesis finds Libya performed very strongly, ranking eighty-sixth in 
comparative state performance out of one 141 developing states reviewed (Sudan 
appears in sixth position).35 When scores are collated into functional or basket 
categories,36 Libya demonstrates very strong performance in the areas of: social 
welfare (scoring a staggering 9.77 out of ten); security (scoring 8.12 out of ten); and 
economic (scoring 6.80 out of ten). Not surprisingly, Libya scores poorly on 
political indicators (scoring 2.45 out of ten).37 Interrogation of this poor 
performance reveals that Libya scores 4.85 for rule of law; 3.87 for government 
effectiveness; 2.85 for control of corruption; 1.10 for voice and accountability; and 
0.00 for freedom. Interestingly, this latter score is marginally lower that Sudan’s 
score for freedom (0.83). Despite scoring relatively well in the area of security, 
Libya ranks below average for gross human rights abuses (scoring 4.91).38 
Collectively, these scores confirm during 2008-2009 economically and socially 
Libya demonstrates it is a strong state in terms of capacity and performance. 
However, over the same period politically Libya falls into the category of a “state to 
watch”. These states usually demonstrate significant poor performance in a 
particular area(s) rather than weakness.  Although “states to watch” demonstrate 
higher aggregate scores, they generally perform poorly in at least one of the four 
core areas of sovereign responsibility.39  
With repression of dissent through autocratic government a central feature in 
Libyan politics, it is not surprising that Libya performs poorly in indicators related 
to individual rights and freedoms. Looking at political rights and civil liberties, 
indicators such as the Freedom in the World Survey (2010) are instructive. Chapter 
five (see section 5.1.3) noted that in states rated as “not free” there is generally an 
absence of political rights, accompanied by widespread and systematic denial of 
basic civil liberties. Of the forty-seven states deemed “not free”, Libya appears in 
fourth position (behind North Korea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan but in front of 
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37 Ibid., p.41. 
38 Ibid., p.44,46. 
39 Ibid., p.20. 
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Sudan) attracting the lowest possible rating of seven.40 However, the case of Libya 
requires a more nuanced understanding to fully appreciate the significance of these 
scores. Taken collectively, the scores outlined here demonstrate the paradoxical 
nature of Libyan performance. While the scores above demonstrate relatively high 
material well-being consistent with developed states, examination of comparative 
performance across individual indicators confirms poor performance in indicators 
related to freedom and human rights. Given the relative material wealth of Libya, 
what these scores confirm is that the poor institutional performance of Libya is 
related more to a lack of political will, rather than institutional weakness arising 
from lack of material capacity; that is, Libya was a strong but illiberal state.   
6.1.4 Receptivity or openness  
Relatively wealthy with low levels of foreign direct investment, totalling $200 
million nationally in 2011 compared to $1.9 billion in Sudan,41 and not dependent 
upon foreign aid, little is known about Libyan trade and engagement with global 
markets. Representative of the repressive and insular approach of Libyan authorities 
under Qadhafi, politically it was a similar story until 2003 when Libya entered into 
a deal with the US lifting extended sanctions against Libya. Following the 
Lockerbie terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988, killing all 259 
passengers on board and crew plus eleven people on the ground, Libya was plunged 
into extended sanctions resulting in a sharp decline in oil exports and corresponding 
revenue, and severely restricting Qadhafi’s ability to manoeuvre in international 
politics. The following year, in September 1989 a terrorist attack on UTA flight 772 
killing 171 on board, led to the Security Council imposing a series of embargoes 
and sanctions on Libya through resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). 
These embargoes and sanctions were suspended under resolution 1192 (1998) and 
later lifted under resolution 1506 (2003), as parties agreed on judicial proceedings 
against two Libyan suspects. Abandoning weapons of mass destruction and 
agreeing to compensate families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing, this 
                                                 
40 A Puddington, Freedom in the world 2010: erosion of freedom intensifies, Freedom House, 
Washington DC, 2010, pp.4-5. 
41 World Bank, ‘Global Links’, World development indicators 2013, retrieved 5 May 2013 
<http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi>, pp.98-9.  
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represented an unprecedented rapprochement between Qadhafi and Western states. 
Consequently, Qadhafi and Libya returned to international politics by becoming a 
member of the HRC in 2010.  
Despite an assurance on 19 March 2011 that a ceasefire with rebel forces 
participating in the uprising had been secured and was being upheld, Libyan 
authorities adopted a policy of non-cooperation. In practice this translated into a 
variety of counter-productive activities including: the use of heavy weaponry to 
target civilian populations; arbitrary arrest and detention of anti-government 
protestors; torture, ill treatment and execution of sources of criticism or opposition; 
and restricting access for the delivery of humanitarian aid and movement of 
personnel. A continuation of impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities occurred 
alongside a refusal to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
6.1.5 Leadership  
According to Alex de Waal, Qadhafi ‘cut a unique figure in African politics’, 
proving ‘divisive, controversial and ambiguous’.42 Qadhafi was pivotal in the 
founding of the AU as a regional organisation with a stronger focus on peace and 
security. The extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) that resulted in the Sirte 
Declaration establishing the AU, was hosted by Qadhafi in September 1999.43 
Qadhafi went on to become the first North African chairperson 2009-2010. Libya is 
also a major source of funding for the AU as one of five major African states 
contributing seventy-five percent of dues. It has also been suggested that Qadhafi 
paid the annual dues of approximately fifteen to twenty other states, in many cases 
so they could vote at summit meetings.44 Despite this pivotal role in AU politics, 
Qadhafi’s refusal to be bound by rules and autocratic approach to leadership ‘put 
him at odds’ with other African leaders.45 Consequently, Libya’s presidency of the 
                                                 
42 de Waal, African roles in the Libyan conflict, p.365. 
43 ‘AU in a nutshell’, African Union website, retrieved 25 April 2013 < 
http://au.int/en/about/nutshell>. 
44 EY Omorogbe, ‘The African Union, responsibility to protect and the Libyan Crisis’, Netherlands 
International Law Review, vol. 59, no.2, August 2012, p.155; see also de Waal, African roles in the 
Libyan conflict, p.366. 
45 de Waal, African roles in the Libyan conflict, p.366. 
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AU comprised ‘repeated public arguments’ with other leaders as well as 
‘considerable effort’ on the part of African leaders to persuade Qadhafi that his 
presidency was for one year and not permanent.46   
Prior to presidency of the AU, Qadhafi was a ‘consistent and vocal pole’ of support 
for anti-colonialism and liberation through armed rebellion.47 This ranged from 
opposition to apartheid in South Africa to support for a number of coups and 
insurgencies, including different factions in Somalia and rebellions by Charles 
Taylor in Liberia and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone. In the 1980s Libya used 
Darfur as a staging post for operations in Chad, sparking the creation of the 
Janjaweed militia and Darfur’s first conflict in 1987-89. Following the outbreak of 
conflict in Darfur in 2003, Qadhafi continued his support, becoming ‘financier, 
arms supplier and protector’ of rebel JEM forces founded by the late Khalil 
Ibrahim.48 At the same time, Qadhafi occupied a contradictory role of peacemaker 
in Darfur, hosting peace talks in his home town of Sirte in October 2007. Supported 
by the AU and UN, hosting of the peace talks signalled the increased involvement 
and desire of the Arab world to secure a political settlement to the conflict. 
Reflective of his approach to governance, during extensive opening remarks, 
Qadhafi indicated that the best thing foreign peacemakers and peacekeepers could 
do to resolve the conflict in Darfur, was to ‘stay out of it’ and let the people of 
Sudan settle it themselves.49     
Following reconciliation between Sudan and Chad in January 2010, Libya became a 
refuge for JEM leaders expelled from Chad, including during the uprising in 2011. 
De Waal explained a possible motivation for providing refuge for JEM rebels was 
that further Darfur peace talks were being hosted by Qatar. Given Qadhafi 
harboured deep resentment towards Qatar, because of the state’s aspiration for Arab 
leadership, this provided a possible motivation for providing refuge to JEM 




49 E Knickmeyer, ‘Talks on Darfur open with partial boycott by rebels’, Washington Post 
(28 October 2007) retrieved 26 April 2013 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/27/AR2007102701447.html>. 
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leaders.50   Interestingly, Sudan played a significant role during the uprising in 
Libya, providing military support to the NTC in terms of weapons and ammunition, 
communications equipment, intelligence officers and trainers, while cooperating 
with NATO to provide forward air controllers to assist in air strikes. Following the 
NTC declaration of liberation, Sudan continued to cooperate with Libya through 
joint border monitoring in the south.51  The same is true for Qartar who provided 
support to coalition air strikes under Operation Odyssey Dawn and the NATO-led 
Operation Unified Protector that followed. From this perspective, Alex de Waal’s 
assessment that Libya’s Saharan politics ‘came to resemble a vast patronage 
machine, renting the allegiances of diverse political entrepreneurs’ as required, 
appears to be an accurate assessment.52  
Looking more broadly at leadership as a risk factor, it is clear from the case of 
Libya examined here and the case of Darfur examined in chapter five that there are 
distinguishable features or characteristics of leadership that are more likely to elicit 
concern under R2P. Characteristics of leadership within this emerging typology 
include: a past history of armed rebellion; large scale and systematic human rights 
violations including summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced 
disappearances and sexual violence perpetrated by a combination of government 
forces and proxy militia or foreign mercenaries; a strong ideological commitment; 
marginalisation of specific populations in terms of legal status, political 
representation or wealth sharing or discrimination to repress cultural identity 
through centralised government; lack of political will or material capacity to resolve 
tensions peacefully despite rhetoric of a commitment to a negotiated settlement; 
indifference to international and national perceptions of legitimacy to rule or 
relative performance against sovereign responsibilities; a refusal to be bound by 
rules or held accountable, resulting in an entrenched culture of impunity; and 
allegiances based on political patronage. From the evidence examined in this 
chapter and chapter five, it would appear that Qadhafi and President Bashir of 
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51 Ibid., p.377-8. 
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Sudan share many characteristics of this typology, as does President al-Assad of 
Syria.  
6.2 Security Council deliberations 
Between February 2011 and January 2013, there were forty-eight substantive 
references to Libya in Security Council deliberations, resulting in a total of seven 
resolutions and seven presidential statements (a summary of meeting records 
reviewed appears at Appendix B). Similar to sources of empirical evidence 
examined in the previous chapter, the nature and scope of these references reflect a 
variety of deliberations, ranging from situational reports on the crisis, fact-finding 
and mission updates, progress reports on ICC investigations, the use of Libya as an 
example during thematic debates or indirect references during deliberations on 
broader regional security arrangements. Chapter five argued that meeting records 
offer a valuable source for understanding how states engage with mass atrocities in 
specific situations. Consistent with this approach, this section examines how 
conceptions of legitimacy were constituted and re-constituted through references to 
R2P, to construct and reconstruct the limits of normatively permissible agency and 
action.53  
Returning to Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P involves a choice in how 
states employ the principle this review is looking for the use of discursive signifiers 
relevant to the disparate functions licensed by this choice. In the case of a normative 
call to action, signifiers would take the form of references to “immediacy”, “timely 
and decisive” action, a sense of “urgency” or “swift” action and a narrow focus on 
“security” and “stability”. In the case of a policy agenda, signifiers would reference 
addressing “structural issues” underlying conflict, “conflict prevention”, “capacity 
building” or make a solid link between security, accountability and development or 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Examining meeting records, resolutions, 
presidential statements and secretariat reports, this chapter argues that while 
international engagement with Libya is more accurately characterised as a 
normative call to action through the Council’s focus upon civilian protection and 
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accountability as measures to avert further atrocities, signifiers consistent with a 
policy agenda and longer-term objectives associated with democratic transition are 
also evident in Security Council deliberations.  
6.2.1 Timely and decisive action  
Seven days after the uprising in Libya commenced, on 22 February 2011 the 
League of Arab States (LAS) formally suspended Libya from the organisation. The 
same day the Security Council held its first deliberations on the crisis in Libya, 
taking the form of a closed meeting. Following the meeting, Council President, 
Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil), issued a statement condemning the use of force 
against civilians and calling for Libya to ‘meet its responsibility to protect its 
population’.54 In addition, the statement urged Libyan authorities to provide safe 
passage for humanitarian assistance, medical supplies and humanitarian workers 
and underscored the need to hold those responsible for attacks on civilians 
accountable. From the outset, this remarkably early invocation of R2P, one week 
into the crisis, framed international engagement around the parameters of civilian 
protection and accountability for violations of IHRL and IHL, including crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. Three days later on 25 February 2011, the 
Security Council held its second round of deliberations on Libya, as part of a 
broader briefing on peace and security in Africa, by Secretary-General, Ban Ki-
moon.55 As the first round of deliberations to be made public, the meeting provided 
substantial evidence on atrocities occurring in Libya, highlighted the failure of 
Libyan authorities to provide human protection and outlined potential measures to 
be considered in the formation of an international response under the umbrella of 
R2P.   
During his briefing, the Secretary-General reported that the streets of Tripoli were 
deserted as civilians lived in fear of being shot by government forces or militia.56 
The Council heard evidence that Qadhafi supporters had been conducting house-to-
house searches to arrest anti-government protestors. Reports from human rights 
                                                 
54 Security Council press statement on Libya (22 February 2011) SC/10180. 
55 Briefing by the Secretary-General (25 February 2011) S/PV.6490. 
56 Ibid. 
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groups, press and civilians in Libya of government forces entering hospitals to kill 
wounded opponents or soldiers unwilling to kill civilians were also conveyed along 
with public statements by Qadhafi threatening civil war and mass killings if protests 
continued. Consistent with this alarming trend, Libyan representative, Abdurrahman 
Mohamed Shalgham, reported one million Libyans seeking democracy, freedom 
and rights had gathered in Benghazi.57 In terms of international engagement with 
the crisis, the Secretary-General advised that a special session of the HRC was 
being convened for the first time against a member, to establish an international 
independent commission of inquiry. At the same time, the Secretary-General 
reiterated a recent statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights making 
an explicit reference to pillar three of the Secretary-General’s approach to 
implementing R2P, which suggested where there is a ‘manifest failure of a state to 
protect its population’ the international community has ‘a responsibility to take 
protective action in a collective, timely and decisive manner’.58 In discussing 
measures being considered, he reminded members it was ‘time for the Security 
Council to consider concrete action’ and cautioned them to be ‘mindful of the 
urgency of the moment’.59 Concluding the meeting, the representative of Libya 
appealed to the Security Council for a ‘swift, decisive and courageous resolution’.60  
The following day, the Council met for the third time on Libya. Acting under 
Chapter VII, the Security Council adopted resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) 
demanding an ‘immediate’ end to violence (paragraph 1), calling for steps to be 
taken to fulfil the legitimate demands of the Libyan population and imposing 
sanctions on Libya through an arms embargo (paragraph 9), travel bans on members 
of the Libyan government and a travel ban and asset freeze on the Qaddafi family 
(paragraphs 15 and 17). A sanctions committee chaired by Portugal was established 
to oversee implementation of these measures (paragraph 24). Acting under article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute, Security Council resolution 1970 also referred the 
situation in Libya since protests commenced on 15 February 2011, to the ICC 
(paragraph 4). While Libya is not a party to the Statute, it is obliged to cooperate 
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with the ICC under the terms of the referral (paragraph 5). Other states not party to 
the ICC were urged to cooperate, but were not obliged to do so as officials would be 
subject to national jurisdiction for any action taken in implementing the resolution 
(paragraph 6). In terms of the significance of resolution 1970 and contribution to 
international engagement with mass atrocities, it was the second referral to the ICC, 
following the referral of Darfur under resolution 1593 (31 March 2005), but the first 
egregious human rights situation unanimously referred to the ICC for investigation.  
Speaking to the vote, the US challenged Qadhafi’s leadership stating that his resort 
to mass violence to stay in power meant that he had lost his ‘legitimacy to rule’.61 
Russia called for an ‘immediate’ end to violence, noting that Libyan compliance 
with the resolution was necessary to ‘avert full scale war’ and to ‘preserve the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Libya.62 In its statement China advocated 
that the ‘greatest urgency’ should be to secure an ‘immediate cessation’ of violence 
and to resolve the crisis through dialogue. In contrast, France reminded states of 
their ‘responsibility to protect their populations’ and the international community to 
intervene where states fail to discharge this duty. France went further to note that 
support for adoption of resolution 1970 rested on the ‘hope that it would extend 
liberty beyond Libya’, signalling a ‘new era for the international community as a 
whole’.63 In his concluding remarks, the Secretary-General commended the 
adoption of resolution 1970 as a ‘vital step and clear expression’ of the united will 
of the international community, but cautioned that ‘even bolder action’ may be 
required.64    
On 5 March 2011 the interim NTC in Benghazi, an opposition mobilised in 
February 2011 as an alternative government to support democratic transition, met 
for the first time calling for the international community to fulfil its obligation to 
protect Libya’s population without resorting to direct military intervention.65 
Adopting a similar approach, on 12 March 2011 the LAS called upon the Security 
Council to establish a no-fly zone with the support of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
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62 Ibid., Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation. 
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64 Ibid, Statement by the Secretary-General.  
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(GCC) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).66 One month after the 
uprising commenced at the fourth round of deliberations on Libya, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) establishing a no-fly zone 
(paragraph 6) and authorising the LAS and member states to take action to 
implement this provision (paragraph 8); plus ‘all necessary measures’ to protect 
civilians, excluding occupation by a foreign force (paragraph 4); and prohibiting all 
international flights by Libyan-owned or operated airlines (paragraph 17). 
Furthermore, resolution 1973 strengthened existing sanctions and established a 
Panel of Experts to support the sanctions committee established under resolution 
1970. Sanctions were strengthened by the inclusion of seven more individuals and 
five entities, including state-owned companies, subject to freezing of assets and 
travel bans (paragraph 22).  
Unlike resolution 1970, support for resolution 1973 was not unanimous. Among the 
P5 China and Russia abstained (as did Brazil, Germany and India). Speaking to the 
vote, Russia explained abstention was principles-based. While Russia agreed that 
the use of force against civilians by Libyan authorities was unacceptable, questions 
about how the no-fly zone would be enforced, rules of engagement and limits on the 
use of force were not addressed during deliberations on the draft resolution. Russia 
went further expressing concern that the draft resolution ‘morphed’ as steps were 
introduced beyond the initial request for assistance issued by the LAS,67 opening 
the door for full-scale military intervention. In conclusion, the Russian 
representative reiterated a preference for a political settlement on the basis that the 
use of force could further destabilise North Africa and the Middle East. China 
indicated its support for action that would ‘stabilise the situation in Libya’ and halt 
acts of violence, but rationalised abstention with reference to a general opposition to 
the use of force stating that the Council should ‘respect the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Libya’ along with efforts of the AU and 
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LAS to broker a political settlement.68 Similar to Russia, China also found elements 
of the resolution ‘difficult’ because of unresolved questions.69   
In contrast, the US characterised resolution 1973 as a ‘powerful response’ to a ‘call 
for action’ by the LAS to ‘urgent needs’ on the ground. Speaking to the vote, the 
US representative, Susan Rice, suggested the US was ready with its Arab and 
NATO partners to ‘shoulder our responsibilities to implement resolution 1973’.70 
Whereas the UK rationalised support on the basis that Libyan leaders had 
commenced air strikes against civilians in anticipation of a ‘brutal attack’.71  Two 
days after resolution 1973 passed, coalition forces from the US, France, UK, Italy 
and Canada launched Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce resolution 1973. On 
23 March 2011, NATO assumed responsibility for enforcement of the arms 
embargo, followed by enforcement of the no-fly zone three days later. By 
31 March 2011 NATO had assumed full command of military activities, signalling 
the commencement of Operation Unified Protector.72 
Over the next six months the Security Council met a further thirteen times on Libya 
without any direct action. Eleven of those meetings were dedicated to receiving 
briefings and updates on the situation on the ground, implementation of existing 
resolutions, investigations of the ICC, reports on the conduct of the NATO mission 
or AU activities. The remaining two represented thematic discussions on UN 
peacekeeping and peace and security in Africa, respectively. In deliberations 
dedicated to the situation in Libya, there were a number of developments during the 
period that influenced international engagement. In an alarming development, a 
briefing by the Secretary-General on 24 March 2011 reported that threats by 
Qadhafi towards opponents had aired on national television, while a number of 
journalists had been arrested, including four Al-Jazeera crew.73 Foreign press 
warned UN staff in Tripoli of a general fear among the population, tight control by 
security services, further arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances. In response 
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to these developments, the Secretary-General reminded the Council of the 
‘imperative to continue to act with speed and decisiveness’ in response to the 
‘critical situation on the ground’.74   
In April and May the Special Envoy for Libya briefed the Council on a meeting he 
had with the Chairman of the NTC, Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil. During the 
meeting, the NTC clarified that a ceasefire alone was not sufficient to end the 
conflict. Furthermore, as the objective of the uprising was the departure of Qadhafi, 
the NTC refused to negotiate with the leader or members of his family.75 By May, 
over 665,000 people had fled Libya as fighting intensified in the western cities of 
Yafran, Zintan and the Dehiba-Wazin border crossing with Tunisia; south-eastern 
towns of Kura and Jula; and Misratah, where government forces imposed a sea 
blockade positioning mines throughout the port. Concurrently, it was alleged that 
NATO forces had bombed the Qadhafi family home killing his son Saif al-Arab and 
grandchildren.76 Responding to the briefing the UK noted increased rocket attacks 
against civilians together with disruptions to electricity and water supplies were 
starting to resemble the deteriorating situation in Syria.77  
Around the same time, Russia and China began to express concerns with civilian 
casualties arising from the NATO-led operation, especially in Tripoli. These 
concerns were twofold. Firstly, they criticised what they saw as arbitrary 
interpretation of resolution 1973. Put simply, Russia and China were concerned 
with what appeared to a subjective interpretation of the provisions of resolution 
1973 by P5 members US, UK and France. Arguing that civilian protection could be 
achieved without intervention, Russia and China were concerned specifically with 
the use of force for human protection and the enforcement of a no-fly zone 
becoming the means to realise individual Western political objectives. Secondly, 
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both were critical that members of the NATO-led coalition were adopting actions 
that appeared to exceed the mandate authorised by the Council.78  
In terms of allegations that members of the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector 
had engaged in deliberate targeting of civilians, ICIL concluded in its report 
A/HRC/19/68 (8 March 2012) that out of the 17,939 missions flown, five resulted 
in civilian casualties, killing sixty and injuring fifty-five (paragraph 86). 
Responding to the allegations of deliberate targeting, ICIL found NATO conducted 
a ‘highly precise campaign, employing precision guided munitions exclusively’ 
with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties’ (paragraphs 84 and 
89). In effect, what Russia and China were suggesting was that the objective of the 
NATO-led operation mandated by the Security Council had fundamentally shifted 
from human protection to forced regime change. While Russia and China’s reaction 
could be rationalised with reference to a general opposition to the use of force and 
an accompanying preference to preserve the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Libya, regional organisations such as the LAS and AU 
together with states who originally voted in favour of resolution 1973, such as 
Colombia and South Africa,79  began to express similar concerns. This ‘edging 
back’ from consensus for international action is similar, at least in nature, to the 
edging back in commitment to R2P that took place among some states following the 
World Summit.80 In the case of Libya, this suggested the start of what has been 
characterised as “buyer’s regret” towards international action under the umbrella of 
R2P.  
6.2.2 Democracy, freedom and rights  
Consistent with objections raised by Russia and China, in April 2011 Commissioner 
of the AU Peace and Security Council, Ramtane Lamamra, expressed concern that 
the ‘pursuit of other agendas in Libya by non-African actors’ compromised AU 
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attempts to promote a political settlement to the crisis.81 Furthermore, the 
international response was marginalising African efforts to implement a roadmap 
for peace in a manner consistent with and complementary to resolutions 1970 and 
1973. The following month, the AU issued a press statement reiterating its 
commitment to respect resolution 1973 but cautioned states involved in 
implementation to ‘act in a manner fully consistent with’ provisions of the 
resolution and the ‘sole objective’ of civilian protection, recognising however, that 
the NATO-led operation posed an ‘increased risk of more civilian casualties’.82 
Building on this criticism, at its annual meeting 30 June-1 July 2011 the AU 
Assembly expressed deep concern towards referral of Libya to the ICC and 
requested that the Security Council defer the process under Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute for a period of twelve months.83 Not surprisingly, the Assembly decided that 
AU member states should not cooperate with execution of the indictment of Colonel 
Qadhafi. This decision was defended on the basis that issuance of a warrant 
complicated AU efforts to ‘negotiate a political solution to crisis, which would also 
address, in a mutually reinforcing way, issues of impunity and reconciliation’.84 
This response by the AU can be located in a general reluctance to take measures 
against incumbent leaders and governments, regardless of popular opinion on their 
performance. In addition, the AU is generally opposed to governments that gain 
power through ‘unconstitutional means’.85 While the AU was not prepared to 
engage in direct action it did compromise its opposition regarding reactionary 
activities when issuing a statement indicating its support for resolution 1973, and 
further noting that imposition of a no-fly zone constituted an ‘important element for 
the protection of civilians and delivery of humanitarian assistance.86 
                                                 
81 African Union, Statement by Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and 
Security, 275th Peace and Security Council Ministerial Meeting (26 April 2011), Addis Ababa, p.4. 
82 African Union, The AU intensifies its efforts towards a political solution in Libya and stresses the 
importance of the respect of the letter and spirit of resolution 1973 (2011), Press release, Addis 
Ababa, 3 May 2011.  
83 African Union, Decision on the implementation of the Assembly decision on the International 
Criminal Court (30 June-1 July 2011), Assembly/AU/Dec.366 (XVII), para 6. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Omorogbe, The African Union, responsibility to protect and the Libyan crisis, p.155-6. 
86 African Union, Press statement of the 268th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (23 March 
2011) PSC/PR/BR.1 (CCLXVIII). 
     
 ʹͲͲ
Briefings of the Council in 2011 delivered mixed results in terms of clarifying the 
AU position, the situation on the ground and focus of international engagement, in 
terms of emphasis between prevention and reaction. In May, Secretariat staff 
advised the Council that they had commenced planning for post-conflict 
peacebuilding, by initiating pre-assessment activities to determine political, 
security, rule of law and human rights, economic recovery, public administration 
and physical infrastructure needs.87 This suggested that while events on the ground 
were still volatile, the focus of international engagement would begin to shift from 
reaction, and its associated short-term focus on security, towards prevention, 
through a longer-term focus upon assisting new Libyan authorities build the 
conditions for sustainable peace. Briefings throughout June and July appeared to 
support this perception of a gradual shift in the focus of international engagement, 
with an emphasis upon both reaction and prevention. In particular, the briefings 
recommended that the Council continue to focus on the immediate task of tackling 
priorities on the ground while ‘inscribing action in a longer-term vision’.88 In June 
2011, following the issuance of arrest warrants for Colonel Qadhafi, his son Saif al-
Islam and head of Libyan intelligence Abdullah al-Senussi for alleged war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, and as the NATO operation reached the 100 day 
mark, Secretariat staff began to place a greater emphasis upon prevention advising 
Council members that early preparation for peacebuilding and peace consolidation 
had to be part of their planning.89 This message was reiterated again in the July 
briefing of the Council, at which it was suggested post-conflict planning would 
prove ‘invaluable if and when the UN is called upon to react quickly in a post-
conflict Libya’.90   
In his August 2011 briefing, the Secretary-General painted an encouraging picture 
as he reported NTC opposition had entered Tripoli toppling the regime and forcing 
Qadhafi to seek asylum in Algeria. While violent clashes between opposition and 
government forces continued in Sirte and Bani Walid, hospitals had reopened. More 
importantly, discussions regarding the ongoing role of the UN were underway with 
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the NTC and other world leaders. These discussions focused on preventive activities 
such as election assistance, transitional justice, policing and humanitarian needs. 
Suggesting that Council members could be hopeful of a ‘quick conclusion to the 
conflict’, the Secretary-General returned momentarily to the use of reactionary 
discursive signifiers to caution members that ‘time is of the essence’ for developing 
preventive measures, such as a ‘proactive and effective’ response to post-conflict 
challenges. He went further, suggesting that the Council should aim to get UN 
personnel on the ground quickly under a robust mandate of three principles: 
national ownership (the UN acts in accordance with Libyan needs and desires); 
rapid response and delivery (the UN responds swiftly to the request of Libyan 
authorities); and effective coordination (to ensure multilateral, bilateral and regional 
efforts are complementary with short-term and long-term priorities).91 
On 16 September 2011, the General Assembly recognised the NTC as the sole 
representative of Libya, voting 114-17 in favour.92 On the same day and building on 
the preparatory work of the Secretariat outlined a month earlier to shift the focus of 
international engagement towards preventive activities commonly associated with a 
policy agenda to address risk factors, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
resolution 2009 (16 September 2011) establishing the UN Support Mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL) with an explicit peacebuilding focus (paragraph 12). Acting under 
Chapter VII and taking measures under Article 41, UNSMIL was mandated to assist 
and support Libyan national efforts to  restore public security, order and rule of law; 
prepare for elections; engage in institution-building; promote and protect human 
rights; and initiate economic recovery. Speaking to the vote, Russia stated support 
for the resolution was based on a policy of rebuilding post-conflict Libya under the 
auspices of the UN and Security Council. Furthermore, as the purpose of the 
mission was to support transition, Russia reiterated the importance that the 
resolution reflected the Council’s intention to consider lifting the no-fly zone. In 
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terms of political transition, Russia emphasised the importance of the NTC taking 
steps to give effect to the ‘declaration to create a new democratic Libya’.93  
Similar to Russia, China rationalised support for the resolution with reference to the 
principles it had emphasised during deliberations on the draft: stability and order 
should be restored as soon as possible; Libya’s sovereignty, independence, unity 
and territorial integrity must be genuinely respected; future national affairs must be 
decided by Libyans; an inclusive political process should be launched as soon as 
possible; and the UN and Security Council should play a leading role in 
reconstruction.94 In terms of political transition, China stopped short of any 
reference to democratic transition reiterating that it would support Libyans to 
‘safeguard national sovereignty, rebuild their country and pursue development’.95 In 
response, the representative of Libya, Ibrahim Omar Dabbbashi, indicated that as a 
result of resolutions 1970 and 1973, this was the first time Libya had ‘witnessed 
operationalisation of R2P’, in terms of a focus upon prevention and its associated 
policy agenda to address risk factors underlying conflict.96 Continuing his emphasis 
upon preventive elements of R2P, the representative of Libya confirmed that the 
transitional government was ‘looking forward to building democratic institutions’ 
as part of the process of political transition.97 
On 20 October 2011, Qadhafi was captured by the thurwa and killed later that day. 
Three days later the NTC formally declared national liberation in Benghazi. Seven 
days after the capture and subsequent death of Qadhafi, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted resolution 2016 (27 October 2011) terminating the provisions 
of resolution 1973, authorising a no-fly zone, and in effect reactionary elements of 
the international response such as the use of force for human protection. On 
31 October 2011, the seven month NATO-led Operation Unified Protector 
concluded. During the period of review, a further two resolutions emphasising 
preventive activities were adopted by the Council: resolution 2022 
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(2 December 2011) extending the mandate of the UNSMIL for a further three 
months and introducing a provision to assist and support national efforts to address 
the threat of proliferation of all arms, including portable surface to air missiles 
(paragraph 2); and resolution 2040 (12 March 2012) renewing UNSMIL for a 
further twelve months and modifying its mandate to include a range of activities 
consistent with a prevention-based policy agenda, such as democratic transition, 
promotion of the rule of law, institutional capacity-building and coordination of 
international assistance (paragraph 6). Resolution 2040 also called upon Libya to 
comply with its obligations under international law tho hold those responsible for 
serious violations of IHRL and IHL accountable (paragraph 3) and urged all states 
to cooperate with Libya in its efforts to end impunity for violations (paragraph 6). 
In a statement following the vote, the representative for Libya characterised the 
renewal as evidence of the Security Council’s commitment to the ‘security and 
stability’ of Libya. Furthermore, in praising the Council for its actions to protect 
civilians, he noted that the unity of the Council was a necessary prerequisite for 
preserving its credibility in addressing similar situations.98  
6.3 R2P as a policy agenda or catalyst for action 
The conflict in Libya caught members of the Security Council by surprise. While 
Libya had a questionable human rights record and illiberal institutional basis, it did 
not appear on any early warning watch lists, it wasn’t flagged as a rapidly 
deteriorating situation, nor had it featured in broader debates around the R2P as a 
potential candidate for application of the principle. However, temporally Libya 
occurred during an interesting period in the development of collective 
understanding towards R2P. Set against the backdrop of increased cooperation 
between the AU and UN in Darfur, preceding a General Assembly dialogue on the 
role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing R2P A/65/877 (28 
June 2011), and following a dialogue on contribution of early warning and 
assessment to prevention the previous year A/64/864 (14 July 2010), the conflict in 
Libya occurred at a time when prevention was still dominating debates around 
operationalising R2P. What remained to be tested in 2011 was collective 
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understanding of pillar three of the Secretary-General’s approach to 
implementation: a timely and decisive response. Thomas Weiss offers a practical 
assessment of this situation.  With an overwhelming focus on preventive elements 
of R2P since 2009, driven largely by the Secretary-General and the interactive 
dialogues of the General Assembly, the use of force for human protection was 
largely absent from the international agenda until Libya. According to Weiss, if 
intervention in Libya went well it would give ‘teeth’ to R2P; whereas, if 
intervention went badly it would enable critics to ‘redouble their opposition’ to 
make future invocation far more difficult.99  
6.3.1 A catalyst for action    
Employing Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P necessarily involves a 
choice by states on how they employ the principle, this part reviews discursive 
signifiers identified in Security Council deliberations discussed in section 6.2 to 
establish the choice made by the P5, including the extent they engaged with the full 
continuum of R2P (to prevent, react and rebuild). Over the course of 2011-12, 
deliberations on Libya were heavily infused with the language of R2P. References 
were mostly direct, but some were implied.  In light of the discursive signifiers 
identified in part two, it is the contention of this chapter that R2P made a significant 
contribution to the ideational and normative framework for international 
engagement, largely as a normative call to action to address an imminent threat but 
also as a policy agenda seeking to address risk factors for future atrocities. 
From the outset of the crisis in Libya, UN officials and regional organisations 
warned of an imminent threat of mass atrocities. Seeking to mitigate this threat, 
briefings and statements by Secretariat staff and regional organisations were framed 
around the protection of vulnerable civilian populations in order to prevent mass 
atrocities. In terms of formulating an international response, during this early period 
of engagement R2P  
helped identify the imminent risk of mass atrocities, portrayed the crisis 
in Libya as a human protection problem, and reminded both the Libyan 
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authorities (to no effect) and the Security Council (to good effect) of 
their responsibilities.100  
For the Security Council, this remarkably early invocation of R2P one week into the 
crisis translated into three practical priorities for international action: stability, 
accountability and averting further atrocities. Consistent with this approach, the first 
round of deliberations on 22 February 2011 reiterated the responsibility of Libya for 
protection of its population under IHRL and IHL and underscored the importance of 
establishing effective accountability mechanisms within Libya in order to monitor 
the actions of all parties to the conflict and avert mass atrocities. From a similar 
perspective, a briefing by the High Commissioner for Human Rights the same day 
reminded Libya of its sovereign responsibilities, highlighting that the protection of 
civilians ‘should always be a paramount consideration in maintaining order and the 
rule of law’.101 Moreover, the briefing emphasised the imminent threat that existed 
if Libya failed to ‘immediately’ cease violence against protestors and cautioned that 
‘widespread and systematic attacks against civilians may amount to crimes against 
humanity’.102 The next round of deliberations three days later featured similar 
discursive references to the ‘urgency of the situation’ by the Secretary-General, 
with the representative of Libya calling for ‘swift and decisive’ action.103 This time, 
responsibility was framed around the international community intervening where a 
state manifestly failed to protect its population.    
This ‘early activism’ to establish state and international responsibility for civilian 
protection and highlight an imminent threat, made a significant normative 
contribution to international engagement with Libya as it became ‘part of the 
catalyst’ for adoption of resolution 1970.104 Specifically, it was references to the 
‘urgency of the moment’, the need for ‘swift, decisive and courageous action’, 
along with invocation of pillar three of the Secretary-General’s approach to 
implementation of R2P, which encouraged the Security Council to take ‘collective, 
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timely and decisive’ action.105 Put simply, these early references to R2P enabled 
international engagement with the crisis, through the legitimacy that R2P accorded. 
Contributing factors to perceptions of legitimacy included: clarity of the case and 
threat (made all the more evident by the various public statements by Qadhafi); the 
degree to which coercive action was gaining regional and international legitimacy 
(following ten years of debate around R2P and the use of force); and realisation that 
diplomacy alone would not prevent the threat of mass atrocities becoming real.106 
Consequently, invocation of R2P became the ‘legitimating principle’ for 
international intervention,107 playing an important role in setting the parameters for 
the adoption of coercive measures, as a last resort, to protect populations from mass 
atrocities.  
Once responsibility for civilian protection had been established, international 
engagement with Libya began to focus on the more immediate tasks of 
accountability and mitigating the imminent threat posed by a rapidly escalating 
crisis. Demanding an ‘immediate end’ to violence (paragraph 1), resolution 1970 
represented the second time the Security Council referred a situation to the ICC for 
investigation. While both the Libya referral and its predecessor on Darfur (2005) 
were motivated by a common need to address an entrenched culture of impunity, 
they diverged in the level of support for the referral within the Security Council, the 
timeframe it took to secure support and the need for judicial endorsement.108 As a 
call to action to establish accountability, resolution 1970 took only two weeks to 
secure unanimous support for the referral of Libya; whereas Darfur, as part of a 
policy agenda seeking to address structural issues, took two years. Similarly, while 
both referrals were accompanied by a commission of inquiry, in the case of Darfur 
it was the inquiry that triggered the referral; whereas the referral of Libya occurred 
prior to the commission conducting its investigation, which meant it was not reliant 
upon judicial endorsement.  
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The other notable difference concerns the actions of the P5, specifically the US who 
abstained in the Darfur referral on the basis of opposition to the ICC. In contrast, 
the US co-sponsored and supported resolution 1970. In terms of normative 
contribution, the shift towards a language of atrocity “crimes” in Darfur and Libya, 
rather than “large scale violations”, instigated a subsequent shift from impartiality 
to partiality on the part of the Security Council.109 As noted by Jennifer Welsh, this 
is because crimes have ‘particular perpetrators’ as opposed to multiple and often 
ambiguous parties to a conflict. Welsh explains ‘actions required to change the 
incentives’ of perpetrators push the Council away from ‘mediation and 
compromise’ towards accountability and enforcement, thereby forcing Council 
members to take targeted action to assist one side and restrict the activities and 
movements of the other. This ‘creep towards partiality’ means the ‘ambition’ of a 
targeted military operation may not always align with the ‘narrowly circumscribed’ 
political objective of civilian protection.110   
Deliberations the following month continued to employ discursive signifiers of a 
‘critical situation’ on the ground, while emphasising the need for a ‘prompt 
response’ to send a ‘clear signal of determination’ to enable the Libyan population 
to pursue their aspirations for political reform.111 The adoption of resolution 1973 
(17 March 2011) establishing a no-fly zone made an important normative 
contribution to broader international understanding, confirming that Libya had 
‘crossed a threshold’ and that the Security Council ‘will not be inhibited as a matter 
of principle from authorising the use of force where a state fails to protect their 
population’.112 While the US described the resolution as a ‘powerful’ response to 
mitigating an imminent threat and the UK welcomed the ‘swift and comprehensive 
action’, Russia and China abstained with reference to general opposition to the use 
of force and concerns around provisions of resolution 1973.113  From this 
perspective, the passing of resolution 1973 and the commencement of enforcement 
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action by NATO provides a compelling example of reaction, and its associated 
normative call to action to address an imminent threat of mass atrocities.  
6.3.2 A policy agenda for prevention   
As argued by many, the Security Council’s response to Libya should have been a 
vindication of R2P and an exemplar of pillar three activities. However, deep 
concerns over how resolutions were interpreted and the international response 
played out on the ground resulted in “buyer’s regret” among some supporters of 
Council action in Libya.114 For states such as Russia and China, Operation Unified 
Protector challenged perceptions of legitimate state action for human protection, 
which was largely based on securing a political settlement to the conflict combined 
with the deterrence value of a referral of Libya to the ICC.  Central to this debate 
was the precedent set by the use of force without host state consent and the 
contentious issue of the relationship between regime change and reactionary 
elements of R2P. As suggested by Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins, the NATO-led 
operation in Libya demonstrated the problematic link between military means and 
humanitarian ends that Operation Allied Force encountered in 1999.115 Where 
Allied Force encountered political disunity securing a mandate, Libya was 
problematic because for some states, such as Russia and China, the interpretation of 
the operation’s mandate compromised the legitimacy of international action. Central 
to these concerns was the perception that Security Council members, France, 
Britain and the US (the P3), had selectively implemented provisions consistent with 
their objectives and expanded interpretation of all necessary measures to include 
actions beyond civilian protection.  
Drawing on public statements, such as one given by US President Barack Obama on 
28 March 2011, suggesting an awareness that international consensus towards the 
use of force was fragile and that openly pursuing regime change would dissipate 
support for international action, Alex de Waal posits that the P3 resolved this 
challenge by claiming they were ‘simultaneously pursuing a military track for 
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protecting civilians’ plus a ‘non-military track for democratic transformation’.116 In 
what seemed to be a contradictory development, the rhetoric of coalition leaders 
who suggested that Qadhafi had to step down or his regime would end, tended to 
support the notion that any perceived success of international action would be 
measured by the demise of Qadhafi.117 With a no-fly zone seemingly insufficient to 
halt the advance of government forces and a political settlement to the crisis 
unlikely, preparing a plan for a negotiated settlement was never really 
contemplated.118 The use of discursive signifiers highlighting the urgency of the 
situation, imminent threat of mass atrocities and calling for immediate and decisive 
response supported this approach. 
Irrespective of these tensions among the P5, by May 2011 deliberations had started 
to shift to the use of discursive signifiers more closely aligned with a policy agenda 
to address risk factors. If all substantive references by the P5 are aggregated, 
discursive signifiers employed in Council deliberations are evenly split between a 
normative call to action and a policy agenda. In the case of the Secretariat, twice as 
many discursive signifiers were used to reference actions associated with a policy 
agenda than for a normative call to action. The turning point came in deliberations 
when NATO assumed command control for enforcement action under resolution 
1973. Following the adoption of resolution 1973, deliberations were characterised 
by a variety of briefings on the situation on the ground and progress with ICC 
investigations. Statements by Council members during this period largely reflected 
Russia and China’s ongoing concerns towards civilian casualties arising from 
Operation Unified Protector, the arbitrary interpretation of resolution 1973 and 
replacement of the language of imminent threat in resolution 1973 with the more 
expansive civilian populated areas under threat of attack. Statements by the UK, US 
and to a lesser extent France, were naturally concerned with defending the 
legitimacy of action under resolution 1973. Alongside these tensions, Secretariat 
staff informed the Council that contingency planning for peacebuilding had 
commenced.  
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In the early stages of planning, staff emphasised that they were not abandoning the 
call to action underpinning the international response thus far; rather they sought to 
complement short-term priorities with a longer-term focus. This longer-term focus 
was primarily concerned with assisting new Libyan authorities to build the 
conditions and institutions for sustainable peace. In June and July this led to a 
recommendation from the Secretariat to ‘tackle priorities on the ground while 
inscribing a longer-term vision’.119 To give this practical effect, Secretariat staff 
recommended integration of peacebuilding into ‘current planning’.120 Discursive 
signifiers employed in these deliberations included references to: rule of law and 
human rights; economic recovery; public administration;121 peace consolidation; 
building accountable institutions; change and modernity; reform,122 as well as 
reconstruction and transitional justice. This shift in focus and discursive references 
to R2P culminated in the unanimous adoption of resolution 2009 (16 September 
2011) establishing UNSMIL, with an explicit peacebuilding mandate. Speaking to 
the vote, Russia emphasised support for the resolution was based on a ‘policy of 
rebuilding post-conflict Libya’. In complete contradiction to abstention on 
resolution 1973, China supported resolution 2009 arguing the UN and Security 
Council should ‘play a leading role in reconstruction’. The UK characterised the 
mission as a ‘transition opportunity’ for Libya to realise its full potential.123 In terms 
of vindication of R2P, the representative of Libya argued the adoption of resolution 
2009 represented an important development in ‘normalisation’ of the situation in 
Libya, and was symbolic of the commencement of ‘reconstruction and 
development’.124  
In what Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock describe as a ‘fortuitous coincidence’, 
Libya was liberated exactly a decade after articulation of R2P by ICISS.125 As a 
case for R2P, Libya is representative of a ‘high water mark’ in terms of application 
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of the principle and the test case it provided to the Security Council.126 While the 
circumstances surrounding the 2011 uprising in Libya were remarkable in terms of 
the immediacy of the threat of mass atrocities, convergence between perceptions of 
legality and legitimacy, political will and operational capacity (and possibly for 
these reasons was more conducive to international intervention than other 
examples), the invocation of R2P as a normative call to action in effect escalated 
the crisis on the international agenda. Moreover, R2P can be credited with quickly 
and lawfully mobilising an international response to protect civilian populations and 
prevent mass atrocities.  
Concerned primarily with reaction, invocation of R2P early in the crisis assisted the 
P5 to establish civilian populations in Libya were existentially threatened, 
emergency measures were required to avert atrocities, and through a process of 
securitisation, convince members of the Security Council that collective and 
decisive action outside the bounds of normal procedure was legal and moreover, 
legitimate. Regardless of continued contestation over the means and ends, this 
chapter concurs with Axworthy and Rock’s assessment that the remarkably quick 
and decisive way in which the international response mobilised demonstrates the 
normative value and contribution of R2P to international engagement with mass 
atrocities.127 Furthermore, Libya demonstrates that while it is preferable that there is 
consensus among the P5 for collective enforcement action, for R2P to function it 
only requires that members do not block such action through the use of the veto.  
It was the contention of chapter five that international engagement in Darfur could 
not be understood solely through the lens of R2P. Alongside R2P there were a 
multitude of other factors, unfolding dynamics and events internationally and 
nationally that led to various turning points in the international response. The same 
is true with respect to Libya. Contributing factors to international engagement in 
Libya included clarity of the threat of atrocity crimes, the increasing legitimacy of 
coercive action within the remit of R2P following ten years of debate, and the 
shared realisation among states that diplomacy alone was unlikely to prevent 
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atrocities from becoming real. Unlike Darfur where contributing factors constrained 
international engagement, in the case of Libya unfolding dynamics internationally 
and nationally legitimised escalation of the crisis under the umbrella of R2P. 
Aware that international consensus towards the use of force was fragile, from 
March 2011 onwards P3 statements confirm that human protection activities 
associated with R2P as a normative call to action were increasingly being 
supplemented with the simultaneous invocation of R2P as a policy agenda.  Driven 
largely by an increasing need to resolve tensions around the use of force, this shift 
in focus was central to reuniting a divided Security Council. In effect, simultaneous 
invocation of R2P as a normative call to action and policy agenda led to the 
adoption of an explicit peacebuilding mandate in resolution 2009. Recognising that 
this simultaneous focus upon prevention and reaction has not resolved ongoing 
tensions around the two functions licensed by invocation of R2P, it is the contention 
of this chapter that the relationship between the policy and speech act functions of 
R2P are far more dynamic and mutually reinforcing than the sharp distinction 
suggested by Bellamy.   
6.4 Conclusion 
As a case for invocation of R2P, popular uprisings that occurred in Libya in 2011 
presented the Security Council with a situation that was both unexpected and 
controversial. Libya provided the Security Council with what seemed to be a 
textbook case for invocation of R2P to mobilise international action to provide 
civilian protection and in doing so, prevent mass atrocities. Libya was also unusual 
because of a convergence between perceptions of legality and legitimacy, political 
will and operational capacity, as well as the clarity of the threat of mass atrocities, 
short time-frame and role of regional organisations in supporting intervention.128 
Yet until Libya, prevention had dominated the debate around R2P.129  Subsequent 
invocation of R2P framed the debate as a question of timely and decisive action to 
protect vulnerable populations. While the passing of Resolution 1973 should have 
been a vindication of R2P, it was quickly followed by regret when intentional action 
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seemingly exceeded its human protection mandate. Central to this debate lie 
divergent perceptions of the legitimacy of the use of force without the consent of a 
host state. In this regard, this chapter concurs with Thomas Weiss’ that while the 
use of force in response to mass atrocities ‘is not a panacea’ or ‘cause for 
celebration’ it is a ‘crucial option’ for international engagement with mass 
atrocities.130 
Within two weeks of appearing on the international agenda, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted resolution 1970 reiterating Libya’s primary responsibility for 
protection, and moreover setting a precedent by making its first egregious human 
rights referral to the ICC. Following the adoption of resolution 1970 architects and 
proponents of R2P suggested that these developments represented the ‘coming of 
age’ of the principle.131 One month into the crisis, the Security Council invoked 
R2P to authorise the use of force in response to the failure of Libya in civilian 
protection and to enforce a no-fly zone. However, unlike resolution 1970, resolution 
1973 received a mixed response, becoming the source of contestation about both the 
principle of R2P and international engagement with mass atrocities more generally. 
Libya subsequently became controversial as it divided the P5 between states who 
believed civilian populations would only be safe once Qadhafi was no longer in 
power and others, specifically Russia and China, who believed a political settlement 
was the only solution to the crisis.132 Employing Bellamy’s assessment that 
invocation of R2P invariably involves a choice between R2P as a policy agenda and 
a normative call to action, this chapter finds that deliberations were framed largely 
around R2P as a normative call to action enabling, at least in part, adoption of 
resolution 1970.133 However, from May 2011 onwards following the 
commencement of the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector, concern for a 
longer-term focus to plan for reconstruction and political transition is also evident. 
Moreover, in the latter stages of Operational Unified Protector the P5 referenced 
R2P in both a preventive and reactive sense. This was most evident when 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 G Evans, The responsibility to protect after Libya and Syria, Address to annual Castan Centre for 
Human Rights Law conference, Melbourne, 20 July 2012. 
132 Welsh, Civilian Protection in Libya,  p.260. 
133 Wiiliams, & Bellamy, Principles, politics and prudence, p.273;. 
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peacebuilding measures were adopted unanimously under resolution 2009 (16 
September 2011) while Operation Unified Protector, designed to halt an imminent 
threat of human suffering, was still underway.  
Irrespective of tensions among the P5, the response elicited by invocation of R2P 
made two important contributions. First and foremost, it demonstrated that more 
than ever, inaction is inexcusable.134 While some may remain sceptical, locating 
international engagement within the remit of R2P makes it increasingly difficult to 
legitimise inaction. Secondly, the response to Libya confirmed what many have 
argued for some time, that ongoing contestation about R2P is concerned more with 
how the Security Council responds, rather than the applicability of R2P. This is 
particularly the case where the two more controversial elements of R2P, prevention 
and reaction, are involved. This has had serious implications for the current conflict 
in Syria. With the impact of R2P in Libya ongoing in the form of rebuilding, this 
chapter concurs with Ramesh Thakur that it will be the willingness, duration and 
effectiveness of international engagement to assist political transition and 
reconstruction that will ultimately ‘shape the judgement’ on the legacy of R2P.135  
Until this complete, it would seem the debate around R2P will remain fluid, similar 
to the response it elicits.  
                                                 
134 Statement by the Permanent Representative of France (7 November 2012), S/PV.6855. 
135 R Thakur, ‘Has R2P Worked in Libya?, Op Ed, Canberra Times, 19 September 2011. 
  
C O NC L U S IO N  
Examining how states justify their actions is integral to understanding international 
responses to large scale human suffering. Sceptics of R2P, such as Aidan Hehir, 
argue there is nothing to suggest that the acceptance of the principle by states at the 
World Summit has altered the decision-making process by which organs such as the 
Security Council respond to mass atrocities, aside from expanding the rhetoric 
available to states seeking to rationalise their position.1 Citing reluctance and 
hesitancy to take decisive action in Darfur, concerns regarding measures adopted in 
Libya and the use of the veto with respect to Syria in 2012, critics argue this is 
particularly the case among the P5. Central to this critique of R2P, is a perceived 
disparity between words and deeds. In contrast to this assessment, this thesis finds 
acceptance of R2P by states has significantly expanded the normative and ideational 
framework surrounding human protection in terms of the values, rules and 
meanings that underpin perceptions of legitimacy with regard to state identity and 
interests.2 Despite criticism highlighting variances in Security Council practice, this 
thesis finds that the normative advance of R2P since its articulation by ICISS has 
been remarkable. R2P has become an integral component of Security Council 
thinking and deliberations on mass atrocities, particularly with respect to what the 
P5 regard as legitimate state action. Most importantly, R2P has facilitated increased 
recognition of the relationship between longer-term preventive measures seeking to 
address risk factors underlying a conflict and the shorter-term need for a timely and 
decisive response to halt human suffering.  
Consistent with this focus, this concluding chapter reviews the contribution of this 
thesis to the debate around R2P. To this end, the first part of this chapter reviews 
the research question and investigative framework guiding this examination of 
Security Council practice and summarises the key findings of this thesis. The 
second part of this chapter examines the significance of these findings for 
international engagement with mass atrocities, particularly the increased emphasis 
within the Security Council upon the relationship between preventive and reactive 
                                                 
1 Hehir, Sound and fury signifying nothing, p.219. 
2 Klotz & Lynch, Strategies for research in constructivist international relations, pp.7-8. 
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elements of R2P. Acknowledging that the normative influence of R2P and 
constructivist approach employed in this thesis are often subject to criticism, the 
third part of this chapter addresses counter arguments to both the findings and 
methodology of the research presented here. Seeking to consolidate the 
interpretation of R2P developed throughout this thesis, the final part of this chapter 
considers the consequences of a dual commitment to prevention and reaction upon 
current and future Security Council action under the umbrella of R2P. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that the invocation of R2P has played a 
central role in constituting international engagement with mass atrocities through a 
social process of legitimation. This process of legitimation confirms the dynamic, 
complex and challenging reality of international engagement with mass atrocities, 
which by virtue of its very nature, means that the utilisation of R2P in response to 
mass atrocities does not involve a distinct choice between a policy agenda that 
seeks to address risk factors and a normative call to action seeking to mitigate an 
imminent threat, as suggested by Bellamy. Rather, invocation of R2P by states 
inherently involves both.  
Research framework and findings 
This research set out to examine how R2P has evolved since its articulation by 
ICISS and the broader acceptance by states at the World Summit, to influence 
international engagement with mass atrocity crimes, defined as genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Narrowing the focus of this 
research further, the central question of this thesis is: does the invocation of R2P by 
the P5 within the Security Council necessarily occupy opposite ends of the 
spectrum of choice for states, between a policy agenda requiring implementation 
and a normative call to action, as suggested by Alex Bellamy? In response, this 
thesis has argued that the invocation of R2P involves a rich and complex process of 
validation based on established and codified precepts of what is regarded as 
legitimate state action. Employing Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P by 
states licences two disparate functions, a policy agenda to address risk factors or a 
normative call to action seeking to mitigate an imminent threat, it is the contention 
of this thesis that the international response elicited by references to R2P in Darfur 
and Libya was fluid, demonstrating consistency with both a policy agenda and a 
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normative call to action at different times during the conflict.  In developing this 
response, this thesis engaged in a constructivist assessment of the relationship 
between the Security Council, the principle of R2P and international engagement 
with mass atrocities. The rationale for engaging in a constructivist examination of 
Security Council practice is its capacity to accommodate the multi-dimensional 
nature of international politics, particularly the politically and socially constituted 
environment within which state action takes place.3  
Constructivism as it is employed throughout this thesis is defined as an approach 
within international politics concerned with explaining how social phenomena such 
as shared ideas, beliefs and values, distinctive languages, culture and ideology 
condition state behaviour.4 In a practical sense, constructivism is concerned with 
explaining the role of normative and ideational frameworks in setting the 
parameters for international engagement with mass atrocities, including what 
behaviour is regarded as legitimate and the possibilities with regard to identity and 
interests among states.5 With interpretation a key feature of constructivist 
epistemology, this approach opens up international institutions to assessment of 
their communicative dynamics,6 in terms of the interplay between how states 
interpret the behaviour of other states, the practice of rationalising and justifying 
their action and the response of other states to such reasoning.7 To this end, this 
thesis finds it is the constant interplay between sources of international law and 
practice, or established rules and norms, values and ideas within the Security 
Council that helps to yield a multi-dimensional picture of the organ, including its 
role in advancing R2P through successive adaptations.8 Within this framework, the 
question of human protection under the umbrella of R2P is not just one of legality, 
but to a larger extent, a question of legitimacy.  
Methodologically, this thesis engaged in an interpretive assessment of situations 
where the principle of R2P featured in Security Council deliberations regarding 
                                                 
3 Reus-Smit, Politics of international law, p.14 
4 Klotz & Lynch, Strategies for research in constructivist international relations, p.7. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Kratchowil & Ruggie, A state of art, p.774. 
7 Ibid., p.769. 
8 Lowe, et al. The United Nations Security Council and war, p.18. 
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prominent cases of mass atrocities. Representing two cases where references to the 
distinctive language of R2P were made following the commitment by states at the 
World Summit, the cases of Darfur and Libya demonstrate disparity in terms of 
levels of resistance or accommodation by the P5 towards elements of the R2P 
normative framework, the international response elicited by references to the 
principle and finally, what states conceive as a legitimate international response. 
Within this interpretive assessment, this thesis pursued two lines of enquiry. The 
first was concerned with how the distinctive language of R2P was employed by the 
P5 to justify their actions (or inaction). The second line of enquiry examined how 
and to what extent the P5 engaged with the continuum of R2P (to prevent, react and 
rebuild) in deliberations following a general commitment to the principle at the 
2005 World Summit. Employing Bellamy’s assessment that invocation of R2P 
licenses disparate functions, a policy agenda versus a normative call to action, this 
thesis concurs with Bellamy on two key points, but diverges in its overall 
assessment of R2P.  
First and foremost, this thesis concurs with Bellamy that R2P is about more than 
just an international reaction to mass atrocities. In contrast to its conceptual 
predecessor humanitarian intervention, R2P provides a comprehensive and 
constructive continuum of international engagement that seeks to not only protect 
populations, but also prevent further conflict by rebuilding communities. 
Furthermore, consistent with the documented desire of ICISS to shift the basic 
mindset underpinning international engagement with mass atrocities from a 
narrowly defined culture of reaction towards a more holistic culture of prevention, 
R2P encourages a broader focus that marries mitigating an imminent threat with 
addressing risk factors for mass atrocities. Recognising the link between a state’s 
capacity to discharge its sovereign responsibilities to protect populations and a 
human development agenda, from the cases of Darfur and Libya examined here it is 
evident that peacebuilding has become a key feature of international engagement 
with mass atrocities.  
The second point of concurrence is that the invocation of R2P by states licenses two 
functions. As posited by Bellamy, when states invoke the discursive frame of R2P 
they make a choice regarding how they employ the principle. Taking this 
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assessment one step further, this thesis argues this choice also involves a preference 
regarding which elements of the principle states emphasise to rationalise their 
actions in response to the unique circumstances of each situation. Reflective of a 
broader debate about the relative value of R2P in terms of costs, benefits and 
opportunities to influence international engagement, the choice identified by 
Bellamy essentially represents a choice between making a difference versus 
escalating an issue as a catalyst for action. Invariably involving rationalising action 
in terms of prevention and reaction, the responses of the P5 are significant as they 
affect collective understanding of the role and impact of R2P upon international 
engagement with mass atrocities.  
Supporting this finding, the cases of Darfur and Libya examined in this thesis 
demonstrate that the P5 consider preventive and reactive elements of R2P as distinct 
in nature. In turn, their choice as to which element of R2P they emphasise to 
rationalise action affects collective understanding towards the measures required for 
implementation and imperatives legitimising state action. Where prevention is 
emphasised action is likely to be based on an imperative for proactive international 
engagement to address risk factors underlying conflict so as to prevent a crisis 
occurring, rather than rely on responding to a crisis once it occurs. At a practical 
level this would involve providing assistance to build institutional capacities 
required to resolve societal differences without recourse to violence and persuade 
perpetrators (potential or real) that they are likely to pay high costs for the 
commission of mass atrocities. Where reaction is emphasised the resulting response 
is likely to be based on a moral imperative to halt and avert large scale suffering 
among civilian populations. In this case, highlighting the imminent threat posed by 
a rapidly deteriorating situation elevates the crisis on the international agenda as 
being above normal politics, and in doing so, provides a catalyst to generate 
sufficient political will to mobilise an operational deployment. 
The point on which this thesis diverges from Bellamy is in its interpretive 
assessment of Security Council practice, specifically the practices of the P5 in 
responding to mass atrocities. It is the contention and contribution of this thesis that 
the international response elicited by references to R2P and the relationship 
between the two functions of the principle in cases such as Darfur and Libya, is far 
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more fluid than suggested by Bellamy. Rather than occupy opposite ends of the 
spectrum of choice for states, cases such as Darfur and Libya reflect a range of 
choices. Within this range, rationalisations of R2P as a policy agenda versus a 
normative call to action are not fixed and are often subject to variation by individual 
states, as they seek to recalibrate their position to meet shifting values, interests and 
expectations. Based on the observable variation in the use of preventive and 
reactive discursive signifiers by the P5, this thesis finds the international response 
elicited by references to R2P since 2005 demonstrates varying levels of consistency 
with both a policy agenda and a normative call to action at different times, rather 
than a sharp distinction. This has significant implications for both current and future 
instances of international engagement with mass atrocities. 
The key contention of this thesis is that members of the P5 have collectively utilised 
R2P simultaneously as a normative call for action and policy agenda addressing risk 
factors. This was evident in Darfur where the P5 emphasised prevention as the most 
effective means to counter the crisis through its focus on addressing the root causes 
of conflict, but in June 2008 when confronted with a rapidly deteriorating 
humanitarian situation, also employed R2P as a normative call for urgent action.9 
Collective utilisation of R2P by the P5 is also evident in Libya when peacebuilding 
measures were adopted unanimously by the P5 under resolution 2009 
(16 September 2011) while the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector designed to 
halt human suffering and avert mass atrocities was still underway. The persistence 
and further development of R2P rests on the broad nature of this dual response to 
mass atrocities which embraces both prevention and reaction. 
Research significance 
Taken collectively, these findings confirm that both conceptually and in practice 
R2P is founded upon a dual commitment to prevention and reaction. This dual 
commitment is consistent with the “culture of protection” first articulated by ICISS 
as the basic mindset for international engagement with mass atrocities. In terms of 
                                                 
9 See (24 June 2008) S/PV.5922. 
   
 ʹʹͳ
Security Council practice, this finding is significant for collective thinking on 
human protection under R2P in two ways. Firstly, with R2P founded upon a dual 
commitment to prevention and reaction, Security Council action is directed towards 
the risk of mass atrocities in a particular crisis rather than a defined threshold to 
trigger international engagement, such as the number of civilian deaths. In this 
regard, the inclusion of atrocity crimes in the 2005 Summit Outcome made an 
important contribution to sharpening the focus of R2P and played a significant role 
in the political evolution of IHL, as serious violations constitute an atrocity crime. 
Focussing upon the risk of atrocities rather than a threshold or specific criteria for 
engagement is an encouraging development because it means R2P is applicable to 
both the threat and not just the commission of mass atrocities. Enabling earlier 
engagement in a crisis, R2P has the dual effect of maximising the deterrence value 
of appearance on the Security Council’s agenda and in doing so, provides a greater 
opportunity to prevent mass atrocities before they occur. In this regard the Security 
Council may compel a state to meet its sovereign responsibilities through pressure 
associated with international condemnation and the threat of further measures, such 
as sanctions. The Security Council can also provide direct assistance to a state to 
increase its institutional capacity to protect civilian populations. More than likely, 
as demonstrated in Darfur and Libya, international engagement in a crisis will 
involve a combination of both.  
Secondly, this focus upon both prevention and reaction recognises that R2P is 
founded upon a positive obligation to assist with developing political, economic and 
societal capacity so as to avoid future atrocities. Within this framework, increasing 
linkages between the legitimacy of peace operations to civilian protection has had a 
twofold effect upon Security Council engagement with mass atrocities. As 
demonstrated in the cases of Darfur and Libya, linking the legitimacy of peace 
operations to civilian protection has resulted in wider recognition that the P5 cannot 
ignore the responsibilities of protection set under IHL, IHRL and the principle of 
R2P, if they are to avert further atrocities. At the same time, greater recognition of 
the link between a state’s capacity to discharge its sovereign responsibilities to 
protect populations and a human development agenda has resulted in peacebuilding 
becoming a key feature of Security Council engagement with mass atrocities. With 
legitimacy of peace operations and the Security Council itself firmly linked to its 
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role in civilian protection, it becomes clear that contemporary responses under the 
umbrella of R2P inherently involve a simultaneous commitment to prevention and 
reaction.  
Based on this assessment, it is the manner in which deliberations within the Security 
Council on Darfur and Libya distinguished collective thinking on R2P from earlier 
adaptations by recognising the mutually reinforcing relationship between longer-
term preventive measures seeking to address risk factors underlying a conflict and 
the shorter-term need for a timely and decisive response to halt human suffering. 
The problem with this assessment is that according to Bellamy, states cannot sustain 
a political commitment to prevention and its associated policy agenda to address 
risk factors and employ R2P as a normative call to action to address an imminent 
threat. In direct contrast with Bellamy, Security Council deliberations on Darfur and 
Libya examined in this thesis demonstrate that states do not just claim to focus upon 
both prevention and reaction at different times during the crisis, but in practice do 
both, as the social process of legitimation that accompanies invocation of R2P to 
constitute or constrain international engagement with mass atrocities enables them 
to do so. This process of legitimation is significant as it confirms the dynamic, 
complex and challenging reality of international engagement with mass atrocities, 
which by virtue of its very nature demands both functions of R2P identified by 
Bellamy.  
Counter arguments  
Critics may argue there are limitations in the research presented here because of its 
reliance on public meeting records to examine state practice. Such criticism is most 
likely to be based on the assessment that invocation of R2P by the P5 is not 
representative of a genuine commitment to the principle or reflective of a proper 
debate over its application to a specific situation, but in contrast represents carefully 
crafted rhetoric full of  ‘posturing and pretence’.10  Drawing on the fact that Security 
Council deliberations are part of a broader international discourse around human 
protection and through verbatim meeting records form part of the official narrative 
                                                 
10 Sandhotlz & Stone Sweet, Law, politics and international governance, p.263. 
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and public record of the UN, this line of criticism may suggest that the P5 frame the 
normative claims within their statements with the intent of influencing the discourse 
around human protection and accumulation of precedent through state practice ‘in 
ways compatible with their interests and values’.11 Put simply, in asserting the 
exceptional or unique circumstances of a case, the P5 may attempt to constrain the 
setting of precedent from which general norms or principles can be derived and 
applied to future cases.12 From a similar perspective, abstention from voting, while 
avoiding any compromise to international engagement through use of the veto, may 
be seen as an attempt to dilute the possibility of more robust measures while 
seemingly supporting the prevailing will of the Council.  
In response to such criticism, it is the contention of this thesis that verbatim meeting 
records do provide an insight into the normative reasoning employed by states in 
their interpretation of the legal, political and ethical dimensions of large scale 
human suffering. Furthermore, the case studies of state practice that appear in this 
thesis provide strong evidence that the P5 refer to both ‘analogy and precedent’ as 
they engage in normative reasoning.13 This assessment is based on the evidentiary 
value of meeting records for charting the normative contribution of R2P, in terms of 
silencing opposition and facilitating conformance with collective values, purpose 
and interests. Regardless of whether invocation of R2P by states is driven by self-
interest or more altruistic motives, what meeting records evidence is that R2P is 
inherently about both prevention and reaction.  
Acknowledging international engagement in Darfur was guided by a mix of values 
and interests, meeting records confirm that while the US was adamantly opposed to 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and China and Russia held strong concerns regarding the 
challenge posed by R2P to state sovereignty, each agreed to action which appeared 
to conflict with their declared interests and existing policies. Interestingly, over the 
course of 171 meetings on Darfur between 2003 and 2013 (see Appendix A), China 
demonstrated the greatest frequency in the use of discursive signifiers emphasising 
prevention or reaction (twenty-eight), followed closely by the UK (twenty), then 
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Russia and France (nineteen) and the US (seventeen). In the case of prevention, 
China frequently cited the need to address the root causes of conflict,14 France 
emphasised the need for a comprehensive approach linking peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding15 and Russia stated the need to harmonise justice with peacebuilding 
in order to prevent further violence.16 With regard to reaction, the US regularly 
referenced a more immediate need to “do something”,17 while Russia called for 
urgent action to halt human suffering and the UK highlighted a moral imperative for 
the Security Council to take action.18 In sum, while early deliberations evidence a 
greater focus upon reaction, from 2006 onwards deliberations increasingly focused 
upon the mutually reinforcing relationship between prevention and reaction through 
an emphasis upon the need to supplement peacekeeping with rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and economic and social development so as to ‘uproot the sources of 
conflict’.19  
In the case of Libya, over the course of forty eight meetings between 2011 and 2013 
(see Appendix B), China demonstrated the greatest frequency in use of discursive 
signifiers emphasising prevention or reaction (ten), followed closely by Russia 
(nine), the UK (eight), then France and the US (seven). With respect to reaction 
following the outbreak of violence in February 2011, the US, UK and China all 
called for urgent and decisive action to protect civilian populations while France 
made an explicit reference to R2P in terms of the Security Council intervening 
where states fail to meet their sovereign responsibilities for civilian protection.20 A 
few weeks into the crisis, invocation of R2P by the US, UK and France to 
rationalise measures that appeared to link international action with forced regime 
change, fuelled contestation towards the legitimacy of R2P and the Security Council 
itself. China directed its concern towards the challenged posed by regional socio-
economic impacts arising from the NATO-led operation to the authority and 
                                                 
14 See (10 December 2005) S/PV.5331. 
15 See (23 January 2009) S/PV.6075. 
16 See (13 December 2012) S/PV.6887. 
17 See (25 September 2007) S/PV.5749. 
18 See (11 September 2006) S/PV.5520 and (18 September 2006) S/PV.5528. 
19 Statement by the Permanent Representative for France (31 July 2007) S/PV.5727. 
20 See (26 February 2011) S/PV.6491. 
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legitimacy of the Security Council, while Russia emphasised the responsibility of 
intervening forces to avoid civilian harm.21  
With respect to prevention, P5 statements also evidence direct referrals to 
international responsibility for political transition and post-conflict reconstruction. 
In particular, China suggested the Security Council should play a lead role in 
reconstruction, Russia emphasised the need  to support transition,22 the US 
advocated assistance for reform in the justice sector, re-establishing the rule of law, 
advancing human rights and promoting international law and the UK highlighted 
the importance of addressing the root causes of the conflict.23 The most salient 
evidence of the mutually reinforcing relationship between prevention and reaction 
was the discussions that accompanied adoption of resolution 2009 (16 September 
2011), which cited Libya as a precedent for future application of R2P by the 
Security Council in terms of post-conflict challenges,24 primarily serious large scale 
security and humanitarian issues that need to be addressed in order to prevent 
further atrocities.  
The consequences of prevention and reaction 
Taken collectively, the cases of Darfur and Libya examined here provide 
compelling evidence that R2P is inherently both prevention and reaction. More 
importantly, Darfur and Libya provide evidence of both the mutually reinforcing 
relationship and tension that exists between prevention and reaction. Representing 
two cases where references to the distinctive language of R2P were made following 
the commitment by states at the 2005 World Summit, Darfur and Libya demonstrate 
disparity in terms of levels of resistance or accommodation by the P5 towards 
elements of the R2P normative framework, the international response elicited by 
references to the principle and finally, what states conceive as a legitimate 
international response. Within this framework, an emphasis by states upon 
prevention, including its associated policy agenda to address risk factors, does not 
                                                 
21 See (4 May 2011) S/PV.6528 and (7 March 2012) S/PV.6731. 
22 See (16 September 2011) S/PV.6620. 
23 See (7 November 2012) S/PV.6855. 
24 See (16 September 2011) S/PV.6620. 
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dismiss an emphasis upon reaction and its associated normative call for action to 
mitigate an imminent threat, but rather refines international engagement with mass 
atrocities into a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to human protection. 
Central to this approach is increased recognition of the link between a state’s 
capacity to discharge its sovereign responsibilities and a human development 
agenda.  
Applied to the current uprising in Syria against the leadership of President Bashar 
al-Assad, which began modestly in March 2011but escalated into entrenched armed 
conflict in 2012 following a crackdown by security forces on anti-government 
protestors,25 first impressions suggest state experience in Darfur and more recently 
in Libya, significantly constrained subsequent engagement in Syria. Based on 
allegations of subjective interpretation of resolution 1973 by Western members of 
the P5 in Libya and the buyers regret that transpired among supporters of the 
resolution including China and Russia, fears regarding the legitimacy of Security 
Council action have reignited concerns traditionally reserved for R2P’s conceptual 
predecessor humanitarian intervention. Prominent among these concerns is an 
implied relationship between R2P and forcible regime change. For Russia and 
China these concerns challenge prevailing understandings of state identity and 
interest, including the ideological basis for international engagement with mass 
atrocities under the umbrella of R2P. This has led to the use of the veto three times 
to block proposed action by the Security Council to address the humanitarian crisis 
in Syria. Citing concerns towards the adoption of the ‘Unified Protector model’ in 
Syria,26 in which a desire for regime change provides the basis for international 
engagement with the crisis, in October 2011, February 2012 and again in July 2012, 
Russia and China vetoed draft resolutions proposing various measures to address 
the crisis.27  
Drawing on the collective experience of hesitancy and reluctance in Darfur, 
concerns regarding measures adopted in Libya and paralysis in reaching agreement 
                                                 
25 Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria’ in World report 2013, retrieved 6 July 2013 
<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/syria>. 
26 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation (4 October 2011) 
S/PV.6627 and (17 July 201) S/PV.6711. 
27 Ibid., (4 February 2012) S/PV.6711 and (19 July 2012) S/PV.6810. 
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on how to respond to Syria, critics argue these developments cement the demise of 
R2P. In contrast, this thesis finds that while the actions of France, the UK and US in 
Libya and the use of the veto by China and Russia in Syria may have reignited 
contestation around R2P, it is important to note that concerns generally relate to 
how the Security Council responds and R2P is operationalised, rather than the 
principle itself. Seeking to mediate the tension between prevention and reaction or 
international demands and local needs, the question for the Security Council when 
confronted with future mass atrocities is not whether the international community 
needs to act, to rebuild communities torn apart by conflict or what institutions and 
characteristics need to be reconstructed, but rather how to do so in order to avoid 
recreating the conditions, tensions and unsustainable structures that contributed to 
large scale violence.28  
It is evident from the cases of Darfur and Libya examined here that R2P is 
constantly subject to variations in emphasis by states as they seek to recalibrate 
their response to meet shifting needs, prevailing values, expectations, or mediate 
tensions between individual elements of R2P. As such, the legitimacy of the 
Security Council in future engagement with mass atrocities has become dependent 
upon its ability to consider and incorporate changing social contexts associated with 
IHRL and IHL and increasingly complex and multi-dimensional security problems, 
into its deliberations. Put simply, this means that in order for Security Council 
action to be deemed legitimate, it needs to demonstrate its transformative capacity 
to respond to contemporary insecurity challenges,29 which largely involve mass 
atrocities.  Looking at the cases of Darfur and Libya examined here as 
contemporary examples, this demand for transformative capacity translates into the 
need to incorporate both preventive and reactive elements into international 
responses. Within the Council, the social process of legitimation is important here 
because it implies a ‘measure of social consensus’ has been reached following 
deliberation with relevant agents,30 as basis for transformation. Legitimacy as it is 
employed here is two dimensional. Firstly, it is understood in the substantive sense 
                                                 
28 Bellamy, Libya and the responsibility to protect, p.265. Emphasis in original. 
29 C Reus-Smit, Society, power and ethics, p.280. 
30 Clark, Legitimacy in international society, p.191. 
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to locate shifts in the way ideas and beliefs towards what is regarded as legitimate 
action is conceived and employed by states to contest, rationalise or reinforce 
established rules and practices. Secondly, legitimacy is understood to contain a 
procedural element in that shifts in collective understanding may influence 
institutional processes and organisational outcomes, such resolutions, member 
voting or even the ‘general orientation’ of an organisation.31  
Since its first articulation by ICISS, successive adaptations of R2P by the Security 
Council demonstrate a material improvement in collective thinking towards human 
protection. In its most recent and significant form, collective thinking marries 
prevention with reaction to recognise that human protection under the umbrella of 
R2P is inherently both. With R2P founded on a commitment to both prevention and 
reaction, the legitimacy of the Security Council is dependent upon its capacity and 
willingness to engage in measures consistent with both functions elicited by 
references to R2P, in order to achieve international security within a context 
influenced by complex cases of human suffering. Given that invocation of R2P by 
the P5 in Darfur and Libya demonstrates consistency with the two functions of R2P 
identified by Bellamy, a policy agenda to address risk factors and a normative call 
to action to mitigate an imminent threat, it is evident that the capacity to engage in 
both is not only a core component of international engagement with mass atrocities, 
but significantly enhances the effectiveness of international action to respond to the 
multi-dimensional challenges that characterise large scale human suffering. 
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Appendix A: Security Council Deliberations—Darfur 
Meeting Date Agenda Press 
release 
Action  Statements 
2003      
S/PV.4839 10 October  Sudan SC/7893 S/PRST/2003/16 Welcome agreement between GOS and SPLM-A secured at Naivasha (Kenya). Request Secretary-General examine how the UN 
could support implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. 
S/PV.4877  9 December  Protection of civilians in 
armed conflict 
SC/7947 No action Briefing by Jan Egeland, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator indicating serious 
concern towards displacement of 600,000 Darfurians. 
2004      
S/PV.4978 25 May  Situation in Darfur SC/8104 S/PRST/2004/18 Call for international community to respond rapidly and effectively and on all parties to comply with resolution 1502 (2003) to allow 
full unimpeded access to vulnerable populations. 
S/PV.5015 
Corr. 1 
30 July  Situation in Darfur SC/8160 S/RES/1556 (2004) 
Vote: 13-0-2 
(China, Pakistan) 
Draft resolution (S/2004/611) submitted by Chile, France, Germany, Romania, Spain, UK, US. 
Demand GOS fulfil its responsibilities to disarm Janjaweed militias, apprehend those who have incited or carried out IHRL and IHL 
violations and expresses intention to consider further measures under Article in the event of non-compliance.  
S/PV.5027 2 September Progress of GOS towards 
meeting resolution1556  
SC/8180 No action Responsibility of GOS to protect population and if unable to do so to seek, request and accept international assistance. 
S/PV.5040 18 September Situation in Darfur SC/8191 S/RES/1564 (2004) 
Vote: 11-0-4 
(China, Russia, Pakistan, 
Algeria) 
Draft resolution (S/2004/744) submitted by Germany, Romania, Spain, UK, US. 
Demand GOS submit to AU mission names of disarmed Janjaweed and those arrested for human rights and violations of IHL. 
Request Secretary-General rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry. 
S/PV.5043 24 September Situation in Darfur SC/8195 No action Briefing by AU on observer mission, Abuja peace negotiations, relationship to conflict in South Sudan and link between peace, 
security and development.  
S/PV.5050 5 October Progress of GOS towards 
meeting resolution1556  
SC/8606 No action Need to employ a tripartite approach focused upon humanitarian assistance, security and protection plus addressing root causes. 
S/PV.5071 4 November Report of Secretary-General  SC/8236 No action Need for a three-pronged approach to facilitate deployment of third party AU force, speed up negotiations and end impunity through 
accountability of Darfur leadership. 
S/PV.5080 18 November Report of Secretary-General  SC/8247 No action Responsibility of international community through Security Council, when states unable or unwilling to protect populations. 
S/PV.5081 18 November Closed meeting   Communiqué Exchange of views with Lazarus Sumbeiywo, Special Envoy IGAD; Aminu Wali, AU; and Dr John Garang, Chairman of SLM-AW. 
S/PV.5082 19 November Report of Secretary-General  SC/8249 S/RES/1574 (2004) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2004/903). 
Welcome commitment among parties to reach a comprehensive peace agreement for Sudan by year end, efforts of donor states to 
convene a conference on reconstruction and economic development, the signing of Humanitarian and Security Protocols for Darfur 
and ongoing Abuja peace talks. 
S/PV.5094 7 December Situation in Darfur following 
signing of Humanitarian and 
Security Protocols, Abuja  
SC/8262 No action AMIS deployment reporting shortage of communications equipment, ground transport, fixed-wing aircraft, aviation fuel and medical 
capabilities. 
2005      
S/PV.5109 11 January Security and humanitarian 
situation in Darfur 
SC/8290 No action Need to de-link talks on political future from humanitarian and security. Abuja talks should focus on political configuration of Darfur 
including sharing of power and wealth. AU Ceasefire Commission should focus on the humanitarian and security situation. 
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Meeting Date Agenda Press 
release 
Action  Statements 
S/PV.5119 4 February Report of Secretary-General  SC/8305 No action Require support operation that is catalytic and not turn-key. Recommendation Security Council act under Chapter VI to authorise a 
multidimensional peace operation mandated to assist parties with security, governance, humanitarian assistance and development. 
S/PV.5120 8 February Report of ICID  SC/8306 No action ICID finding of mass violations of human rights no less serious than genocide, but not genocide. 
S/PV.5125 16 February Report of ICID  SC/8313 No action GOS and Janjaweed responsible for large scale atrocities, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, supported by a policy of 
impunity. Credible evidence that rebel forces also responsible for serious violations, including war crimes.  
S/PV.5151 24 March Sudan 
 
SC/8343 S/RES/1590 (2005) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
 
Draft resolution (S/2005/198). 
Establishes UNMIS to support implementation of the CPA, protect civilians by force if necessary and encourage the GOS, SLM/A 
and JEM to rapidly resume the Abuja peace process. 
S/PV.5153 29 March Sudan SC/8346 S/RES/1591 (2005) 
Vote: 12-0-3 
(China, Russia, Algeria) 
Draft resolution (S/2005/206) submitted by the US. 
Establishes a sanctions committee to monitor implementation of measures to freeze assets and economic resources of those suspected 
of violations of IHRL, IHL, other atrocities and offensive military flights over Darfur. 
S/PV.5154 30 March Report of Secretary-General   No action Delay consideration of report until 31 March 2005 at request of France. 
S/PV.5158 31 March Sudan 
 
SC/8351 S/RES/1593 (2005 
Vote: 11-0-4  
(China, US, Algeria, 
Brazil) 
Draft resolution (S/2005/218) submitted by UK. 
Referral of the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the ICC.  
S/PV.5176 12 May  Report of Secretary-General 
 
SC/8383 No action AMIS deployment 2,409 military and 244 police. AU Peace and Security Council to strengthen deployment to 6,171 military and 
1,560 police within six months. 
S/PV.5177 12 May  Sudan SC/8383 S/PRST/2005/8 Welcome leadership role of AU in AMIS. Commitment to consult on scope and nature of possible support for strengthening of AMIS. 
S/PV.5216 29 June Report of Secretary-General SC/8429 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC on volume of credible evidence disclosing commission of grave crimes in Darfur. 
S/PV.5217 29 June Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.5231 22 July Sudan SC/8456 No action One year since first resolution. Key developments include constitution of Government of National Unity comprising al-Bashir (GOS), 
Garang (SPLM/A) and Taha (NCP), lifting of censorship by government and state of emergency (with exception of Darfur). 
S/PV.5269 23 September Report of Secretary-General  SC/8509 S/RES/1627 (2005) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2005/599). 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until March 2006. 
S/PV.5277 13 October Sudan SC/8521 S/PRST/2005/48 Condemn October attack by SLM/A and JEM on AMIS personnel in Darfur. Concern over no visible effort by GOS to disarm and 
hold militia accountable. 
S/PV.5321 13 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/8578 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC on ongoing ICC investigation.  
S/PV.5331 19 December Africa SC/8589 No action Briefing by Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. 
Spill-over of conflict fuelling tensions with host communities and attacks on civilians crossing borders from Sudan. Call for Security 
Council to show a sense of urgency, rebalance security and humanitarian efforts through increased resourcing (personnel).  
S/PV.5342 21 December Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/8601 S/RES/1651 (2005) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2005/812). 
Signalling commencement of seventh round of AU-led inter-Sudanese peace talks (Abuja), extends mandate of the Panel of Experts 
until March 2006. 
2006      
S/PV.5344 13 January Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/8607 No action International support should have a broad mandate, be an integral element of a unified approach encompassing humanitarian, 
political, police, legal, human rights, reconstruction and economic development instruments. 
S/PV.5345 13 January Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Jan Pronk, SRSG Sudan and Salim A Salim, Special Envoy, AU Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur. 
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Meeting Date Agenda Press 
release 
Action  Statements 
S/PV.5364 3 February Report of Secretary-General  SC/8628 S/PRST/2006/5 Welcome AU Peace and Security Council communiqué (12 January 2006) expressing support for transition of AMIS to UN 
operation, request AU initiate consultations with UN and other stakeholders.  
S/PV.5392 21 March Report of Secretary-General  SC/8668 No action Evidence in Darfur of confusion about UN, including Charter, principles and objectives of Security Council. Fear of an Iraq scenario 
playing out. 
S/PV.5396 24 March Report of Secretary-General  SC/8672 S/RES/.1663 (2006) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2006/179). 
Revision of operational paragraphs four and six to expedite planning for transition of AMIS to UN operation and support for AMIS 
during transition. 
S/PV.5402 29 March Letter from Chairman, 
resolution 1591 Committee  
SC/8678 S/RES/1665 (2006) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2006/189). 
Extend mandate of Panel of Experts to September 2006. 
S/PV.5409 11 April Report of Secretary-General  SC/8688 S/PRST/2006/16 Transition from AMIS to UN operation not a challenge to sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan. 
Explanation being sought from Government of National Unity for decision not to renew mandate of Norwegian Refugee Council and 
denial of entry for UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. 
S/PV.5413 18 April Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/8694 No action Continued distrust and mutual suspicion among parties in peace process. Outstanding issues include assistance for IDPs and refugees, 
formula for transfers from national government to states, seed money for reconstruction and development fund and compensation for 
victims of conflict. 
S/PV. 5414 18 April Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Salim A Salim, Special Envoy, AU Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur. 
S/PV.5422 25 April Report of Secretary-General  SC/8699 S/PRST/2006/17 Reiterate support for Abuja peace talks. Accord must be reached by end of month. 
S/PV.5423 25 April Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/8700 S/RES/1672 (2006) 
Vote: 12-0-3 
(China, Russia, Qatar) 
Draft resolution (S/2006/255) submitted by Argentina, Denmark, France, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, UK, US. 
Identifies four individuals undermining a political settlement in Darfur. 
S/PV.5425 25 April Chad-Sudan SC/8702 S/PRST/2006/19 Concern towards spill-over of Darfur conflict, border tensions and refugees with Chad and Sudan. 
S/PV.5434 9 May  Report of Secretary-General  SC/8713 S/PRST/2006/21 Meeting called by US. Seeking broader support for AMIS and transformation into UN operation. Ready to support wider 
reconstruction to facilitate return of Dafurians, but require funding to address threat of hunger, malnutrition and disease. 
S/PV.5439 16 May  Report of Secretary-General  SC/8721 S/RES/1679 (2006) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
 
Draft resolution (S/2006/296).  
Calls upon parties to the DPA to implement without delay, expresses intention to consider taking stronger measures (including 
targeted sanctions) against individuals or groups attempting to block or violate the DPA and accelerate planning for transition from 
AMIS to a UN operation. 
S/PV.5441 19 May  Chad-Sudan SC/8724 No action Briefing by Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs, Emergency Relief Coordinator on visit to Chad and Sudan 
6-11 May 2006. 
S/PV.5459 14 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/8748 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosector, ICC. 
Gravity of crimes central to case selection. Anticipate investigation and prosecution of a sequence of cases rather than case dealing 
with Darfur.  
S/PV.5460 14 June Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.5462 15 June Security Council mission to 
Sudan, Chad and AU 
Headquarters (Addis Ababa) 
SC/8750 No action Purpose of visit to persuade GOS a UN operation is best option for Darfur and address concerns over Chapter VII basis of resolution 
1679 (2006). 
Negative perceptions among civilians towards intentions of Security Council, demonstrations held in camps across Darfur. 
S/PV.5517 28 August Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Jan Egeland , Under-Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs, Hédi Annabi, Assistant-Secretary-General 
Peacekeeping Operations, AU, LAS and OIC. 
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S/PV.5519 31 August Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/8821 S/RES/1706 (2006) 
Vote: 12-0-3 
(China, Russia, Qatar) 
Draft resolution (S/2066/699) submitted by Argentina, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, UK, Tanzania, US. 
Authorises strengthening and extension of UNMIS into Darfur and UNMIS to use all necessary means for protection of mission 
activities, humanitarian efforts and civilians.  
S/PV. 5520 11 September Report of Secretary-General  SC/8823 No action  Darfur represents a test of the Security Council’s authority, effectiveness, solidarity with people in need and seriousness about quest 
for peace. 
S/PV.5528 18 September Report of Secretary-General  SC/8833 No action State security forces continuing to harass all opposition. Engaging in heavy-handed tactics against peaceful demonstrations by 
civilians, human rights violations blocking of UN radio broadcasts and lengthy delays on equipment clearances at Khartoum airport. 
S/PV.5532 
Corr. 1 
22 September Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/8838 S/RES/1709 (2006) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2006/758). 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until October 2006. 
S/PV.5543 29 September Report of Secretary-General  SC/8845 S/RES./1713 (2006) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2006/775). 
Extends mandate of the Panel of Experts until September 2007. 
S/PV.5545 6 October Report of Secretary-General  SC/8848 S/RES/1714 (2006) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2006/792). 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until April 2007. 
S/PV.5589 14 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/8901 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC on ongoing ICC investigation. 
S/PV.5590 14 December Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis, Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.5595 15 December Situation in Chad and Sudan SC/8907 S/PRST/2006/53 Deep concern towards worsening security situation and implications for relationship with Chad. 
S/PV.5598 19 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/8912 S/PRST/2006/55 Endorse Addis Ababa high-level consultation.  
2007      
S/PV.5621 16 January Report of Secretary-General  SC/8941 S/PRST/2007/2 Deep concern regarding continuing instability along borders with Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic. 
S/PV.5670 30 April Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/9008 S/RES/1755 (2007) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2007/240). 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until October 2007 and calls upon all parties to the CPA and DPA to implement all aspects of those 
agreements without delay. 
S/PV.5684 25 May  Report of Secretary-General  SC/9027 S/PRST/2007/15 Transmission of AU report on Hybrid operation (S/2007/307) outlining mandate and structure of UN operation, including ongoing 
efforts required to support peace processes. 
S/:PV.5687 7 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/9036 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
ICC finding that Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior, now Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali 
Abd-al Rahman (aka Ali Kushayb) Janjaweed leader, criminally responsible for fifty-one counts of crimes against humanity 
(including persecution, murder, rape, other forms of sexual violence, torture, cruel treatment, unlawful imprisonment, pillaging, 
forcible transfer of civilians) and war crimes (including rape, intentionally attacking civilians and pillaging). 
S/PV. 5688 7 June Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.5706 26 June Security Council mission to 
Africa  
SC/9061 No action  Reaffirmed need to expand narrow focus on peacekeeping to include conflict prevention and DDR. Progress of GOS on cooperation 
is the result of Security Council maintaining pressure. 
S/PV.5717 16 July Security Council mission to 
Addis Ababa and Khartoum 
SC/9079 No action Draft resolution prepared by UK mandating hybrid operation in Darfur, outlining political process and humanitarian tracks for 
international support. 
S/PV.5727 31 July Letter from Secretary-
General on Sudan 
SC/9089 S/RES/1769 (2007) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2007/468). 
Establishes AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNMID) to take necessary action to protect personnel, facilities and equipment and 
humanitarian workers, support implementation of the DPA and protect civilians. 
S/PV.5735 
Res. 1 
28 August Peace and security—Africa  
 
SC/9105 S/PRST/2007/31 Darfur reminder of how much needs to be done before the international community completes transformation from a culture of 
reaction to one of effective prevention.  
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S/PV. 5749 25 September Peace and security—Africa   
 
SC/9128 No action Hybrid operation in Darfur expression of collective commitment to end crisis. 
President George W Bush (US) labels situation as genocide and calls upon the Security Council to ‘do something’.  
S/PV.5750 28 September Report of Secretary-General  SC/9131 S/RES/1779 (2007) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2007/572) 
Extends mandate of Panel of Experts until October 2008 and requests it coordinate its activities with AMIS and UNAMID. 
S/PV.5752 2 October Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/9135 S/PRST/2007/35 Condemn rebel attack on AU peacekeepers in Haskanita (South Darfur) on eve of Tripoli peace process. Reiterate provisions of 
resolution 1769 (2007) insisting all parties comply with demands and cooperate with deployment of UNAMID. 
S/PV.5768 24 October Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/9156 S/PRST/2007/41 Urgent need for inclusive and sustainable political settlement in Darfur. Calls on Security Council to make available aviation and 
ground transport units required to facilitate UNAMID deployment. 
S/PV.5774 31 October Cooperation between 
UNMIS and UNAMID 
SC/9160 S/RES/1784 (2007) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2007/642). 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until April 2008 and recalls role in facilitating deployment of support packages to AMIS and UNAMID. 
S/PV.5776 
Res.1 
6 November Role of regional 
organisations and sub-
regional organisations in 
maintenance of international 
peace and security  
SC/9163 No action  Five weeks before transfer of authority from AMIS to UN operation short on critical military capabilities including transport units 
(medium, heavy), aviation utility (eighteen helicopters) and tactical (six helicopters). If gap between pledge and commitment is not 
resolved will have to return to Security Council for ground forces despite preference for aerial capability. 
S/PV.5789 5 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/9188 No action June 2007 Ahmad Huran accompanied President Bashir to Darfur as Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs.  
September 2007 released by GOS following investigation for lack of evidence and appointed to committee on human rights 
violations.  
November 2007 government website announces Huran appointed to UNAMID monitoring group with responsibility for oversight of 
deployment. 
S/PV.5792 6 December Sudan SC/9189 No action GOS restricting access to Adilla and Jebel Marra as well as IDP camps near Nyala (South Darfur). Highjacking of humanitarian 
vehicles totals 128, with 118 hostages and twelve deaths.  
2008      
S/PV.5817 9 January Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of the AU-
UN hybrid operation  
SC/9222 No action Ongoing impediments to transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID under resolution 1769 (2007).  
S/PV.5818 11 January Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of the AU-
UN hybrid operation  
SC/9224 S/PRST/2008/1 Condemn SAF attack on UNAMID convoy and demand GOS comply with resolution 1769 (2007). Security Council ready to take 
action against parties undermining peace process, humanitarian aid and deployment of UNAMID. 
S/PV.5832 8 February Report of Secretary-General  SC/9243 No action Challenge of managing gap between expectations of Darfurians and international efforts. If UNAMID fails to meet expectations could 
undermine confidence-building efforts. International community needs to accept this and adopt a more active role in post-conflict 
recovery. 
S/PV.5840 19 February Report of Secretary-General  SC/9256 No action National census in Darfur a continuing challenge, especially political ramifications of an incomplete census. 
S/PV.5849 11 March Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of the AU-
UN hybrid operation  
SC/9271 No action UNAMID not a substitute for political engagement. Urgent international engagement required to encourage and pressure parties to lay 
down weapons and commit to dialogue. 
S/PV.5868 
Res. 1 
16 April Reports of Secretary-General 
on relationship between 
regional organisations in 
maintenance of international 
peace and security and 
conflict prevention in Africa 
SC/9301 S/RES/1809 (2008) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
 
Concept note (S/2008/229) submitted by South Africa. 
Express determination to enhance relationship between UN and regional organisations (especially AU). 
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S/PV.5872 22 April Report of Secretary-General  SC/9304 No action Peace in Darfur no longer attractive politically and economically to DPA signatories, frustrated with lack of political and logistical 
support from international community and GOS. Non-signatories enjoy logistical and financial support. 
s/PV.5882 30 April UNMIS relationship to 
Darfur and UNAMID 
SC/9317 S/RES/1812 (2008) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2008/283). 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until April 2009 and urges UNMIS to coordinate closely with UNAMID. 
S/PV.5891 13 May  Report of Secretary-General  SC/9329 S/PRST/2008/15 Condemns attack on government forces in Omdurman on 10 May 2008 by JEM forces from Darfur. 
s/PV.5892 13 May  Report of Secretary-General 
on relationship between 
regional organisations in 
maintenance in international 
peace and security 
SC/9330 No action Among eighty-one IDP camps, twenty-five per cent participated in the census, ten per cent partially participated and fifty per cent did 
not participate at all. 
S/PV.5905 5 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/9349 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
Despite GOS claims would investigate and prosecute perpetrators of crimes in Darfur, courts and investigative mechanisms created 
but no trace of proceedings in last three years. GOS have clarified there were none. Request Security Council act and send a strong 
message to GOS. 
S/PV.5912 16 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/9359 S/PRST/2008/21 Urge GOS and other parties to cooperate with resolution 1593 (2005). 
S/PV.5915 18 June Security Council mission-
Africa 
SC/9363 No action Security Council discussions on Darfur focused on four tracks required to solve the crisis (peacekeeping, political settlement, 
humanitarian, impunity). Have not seen expected progress in adopting resolution 1769 (2007).  
S/PV.5922 24 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/9370 No action Darfur difficult to resolve, requires simultaneous effort by international community, regional partners, Government of National Unity 
and rebel movements combined with political will to compromise; credible diplomatic, financial and socio-economic incentives and 
disincentives; and active engagement of Darfurians. Credibility of Security Council and those involved in peace process also 
contingent upon follow-up action. 
S/PV.5934 16 July Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views among states contributing troops to UNAMID. 
S/PV.5935 16 July Report of Secretary-General  SC/9397 S/PRST/2008/27 Condemns 8 July 2008 attack on UNAMID military and police convoy in Um Hakibah by two hundred on horses and forty vehicles.  
S/PV.5947 31 July Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation 
SC/9412 S/RES/1828 (2008) 
Vote: 14-0-1 
(US) 
Draft resolution (S/2008/506) submitted by UK. 
Extends mandate of UNAMID to July 2009, underlines need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities for 
protection of civilians and humanitarian workers. 
S/PV.5956 18 August Relationship of Darfur to 
CPA and UNMIS 
SC/9424 No action Briefing by Ashraf Jehangir Qazi , SRSG Sudan. 
S/PV.5979 23 September Peace and security  SC/.9452 S/PRST/2008/36 High level meeting on mediation and settlement of disputes. Darfur example of cooperation of UN and regional organisations in 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
S/PV.5996 15 October Report of Secretary-General  SC/9474 S/RES/1841 (2008) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2008/648). 
Extends mandate of the Panel of Experts until October 2009 and coordinate its activities with UNAMID. 
S/PV.6003 28 October Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9485 No action UNAMID needs acknowledgement by Security Council that risks being taken are accepted as a collective and full responsibility. 
S/PV.6028 3 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/9516 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
Evidence President Bashir ordered scorched earth attack against Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa groups in March 2003. 
S/PV.6029  3 December Chad-Sudan 
 
SC./9517 No action Alleviating suffering and protection of populations from abuses as much a part of humanitarianism as food, water and other material 
assistance. 
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S/PV.6054 19 December Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9550 No action Transition to UNAMID too slow to provide real improvements for Darfurians and inadequate in resolving crisis (but question of 
whether it was intended to). 
2009      
S/PV. 6062 8 January Briefing by UNHCR SC/9566 No action Prevention most important element of R2P. Requires careful, balanced and coordinated action based on a combination of political, 
diplomatic, developmental, environmental and humanitarian measures. Security Council has responsibility to prevent and end 
violations of IL, IHL and IHRL. Example of Darfur cited. 
S/PV.6075 23 January Peacekeeping operations SC/9583 No action Unified voice of Security Council (unequivocal political message) and political pressure from key players critical. Peacekeeping and 
political leverage must work together to tackle larger systemic challenges. 
UNAMID one of the most complex and difficult operations ever contemplated by UN. 
S/PV. 6079 5 February Report of Secretary-General  SC/9590 No action Briefing by Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, head of UNMIS on  pending decision of ICC. 
S/PV.6092 
plus Res.1 
18 March Peace and security in Africa 
 
SC/9615 S/PRST/2009/3 Briefing by Ramtane Lamamia, Commissoner for AU Peace and Security Council on role of regional organisations under Chapter 
VIII, enhancing partnership and resourcing. 
S/PV.6096 20 March Report of Secretary-General  SC/9622 No action Rapid assessment underway to determine impact of expulsion of INGOs and suspension of operations in North Sudan on four life-
saving sectors: food aid, health and nutrition; shelter; water and sanitation. President Bashir forecasts potential departure of all foreign 
humanitarian organisations within one year. 
S/PV.6108 
plus Res.1 
21 April Maintenance of international 
peace and security  
SC/9640 S/PRST/2009/8 Mediation of disputes with Darfur cited as example. 
S/PV.6112 27 April Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9644 No action Compared to 2003-04 Darfur presently low intensity conflict in numerical terms. 
S/PV.6116 30 April Report of Secretary-General  SC/9649 S/RES/1871 (2009) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2009/224). 
Extends UNMIS mandate until April 2010 and requests it makes full use of its mandate and capabilities for protection of civilians, 
humanitarian workers, UN personnel, refugees, IDPs and returnees. 
S/PV.6136 5 June Report of Secretary-General   Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.6139 11 June Sudan 
 
SC/9678 No action Working with GOS on “Sudanisation” of humanitarian activities, in line with UN global policy on building national and local 
capacity.  
S/PV.6169 24 July  Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations by states contributing troops to UNAMID. 
S/PV.6170 24 July Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9716 No action More than five years since Security Council first addressed Darfur crisis. While situation on the ground has changed, no closer to a 
solution. 
Responsibility for peace and stability in Darfur lies with GOS but international community has central role to play in creating 
conditions to support, including provide concrete incentives to reach an agreement and guarantee new agreement will be implemented 
S/PV.6175 30 July Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9721 S/RES/1881 (2009) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
 
Draft resolution (S/2009/392). 
Extends mandate of UNAMID until July 2010, requests UNAMID examine how to maximise use of its capabilities and urges GOS to 
comply with agreements and continue dialogue. 
S/PV.6227 30 November Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9800 No action Briefing by Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations and Djibril Bassolé, Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator, 
Darfur on new peace process in Doha. 
S/PV.6230 4 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/.9804 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC on efforts to encourage GOS to respect its responsibilities, end crimes and 
comply with decisions of the ICC. 
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S/PV.6251 21 December AU High Level Panel Report SC./9829 No action Transmission of AU report. 
S/PV.6252 21 December Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with AU Commission and High-Level Panel on Darfur. 
2010      
S/PV.6257 13 January Cooperation between UN 
and regional and sub-
regional organisations in 
maintenance of international 
peace and security  
SC/9840 S/PRST/2010/1 Darfur as example of partnership with regional organisations that grants local legitimacy to international action. 
S/PV.6269 11 February Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9859 No action Registration process for national elections peaceful but flawed with large numbers of IDPs loyal to Abdul Wahid boycotting 
registration while in West Darfur no numbers available on registration of estimated 747,000 IDPs as centres are outside camps. 
S/PV.6270 
Res.1 
12 February UN peacekeeping operations: 
transition exit strategies 
SC/9860 S/PRST/2010/2 Darfur as example of contemporary operations. 
S/PV.6304 29 April Sudan 
 
SC/9916 S/RES/1919 (2010) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Extends mandate of UNMIS until April 2011 and encourages periodic review of the mission’s concept of operations and rules of 
engagement. 
Draft resolution (S/2010/215). 
S/PV.6306 4 May  Cooperation between UN 
and regional and sub-
regional organisations in 
maintaining international 
peace and security 
SC/9918 No action  Darfur as an example of enhanced cooperation. 
S/PV.6318 20 May  Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9932 No action Three UN institutions operating in Darfur: UNMIS, UNAMID and AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator. 
S/PV.6336 11 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/9950 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC summarising cases investigated to date: 
1. Attacks against civilian population 2003-05 (Harun and Kashayb); 
2. Involvement of Sudanese officials (state) in attacks on villages and crimes committed against displaced persons (Bashir); 
3. Prosecution of three rebel commanders for attack on peacekeepers in Haskanita September 2007. 
S/PV.6337 11 June Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocmapo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.6338 14 June  Preparation for referendum 
in South Sudan and Darfur-
Darfur dialogue 
SC/9952 No action AU pursuing Darfur-Darfur dialogue through High-Level Panel and UNAMID. 
Essential for international community to impress need on parties to cease hostilities.  
S/PV.6347 29 June Maintenance of international 
peace and security  
SC/9965 S/PRST/2010/11 Darfur cited as an example. Rule of law activities in peacekeeping operations. 
S/PV.6360 16 July Maintenance of international 
peace and security 
SC/9984 S/PRST/2010/14 Darfur cited as an example. Optimising preventive diplomacy tools. 
S/PV.6361 19 July Closed meeting  Communiqué Briefing by Assistant Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations, Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, Police Division of 
Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support on UNAMID.  
S/PV.6365 27 July Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9994 No action Comprehensive political solution characterised by secure and stable environment, enhanced rule of law, governance and human 
rights, stabilised humanitarian situation. New negotiations/dialogue underway on root causes of conflict.  
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S/PV.6366 30 July Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/9997 S/RES/1935 (2010) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2010/402). 
Extends UNAMID mandate until July 2011, stresses the importance of achievable and realistic targets against which the progress of 
UN operations can be measured and stresses the importance of early recovery efforts. 
S/PV.6389 23 September Maintenance of international 
peace and security  
Effectiveness of Security 
Council  
SC/10036 S/PRST/2010/18 Darfur cited as an example. 
S/PV.6397 14 October Security Council mission-
Africa 
4-10 October 2010 
SC/10052 No action Visit characterised by ongoing insecurity, restricted access to populations in need and attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian 
workers. Mission found better understanding and political will required to meet challenges. 
S/PV.6401 14 October Report of the Secretary-
General  
SC/10056 S/RES/1945 (2010) 
Vote: 14-0-1 
(China) 
Draft resolution (S/2010/520) submitted by US. 
Extends mandate of Panel of Experts until October 2011 and urges all states to report to the sanctions committee on actions they have 
taken to implement measures imposed by resolution 1591 (2005) and 1556 (2004). 
S/PV. 6409 22 October Report of Secretary-General 
--support to AU 
peacekeeping operations by 
UN 
SC/10067 S/PRST/2010/21 Darfur cited as example. 
S/PV.6410 25 October Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/10069 No action Security Council support required to pressure GOS to create an enabling environment and impose consequences on parties that 
remain outside of peace process.  
S/PV.6425 16 November Report of Secretary-General  
 
SC/10086 S/PRST/2010/24 Core objective of international community in Sudan is peaceful coexistence and to build conditions for conflict affected communities 
to build strong, sustainable livelihoods; democratic governance, rule of law, accountability, equality, respect for human rights, justice 
and economic development. 
S/PV.6441 9 December Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
S/PV.6452 16 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/10121 S/PRST/2010/28 Reiterate willingness to consider measures against any party whose actions undermine peace process. 
2011      
S/PV.6468 18 January Report of Secretary-General  SC/10155 No action Briefing on South Sudan referendum and relationship to Darfur conflict. 
S/PV.6474 26 January Report of Secretary-General 
on deployment of AU-UN 
hybrid operation  
SC/10165 No action  16 December AU High-Level Panel and GOS agree to joint UNAMID-GOS technical taskforce to monitor enabling environment. 
S/PV.6478 9 February Report of Secretary-General 
on Sudan 
SC/10169 S/PRST/2011/3 Positive referendum outcome in South Sudan, implementation in Darfur and UNAMID.  
S/PV.6499 21 March Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Pagan Anum and Mr Atul Khare, Assistant Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations 
S/PV.6519 20 April Report of the Secretary-
General on AU-UN hybrid 
operation  
SC/10229 No action April intervention leads to twelve being released unharmed. Three air crew of UN Humanitarian Air Service abducted in West Darfur, 
detained by government for ninety-eight days. 
S/PV.6521 21 April Sudan SC/10231 S/PRST/2011/8 Important aspects of enabling environment necessary for comprehensive political agreement not in place.  
S/PV.6531 
Res. 1 
10 May  Protection of civilians in 
armed conflict  
SC/10245 No action Darfur cited as example. 
S/PV.6546 6 June Briefing by Security Council 
mission to Africa 
SC/10271 No action  GOS commitment to issue 800 visas still outstanding, support Doha process and lift state of emergency in Darfur.  
International humanitarian staff in Darfur down from 1,000 to 250. Visit dispiriting. 
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S/PV.6548 8 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/10274 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC.  
Crimes against humanity, air attacks on civilians, direct killing of members of ethnic groups (Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa) continue 
unabated during last six months. Crimes consequence of strategic decision by Sudanese officials not by-product of conflict, inter-
tribal clashes or climate change. 
President Bashir challenging authority and legitimacy of Security Council. 
S/PV.6549 8 June Report of Secretary-General   Communiqué Exchange of views with troop contributing states to UNAMID and Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosector, ICC. 
S/PV.6559 20 June Report of Secretary-General  SC/10286 No action Briefing by Haile Menkerios, Chairperson AU High-Level Implementation Panel and SRSG Sudan. 
S/PV.6561 21 June Peace and security in Africa SC/10288 No action Briefing by UN Office to AU (ONOAU), established to support AU-UN partnership and part of contribution to institutional 
development of AU. 
References to examples of Darfur and Libya.  
S/PV.6576 8 July Sudan SC/10314 S/RES/1996 (2011) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2011/416). 
Establishes a UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to use all means necessary for protection. 
S/PV.6583 13 July Special Report of Secretary-
General on Sudan 
SC/10323 No action Briefing on transition from UNMIS to UNMISS, UNISFA and cooperation with UNAMID. 
S/PV.6585 18 July Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations, Major-General Abhijit Guha, Deputy 
Military Advisor, Andrew Carpenter, Acting Police Advisor and states contributing troops and police to UNAMID. 
S/PV.6587 
Res.1 
20 July Maintenance of international 
peace and security—impact 
of climate change 
SC/10332 No action Darfur cited as example in terms of drought and rapid desertification contributing to conflict. 
S/PV.6589 22 July Report of Secretary-General 
on AU-UN hybrid operation  
SC/10336 No action Operation Spring Basket a coordinated effort with humanitarian agencies to expand access to parts of Darfur long been inaccessible in 
North, South and West Darfur. 
Recommends Security Council endorse Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). 
S/PV.6592 27 July UN peacekeeping operations SC/10343 No action Robust posture adopted by UNAMID cited as example. 
S/PV.6597 29 July Report of Secretary-General 
on AU-UN hybrid operation  
SC/10349 S/RES/2003 (2011) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
 
Draft resolution (S/2011/471). 
Extends mandate of UNAMID to July 2012 and requests UNAMID make full use of its capabilities and mandate for civilian 
protection and ensuring safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access. 
S/PV.6621 22 September Maintenance of international 
peace and security  
SC/10392 S/PRST/2011/18 Darfur cited as example of conflict prevention. 
S/PV.6638 25 October Report of the Secretary-
General on AU-UN hybrid 
operation  




9 November Protection of civilians in 
armed conflict  
SC/10442 No action Briefing by Assistant Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs, UNHCR, Director of International Law and Cooperation ICRC citing 
Darfur as an example. 
S/PV.6656 11 November Report of Secretary-General 
on Sudan 
SC/10445 No action Call for better coordination in support of peace process, humanitarian assistance and early recovery in Darfur. 
S/PV.6660 15 November Report of Secretary-General  SC/10450 No action Briefing by Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General Peacekeeping Operations on establishment of new rebel alliances counter-
productive to peace process. 
S/PV.6679 8 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/10477 No action Cooperation between SPLM-North and Darfur rebel movements against GOS . 
A P P EN DI X A  
 ʹͷ͸
Meeting Date Agenda Press 
release 
Action  Statements 
S/PV.6688 15 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/10489 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
Additional warrant for arrest of former Minister for the Interior, Abdelrahim Mohammed Hussein (currently Minister of Defence) 
issued. Played central role in coordinating crimes (recruiting, mobilising, funding, arming, training and deploying militia/Janjaweed 
as part of GOS forces).  
S/PV.6689 15 December Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
2012      
S/PV.6700 11 January Report of Secretary-General 
on AU-UN hybrid operation  
SC/10515 No action December 2011 President Bashir issued decree appointing new governors to Darfur states including two new states East and Central 
Darfur bringing total number to five (West Darfur Governor LJM, all others NCP representatives).  
S/PV.6702 
Res.1 
12 January Cooperation between the UN 
and regional and sub-
regional organisations in the 
maintenance of international 
peace and security 
SC/10519 S/RES/2033 (2012) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
 
Draft resolution (S/2012/25). 
Expresses determination to take steps to enhance the relationship between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations. 
S/PV.6705 
plus Res.1 
19 January Maintenance of international 
peace and security 
SC/10524 S/PRST/.2012/1 Report of Secretary-General on rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Darfur and Libya cited as 
examples of ICC reforms. 
 
S/PV.6716 17 February Report of Secretary-General  SC/10544 S/RES/2035 (2012) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2012/97) submitted by US. 
Renew Panel of Experts mandate 
S/PV.6762 26 April Report of Secretary-General 
on AU-UN hybrid operation  
SC/10628 No action Doha Document for Peace and negotiations for political settlement – JEM and SLA-MM members of Sudan Revolutionary Front 
alliance will only negotiate national, political and economic reforms, while SLA-AW not negotiating until root causes of conflict 
addressed.  
S/PV.6778 5 June Sudan SC/10663 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
GOS failure to arrest and surrender Harun, Kushayb, Hussein and Bashir direct challenge to Security Council authority and 
legitimacy. 
Security Council needs to determine measures to ensure compliance with resolutions. Individual members must reconcile national 
interest with responsibility for international peace and security. In absence of compliance by Sudan, Security Council could ask 
member states or regional organisations to execute warrants. 
S/PV.6759 20 June Peacekeeping operations SC/10679 No action Interactive dialogue with Force Commanders in Darfur. 
S/PV.6790 25 June Protection of civilians in 
armed conflict 
SC/10683 No action Integration of civilian protection mandates into operations, states  fulfilling R2P and importance of political will.  
S/PV.6800 5 July Report of Secretary-General  SC/10700 S/RES/2057 (2012) 
Vote: 15-0-0 
Draft resolution (S/2012/514). 
Extends mandate of UNMISS to July 2013 and requests the Secretary-General include in his reports a summary of cooperation with 
UNAMID. 
S/PV.6806 18 July Closed meeting  Communiqué Exchange of views with Margaret Carey, Director Africa Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operation, and states contributing 
troops/police to UNAMID. 
S/PV.6813 24 July Report of Secretary-General 
on AU-UN hybrid operations  
SC/10724 No action Darfur Regional Authority with support of UNAMID initiated Joint Assessment Mission to assess economic recovery, development 
and poverty eradication required. Provides UNAMID with direct partner to work towards peace. 
S/PV.6819 31 July Report of Secretary-General 




Draft resolution (S/2012/582) submitted by France, Germany, UK, US. 
Extends UNAMID mandate until July 2013, underlines the need for UNAMID to make full use of its mandate and capabilities, 
emphasises Chapter VII mandate set out in resolution 1769 to protect civilians, UNAMID personnel and humanitarian workers and 
expresses serious concern that situation in Darfur has not improved.  
A P P EN DI X A  
 ʹͷ͹
Meeting Date Agenda Press 
release 
Action  Statements 
S/PV.6849 
plus Res.1 
17 October Promotion of strengthening 
of rule of law in maintenance 
of international peace and 
security 
SC/10793 No action Darfur and Libya clear follow-up to ICC. Referrals have been problematic but symbolic of complementary nature of relationship 
between Security Council and ICC. Unity of referral of Darfur and Libya, but deep division on Syria. 
S/PV.6851 24 October Report of Secretary-General 
on the AU-UN hybrid 
operation  
SC/10801 No action Negotiations between GOS and delegation of former JEM executive council to adopt DDPD. 
S/PV.6887 13 December Report of Secretary-General  SC/10855 No action Words of GOS promising peace initiatives undermined by actions on the ground that show ongoing commitment to crimes against 
civilians. 
ICC shares frustration of Darfurians regarding lack of progress in arresting those indicted. Resolution 2063 (2012) expressed concern 
towards ongoing impunity, lack of national proceedings following nearly eight years of reported efforts on part of GOS. 
S/PV.6897 20 December Report of Secretary-General 
on peacebuilding in the 
aftermath of conflict 
SC/10868 S/PRST/2012/29 Darfur as example of cooperation of AU and UN and contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding. 
2013      
S/PV.6910 24 January Report of Secretary-General 
on AU-UN hybrid operation  
SC/10899 No action Breakthrough in Doha negotiations underway since 20 January 2013 between GOS and Mohamed Bashar faction of JEM. 
Root causes of conflict traditionally land, water and grazing now includes precious metals, especially gold (North Darfur.  
Comprehensive and sustainable peace required. GOS holistic settlement of political and economic marginalisation affecting not only 




Appendix B: Security Council Deliberations—Libya 
Meeting Date Agenda  Press 
release 
Action Statements 
2011      
S/PV.6486 22 February Closed meeting SC/10180 Commniqué Call upon the Libyan government to meet its responsibility to protect population, ensure safe passage of medical supplies and 
humanitarian workers and hold those responsible for attacks on civilians accountable, including forces under their control. 
S/PV.6490 25 February Peace and security in 
Africa—Libya  
SC/10185 No action Evidence of Muammar Qadhafi threatening civil war and mass killings if protests continue. Special session of HRC being convened to 
establish international independent commission of inquiry.  






Draft resolution (S/2011/95). 
Demand immediate end to violence, full respect for human rights and international law and accountability for those responsible for 
violence. Authorise targeted travel bans and assets freeze against Libyan leadership, arms embargo upon state and immediate referral to 
the ICC, representing the first egregious human rights referral. 




(China, Russia, Brazil, 
Germany, India) 
Draft resolution (S/2011/142) submitted by France, Lebanon, UK, US. 
Establish a no-fly zone, authorise LAS and member states to take action to implement plus all necessary measures to protect civilians 
(excluding occupation by a foreign force). Prohibits all international flights by Libyan owned or operated airlines, extends sanctions and 
establishes a Panel of Experts to support resolution 1970 Sanctions Committee. 
S/PV.6505 24 March Situation in Libya SC/10210 No action Briefing by Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011).  
Communication from Libyan Prime Minister suggests ceasefire adopted. Evidence of increased violence including use of tanks and 
heavy weaponry to target civilians. AU to convene meeting with Libyan government, opposition and regional organisations to negotiate 
a political settlement. 
S/PV.6507 28 March Situation in Libya SC/10214 No action Briefing by Chairman, resolution 1970 Sanctions Committee.  
Eighteen individuals subject to travel bans and thirteen individuals and five entities subject to assets freeze. 
S/PV6509 4 April Situation in Libya SC/10217 No action Ruling by African Court of Human and People’s Rights (25 March 2011) demanding Libyan government refrain from action resulting in 
loss of life and/or violation of physical integrity of a person and report within fifteen days on actions taken to comply with ruling. 
London Conference (29 March 2011) attended by UN, OIC, EU, LAS and NATO, establishes Contact Group to lead international effort 
and provide political direction, coordinate response and provide focal point for contact with Libyan parties. 
S/PV.6527 3 May  Situation in Libya SC/10240 No action Agreement between UN and Libyan government to facilitate humanitarian access and indicates willingness to accept ceasefire with 
impartial monitors. Role of AU critical in monitoring ceasefire. Allegation NATO forces bombed Qadhafi’s family home killing his son 
Saif al-Arab and grandchildren. 
Consultations with parties on key elements of resolutions1970 and 1973, unrestricted access for humanitarian assistance, securing an 
immediate ceasefire and political process to meet aspirations of Libyans immediate tasks. 
S/PV.6528 4 May  Situation in Libya SC/10241 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
Evidence of widespread systematic attacks on civilians committed under direction of a few members of Libyan leadership, including: 
x Shooting of protestors, arrests, torture, killings, enforced disappearances, rape, persecution for speaking with media, blocking of 
humanitarian access and direct targeting of medical facilities;  
x Use of imprecise weaponry (cluster munitions, rocket launchers, mortars) in urban areas, civilians being used as human shields and 
torture of prisoners of war..  
S/PV.6530 9 May  Situation in Libya SC/10244 No action Conflict, breakdown of state infrastructure, shortages of cash and fuel causing serious problems for population. Fuel shortages disrupting 
supply lines including water from desalination. Schools closed and educational supplies not getting through. Food stocks rapidly 
depleting with only two-three month supply left in most regions. 
A P P EN DI X B  
 ʹͷͻ
Meeting Date Agenda  Press 
release 
Action Statements 
S/PV.6541 31 May  Situation in Libya SC/10266 No action Report on extraordinary summit of AU Assembly. Leaders agree on need for political settlement. Peace and Security Council will 
consider deployment of AU observers and monitors. Pre-assessment for post-conflict peacebuilding commenced by SRSG for Libya.  
S/PV.6555 15 June Situation in Libya SC/10280 No action AU particularly concerned at regional spill-over from conflict. Moral and political imperative to tackle short-term priorities to relieve 
suffering while inscribing action with a longer-term vision. 
S/PV.6561 21 June Peace and security in Africa 
 
SC/10288 No action Briefing by UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU). 
Importance of greater coordination between Security Council and AU. High-Level Panel on Libya as an example.  
S/PV.6566 27 June Situation in Libya SC/10297 No action One hundred days since NATO-led operation began. Arrest warrants issued for Qadhafi, son Saif al-Islam and Abdullah al-Senussi. 
Early preparation for post-conflict peacebuilding and peace consolidation must be part of planning (to be discussed further in private 
meeting). 
S/PV.6595 28 July Situation in Libya SC/10346 No action Both sides willing to talk but emphasise maximum demands for a political settlement. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) undertaking contingency planning for military and police roles in anticipation of a ceasefire. 
S/PV.6603 
Res. 1 
26 August UN peacekeeping operations: 
taking stock and preparing 
for the future 
SC/10368 No action Concern towards foreign forces promoting, financing and supporting regime change under resolution 1973. 
S/PV.6606 30 August Situation in Libya SC/10374 No action Ongoing role of UN in areas of election assistance, transitional justice, policing and humanitarian needs.  
Aim to get personnel on ground quickly under a robust mandate founded upon: 
1. National ownership –to act in accordance with Libyan needs and desires; 
2. Rapid response and delivery –to respond swiftly in restoring public security and order and promoting rule of law; leading inclusive 
political dialogue, promoting national reconciliation, determining constitution-making and electoral processes; extending state 
authority by strengthening emerging accountable institutions and restoration of public services; protecting human rights, supporting 
transitional justice and economic recovery; 
3. Effective coordination – ensuring multilateral, bilateral and regional efforts are complementary with short-term and long-term 
priorities. 





Draft resolution (S/2011/578). 
Establishes UNSMIL with mandate to support preparations for elections, assist in institution-building, promote and protect human rights 
and support economic recovery. Includes mechanism to progressively de-list sanctioned entities and unfreeze assets. Seeks reintegration 
of Libya into UN (with NTC assuming seat). 
S/PV.6621 22 September Maintenance of international 
peace and security: conflict 
prevention 
SC/10392 S/PRST/2011/18 Libya as an example of the use of “all means necessary” to protect civilians. 
 
S/PV.6622 26 September Situation in Libya SC/10395 No action Tripoli returning to some normalcy but security fragile. Post-conflict challenges include addressing national reconciliation and unity (to 
ensure all military groups come under political authority of NTC); establish control over large weapons stocks;secure mass grave site 
near Abu Salim prison (Tripoli) for forensic investigation and accountability; and welfare of African migrants and third party nationals. 
S/PV.6630 12 October Maintenance of international  
peace and security: moving 
forward with security sector 
reforms 
SC/10409 S/PRST/2011/19 Libya as an example of post-conflict challenges, especially security sector reform. 
S/PV.6639 26 October Situation in Libya SC/10422 No action Announcement of Libyan liberation (23 October 2011) but international assistance required to build a democratic state, commence 
reconstruction and achieve prosperity. 
Allegation of war crimes on both sides in latest fighting, including among coalition forces. Death of Qadhafi and son requires 
investigation.  
A P P EN DI X B  
 ʹ͸Ͳ
Meeting Date Agenda  Press 
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Draft resolution (S/2011/699). 
Modifies arms embargo to facilitate further exemptions, terminates or modifies assets freeze on entities, ceases measures imposed by 
resolution 1973 (2011), especially imposition of a no-fly zone. 
S/PV.6643 31 October Post-conflict peacebuilding SC/10428 No action UNSMIL as an example of good practice in post-conflict peacebuilding. 





Draft resolution (S/2011/670). 
Calls upon Libyan authorities to take all necessary steps to prevent arms proliferation and destroy chemical weapons stockpiles. Requests 
the resolution 1970 Sanctions Committee assess threats and challenges of proliferation and present proposals to counter threat. 
S/PV.6647 2 November Situation in Libya SC/10433 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC. 
Arrest warrants issued for Qadhafi; son Saifi and al-Senussi for murder and persecution as crimes against humanity. Muammar and Saif 
al-Qadhafi found jointly responsible as indirect co-perpetrators of crimes against humanity with al-Senussi responsible as a direct 
perpetrator. Further investigation into allegations of sexual violence by security service underway.  Allegations of crimes by all parties 
including NATO forces. 
S/PV.6650 
Res. 1 
9 November Protection of civilians in 
armed conflict 
SC/10442 No action Libya as example of failure of state to protect population and importance of cooperative post-conflict reconstruction and institution-
building. 
S/PV.6668 23 November Maintenance of international 
peace and security: new 
challenges to international 
peace and security and 
conflict prevention 
SC/10457 No action Libya as example of new threats in regional arms and the work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to establish programs in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya. 





Draft resolution (S/2011/752) submitted by France, Germany, Lebanon, Portugal, UK, US. 
Extends UNSMIL to March 2012 and includes provision to support Libyan national efforts to contain proliferation of all arms. 
S/PV.6698 22 December Situation in Libya SC/10503 No action Dual challenge for interim government to respond to immediate needs of population while reforming and building institutions that will 
support aspirations for change and modernity. 
2012      
S/PV.6705 
Res. 1 
19 January Maintenance of international 
peace and security: 
promotion and strengthening 
of the rule of law 
SC/10524 S/PRST/2012/1 Libya as an example of ICC’s positive contribution to accountability and combating impunity. 
 
S/PV.6707 25 January Situation in Libya SC/10528 No action Seven priorities for transitional government outside security sector: civil society and media; elections; public administration; public 
financial management; social service delivery; strategic communications; and transitional justice. 
Briefing by Navanethem Pillay, UNHCR. 
Following liberation, challenge to create conditions necessary for long-term stability and to ensure respect for rule of law and human 
rights. Civil society can play a key role in addressing social and political challenges.    
S/PV.6709 26 January Peace and security in Africa SC/10533 No action Highest priority to reintegrate returnees from Libya while assisting communities adjust to loss of remittances. Recommendations to 
address underlying structural challenges fall into three categories: 
1. Support and capacity-building for national initiatives to address immediate humanitarian, socio-economic and security challenges; 
2. Support for existing regional mechanisms related to control of borders and information-sharing on cross-border activity such as 
human trafficking and arms movements; 
3. Mobilising greater international support through UN/AU to address human insecurity, underdevelopment, security and terrorism.  
S/PV.6717 21 February Peace and security in Africa SC/10546 S/PRST/2012/2 Impact of transnational organised crime on peace, including impact of Libyan crisis on Sahel region. 
A P P EN DI X B  
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S/PV.6728 29 February Situation in Libya SC/10563 No action Government plans for reintegration and demobilisation of ex-combatants nearing completion. UNSMIL assisting Ministry of Justice to 
assert control over brigade facilities housing detainees. Deteriorating situation in Syria led to an influx of refugees to Libya from Egypt. 
S/PV.6731 7 March Situation in Libya SC/10570 No action Libyan wealth in resources and skilled personnel confirms does not need traditional donor support but is weak in institutions. High 
priority for UNSMIL supporting Libyan authorities and civil society to ensure transitional justice processes are anchored in solid rule of 
law systems, institutions and practices that respect human rights.  




Draft resolution (S/2012/146) submitted by France, Germany, Morocco, Portugal, UK, US. 
Renewal of UNSMIL mandate for twelve months.   
S/PV.6741 26 March Peace and security in Africa SC/10592 S/PRST/2012/7 Condemns forcible seizure of power from Malian government.  
Highlights link between humanitarian and security situation within Sahel region and Libyan conflict.  
S/PV.6760 25 April Threats to international peace 
and security 
SC/10624 S/PRST/2012/16 Libya as example of illicit cross-border trafficking of goods and proliferation of weapons. 
S/PV.6768 10 May  Situation in Libya SC/10644 No action Elections a positive development and part of transition, but not the beginning nor the end. Following elections Libyans must commit to 
serious long-term state building. 
S/PV.6772 16 May  Situation in Libya SC/10651 No action Briefing by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC.  
Admissibility challenge by Libya following the arrest of Saif al-Islan Qadhafi. First time a state has requested jurisdiction to conduct a 
national investigation against the same individual for the same alleged crimes as the ICC. 
Abdullah Al-Senussi arrested by Mauritania authorities and subject to extradition by France and Libya. Collecting evidence in a second 
case of sexual violence.  
S/PV.6807 18 July Situation in Libya SC/10710 No action Briefing by Ian Martin, SRSG for Libya and Head of UNSMIL. 
Over 2.8 million voters registered and over sixty-two percent casting votes during elections. UNSMIL working with Libyan government 
to develop first ever Defence white paper. 
S/PV.6832 12 September Situation in Libya SC/10760  No action Attack on US embassy resulting in death of Ambassador Chris Stevens, plus three other US staff and Libyan security personnel. 
Transfer of authority from NTC to General National Congress (8 August 2012), first democratically elected body in over 40 years.  
S/PV.6849 
Res. 1 
17 October Promotion and strengthening 
of the rule of law in the 
maintenance of international 
peace and security 
SC/10793 No action Role of the ICC, with Libya example of relationship between ICC and Security Council.  
First unanimous referral by Security Council to ICC. 
S/PV.6855 7 November Situation in Libya SC/10807 No action Briefing by Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor, ICC. 
Issuance of arrest warrants for Qadhafi, his son and al-Senussi played a crucial role in delegitimising the former authoritarian regime.  
S/PV.6857 8 November Situation in Libya SC/10809 No action Challenges for Libya include institution-building, constitutional processes, continuing violence, IDPs, assassination attempts and 
targeting of security officials. 
Outpouring of public opposition to violence and support for new government provides an opportunity to move quickly and decisively in 
advancing security sector reform. 
S/PV.6882 10 December Peace and Security in Africa 
 
SC/10849 S/PRST/2012/26 Towards a coordinated and more comprehensive approach in Sahel theme for meeting. Libya as example of regional dimension to 
conflict (weapons proliferation). 
2013      
S/PV.6912 29 January Situation in Libya SC/10902 No action Libyan Prime Minister and Cabinet taken up office in Tripoli. UNSMIL providing technical assistance in developing effective 
institutions and processes, supporting women’s political participation, demobilisation and reintegration, development of national security 
policies, legal frameworks, organisational structures and budgets.  
 
